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Abstract 
Several sources of constraints, such as business, financial and legal, can lead 
organisations to outsource some of their IT services. As a consequence, different 
security risks may be introduced, such as confidentiality, integrity and 
availability risks. Analysing and managing the potential security risks in the 
early stages of project execution allow organisations to avoid or mitigate the 
impact of these security risks. Several organisations have adopted ISMS 
standards and frameworks in an endeavour to manage outsourced IT project 
security risks. In this thesis, existing ISMS standards and frameworks have been 
reviewed and analysed to assess their ability to effectively manage the security 
and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects and satisfy their security needs. 
The review reveals that existing ISMS standards and frameworks represent only 
general security recommendations and do not consider variation in security 
requirements from one organisation to another. There is also a lack of adequate 
guidance for implementing or complying with these standards and frameworks, 
and they are not designed to manage the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects. To overcome these weaknesses, a new framework has 
been introduced. The framework is a structured approach that is designed to 
manage variation in security requirements, as well as provide a methodology to 
guide organisations for the purpose of security management and implementation. 
The framework was evaluated using different evaluation methods including a 
focus group, questionnaire, and case study, which were also used to generate 
recommendations and suggestions for improvements. The evaluation results 
confirmed that the framework provided the participants with an effective 
approach for managing security and compliance risks in the outsourcing context. 
It was understandable, easy to use, and independent from different constraints 
such as project size, cost or execution time. The framework is now ready to be put 
into practice by organisations that intend to outsource their IT services partially 
or totally. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, outsourcing has gained more popularity among different 
organisations in both the public and private domains. The Information 
Technology (IT) outsourcing market was estimated at $288 billion in 2013 with a 
5.9% compound annual growth rate until 2018 [1]. The appearance of new forms 
of outsourcing arrangements, such as business benefits contracting and co-
operative outsourcing, in addition to the spread of cloud computing, has increased 
the shift towards outsourcing [2]. Software development, systems maintenance, 
storage operations, and hardware and data management [3], which used to be the 
responsibility of the IT department of any organisation, are examples of modern 
outsourcing business practices. 
The rapid technological changes and heightened competition have forced 
some organisations to refocus their IT work on core and strategic business 
activities and to outsource their routine and non-strategic IT activities to third 
parties, who can deliver such services in a better and more efficient way [3]. 
Thus, the time and effort spent by organisations on building and maintaining 
their internal IT infrastructure are reduced; instead they concentrate their effort 
and resources on how to use information effectively and efficiently, and on how to 
build analytical tools that can provide better IT business management [3]. 
The term outsourcing is not only used in the IT field; it can be used to reflect 
any business practice that involves contracting with external providers for 
delivering specific services. This business practice can be used in any business 
type, and can be used for services such as IT, human resources and help desk 
functions. The growth of IT outsourcing has been influenced by many factors, one 
of which is the increased acceptance by organisations of the Internet as a major 
means of communication. The other important factor is the cost reductions that 
outsourcing can provide to organisations [4, 5]. 
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Outsourcing is an attractive option for organisations, offering benefits 
including cost reduction, quality improvement, and the opportunity to 
concentrate on core business activities [6-8]. However, it is an option that must 
be managed properly as it brings risks, such as security and contract violations, 
and the loss of technology skills for the organisation [7, 9, 10]. Failure to manage 
these risks could lead to major issues not only in a particular project, but also for 
the entire organisation or business [11]. 
As the growth of outsourcing rapidly increases, information systems become 
more complex and comprise different entities. Due to the complexity of 
information systems and the need to integrate new IT services with the existing 
IT services of organisations, security and compliance risks arise as major 
challenges for different organisations that intend to outsource their IT services. 
Confidentiality breaches, auditing compliance, heterogeneity management of IT 
services, continuity management and lack of security awareness are examples of 
challenges that can affect organisations if they are not properly addressed. The 
insufficiency of existing solutions for managing security and compliance risks 
exposes these organisations to different security and compliance risks, such as 
the trust that providers apply proper security controls, the ability or willingness 
of providers to comply with the security policies of the organisation and the trust 
that the provider will not abuse an organisation’s proprietary information or 
knowledge[2, 12]. 
While many organisations have adopted Information Security Management 
System (ISMS) standards and frameworks to secure their information systems, 
the outsourcing context is still not covered adequately by these standards and 
frameworks. Even for conventional contexts, these standards and frameworks 
only represent general security recommendations and do not take into account 
how security requirements differ from one organisation to another [13]. 
Moreover, there is no adequate guidance for implementing or complying with 
such standards and frameworks, nor are they designed to manage the security 
and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects [14]. Updating these standards 
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and frameworks to fit the outsourced IT project context makes them more 
complicated, and increases time and resource consumption. Therefore, this 
research studies how to effectively manage the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects that need to be integrated with clients’ information 
systems. 
1.2 Research Motivation 
Outsourcing benefits have attracted many organisations and have dominated 
their decision about whether or not to outsource some functions of their 
information systems. Other considerations such as security and compliance risks 
have not been given much attention [15].  
The lack of a comprehensive methodology that is capable of effectively 
managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects was the 
major motivation for conducting this research.  
To minimise the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects, we 
propose several recommendations that aim to improve the overall security 
management of organisations. The security programme or framework should 
comprise different features such as aligning security management with project 
management, establishing a comprehensive methodology for managing security 
requirements, managing security risks from different perspectives, managing 
compliance, and improving flexibility and usability. 
As a response to this motivation, we have developed a framework, called the 
OSCR framework (Outsourcing Security and Compliance Risks framework), that 
takes into account the recommendations for improving the overall security 
management of the organisation when outsourcing. The framework is also 
designed to benefit from the strengths of existing ISMS standards and 
frameworks and to avoid their weaknesses, as it will be explained in detail in this 
research. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
In this research, our main question focuses on managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects effectively. To help answer this 
question, two sub-questions were asked and answered in this research. The main 
research question and sub-questions are as follows: 
1- How can we manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT 
projects effectively? 
a. What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing security standards 
and frameworks for managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects? 
b. What are the requirements for managing the security and compliance 
risks of outsourced IT projects? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This research aims to develop a framework capable of effectively managing 
the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. The research 
objectives encompass the following: 
• Analysing outsourcing business practices and identifying their benefits 
and risks, and all other processes and arrangements associated with 
them, as well as identifying security needs for the outsourcing context. 
• Reviewing existing ISMS standards and frameworks in order to assess 
their ability to manage security and compliance risks in the 
outsourcing context and to identify their focus, strengths, and 
weaknesses. 
• Developing a comprehensive methodology (framework) capable of 
effectively managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT 
projects. 
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• Evaluating the proposed comprehensive methodology (framework) 
using diverse empirical evaluation methods to assess the applicability 
of the framework for the outsourced IT project context. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
To answer the research questions and achieve the research objectives, a 
research methodology was developed and put into practice. The following 
highlights the research methodology that has been followed in this research: 
• Literature review: this first step of the research methodology aims to 
analyse outsourcing business practices in order to identify their 
benefits and risks, and all other processes and arrangements 
associated with them, as well as identifying security issues with 
outsourcing business practices. Based on this review, the security 
needs of the outsourcing context can be identified. 
• Related work review: the research methodology, as a second step, 
concentrates on reviewing existing ISMS standards and frameworks. 
The aim of this review is to assess their ability to meet outsourcing 
security needs and to identify their strengths and weaknesses for 
managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
• Requirements identification: the research methodology in its third 
step identifies requirements for effectively managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. The requirements 
identification will be drawn based on the outcomes of the review of the 
literature and existing ISMS standards and frameworks. 
• Framework development: as a fourth step in the research 
methodology, we will develop a framework (the OSCR framework) that 
is expected to effectively manage the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects. The framework should meet the identified 
requirements as well as overcome the weaknesses of the existing ISMS 
standards and frameworks. 
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• Framework evaluation: the final step of our methodology will be to 
evaluate the framework. Different empirical evaluation methods will 
be used (e.g. case study, focus group). The aims of this evaluation 
include assessing the ability of the framework to effectively manage the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects as well as 
assessing its applicability for the outsourcing context. 
1.6 Research Contributions 
The major contribution of this research is the framework. Other contributions 
comprise the analysis of outsourcing, the related work review, and research 
publications. The following briefly describes these contributions: 
• The OSCR framework: this is designed to manage the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects effectively. The OSCR 
framework is expected to contribute to the body of knowledge as 
follows: 
1) Providing a comprehensive methodology for managing the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
2) Introducing the concept of aligning security management with 
project management in the outsourcing context. 
3) Designing a threat classification approach for the outsourcing 
context. 
4) Enhancing security compliance throughout project execution. 
5) Improving security risk assessment by providing qualitative and 
semi-quantitative ranges of the probability and magnitude of 
security threats in the outsourcing context. 
6) Achieving promising features such as flexibility, simplicity and 
continuous improvement. 
• Outsourcing analysis: this analyses outsourcing business practices 
including their benefits, processes, and risks. As a result of this 
analysis, outsourcing security needs will be identified. 
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• Related work review: this provides an assessment of the existing 
ISMS standards and frameworks related to security and compliance 
risk management in the outsourcing context. Their focus, strengths 
and weaknesses will be identified. 
• Research publications: six publications have been produced as a 
result of this research. Section 1.7 provides more details of these 
publications. 
1.7 Research Publications 
During the research stages, six publications have been produced. The 
following describes these publications in more detail: 
• M. Almutairi and S. Riddle, "State of the art of IT outsourcing and 
future needs for managing its security risks," in (IEEE) 2018 
International Conference on Information Management and Processing 
(ICIMP 2018), pp. 42-48, 2018. 
This paper provides analysis of the outsourcing business practice and 
identifies its benefits, risks, and all other processes and arrangements 
associated with it. The content of this paper is covered in Chapter 2 of 
this research. 
• M. Almutairi and S. Riddle, “ISMSs In outsourcing Context," in (IEEE) 
21st Saudi Computer Society National Computer Conference (SCS-
NCC’2018), 2018. 
This publication provides a review of some of the existing ISMS 
standards and frameworks that have been reviewed in this research. 
The paper’s content is covered in Chapter 3. 
• M. Almutairi and S. Riddle, "Managing Security and Compliance Risks 
of Outsourced IT Projects", in Fifth International Conference on Soft 
Computing (SCOM 2017), pp. 33-42, 2017. 
The OSCR framework that has been designed to manage the security 
and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects is presented in this 
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paper. The scope of this paper is covered in Chapters 4 and 5 in this 
research. 
• M. Almutairi and S. Riddle, "Security threat classification for 
outsourced IT projects," in (IEEE) 11th International Conference on 
Research Challenges in Information Science (RCIS 2017), pp. 447-448, 
2017. 
In this paper, the threat classification approach that has been designed 
for the outsourcing context is presented. The paper’s content is covered 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
• M. Almutairi and S. Riddle, "A Framework for Managing Security 
Risks of Outsourced IT Projects: An Empirical Study," in (ACM) the 
International Conference on Software Engineering and Information 
Management (ICSIM 2018), pp. 40-44, 2018. 
This publication presents the evalution results of the focus group and 
questionnaire. The scope of this publication is covered in Chapter 6. 
• M. Almutairi and S. Riddle, “Managing Outsourced IT Projects 
Security Risks: A Case Study," in (ACM) 10th International Conference 
on Information Management and Engineering (ICIME 2018), pp. 21-26 
2018. 
This publication presents the evalution results of the case study. The 
scope of this publication is covered in Chapter 7. 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The following describes the thesis 
chapters briefly: 
• Chapter 1 (Introduction): The research objectives, questions, 
methodology, contributions and publications are highlighted in this 
chapter. 
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• Chapter 2 (Background): It gives background information related to 
outsourcing business practices as well as discussing their benefits, risks 
and all other processes and arrangements associated with them. 
• Chapter 3 (Related Work): It reviews existing ISMS standards and 
frameworks in the outsourcing context. Their strengths and 
weaknesses in managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects are identified. 
• Chapter 4 (Requirements for Managing the Security and 
Compliance Risks of Outsourced IT Projects): This chapter 
discusses the requirements that need to be met in order to manage 
security and compliance risks effectively when outsourcing. 
• Chapter 5 (Managing the Security and Compliance Risks of 
Outsourced IT Projects): The OSCR framework for managing the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects is presented in 
this chapter. It also explains how the OSCR framework tackles the 
problems and weaknesses of existing ISMS standards and frameworks 
in addressing outsourcing security requirements. 
• Chapter 6 (Experts Evaluation): It describes the first evaluation 
method, which involves a focus group and questionnaire. The 
evaluation results are presented and analysed in this chapter. 
• Chapter 7 (Case Study): in this chapter, the OSCR framework is 
applied to real outsourced IT projects and the results are discussed and 
analysed. 
• Chapter 8 (Conclusion): It summarises the research and provides 
future directions for extending this work. 
1.9 Research Definitions 
• Information System: “A discrete set of information resources organized 
for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, 
or disposition of information” [16]. 
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• Information Technology: “Any equipment or interconnected system or 
subsystem of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, 
storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, 
switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or 
information by the executive agency” [16]. 
• IS Outsourcing: “The organizational decision to turn over part or all of 
an organization’s IS functions to external service provider(s) in order for 
an organization to be able to achieve its goals” [3]. 
• Information Security: “The protection of information and information 
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability” [16]. 
• Information Security Management System (ISMS): “that part of the 
overall management system, based on a business-risk approach, to 
establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain and improve 
information security” [17]. 
• Confidentiality: “Preserving authorized restrictions on information 
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy 
and proprietary information” [16]. 
• Integrity: “Guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and 
authenticity” [16]. 
• Availability: “Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information” [16]. 
• Risk: “A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a 
potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the 
adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; 
and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” [16]. 
• Threat: “Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely 
impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, 
or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, 
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or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized access, 
destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of 
service” [16]. 
• Assets: any project resources (software, hardware, information, etc.) 
tangible or intangible that represent a value for the project and the 
organization [18]. 
• Vulnerability: “A weakness in an information system, system security 
procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited 
by a threat” [19].  
• Countermeasures: “A technique or a process which helps to achieve one 
or more security goals and helps to mitigate risks to information and 
vulnerabilities in an IS” [20].  
• Information Security Framework: “is a series of documented 
processes that are used to define policies and procedures around the 
implementation and ongoing management of information security 
controls in an enterprise environment” [21] 
• Information Security Standard: “documented agreements containing 
exact criteria that must be followed consistently as rules, guidelines or 
definitions of characteristics to ensure that any materials, products, 
processes or services are fit for their purpose” [22] 
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Chapter 2 Background 
This chapter provides background information related to outsourcing 
business practices. Before we proceed to the next stages of this research, it is 
important to understand outsourcing business practices, their benefits and risks, 
and all other processes and arrangements associated with them. This will allow 
us to identify outsourcing security issues and needs for managing the security 
and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
2.1 Introduction 
As a result of globalisation and heightened competition, many organisations 
today find it difficult to develop services that satisfy customers’ needs; these 
needs need to be met on time, despite the organisation’s resource limits, so that 
the organisation can compete effectively [23]. With the emergence of cloud 
computing, and advancements in web technology, challenges and customers’ 
demands increase. Hence, organisations recognise the need to consider potential 
alternatives that help them to meet such tremendous demands and improve their 
agility [24]. 
In response to these challenges and demands, many organisations consider 
outsourcing as a choice for delivering and improving their Information 
Technology (IT) services. Over the last two decades, Information Systems (IS) 
outsourcing has grown rapidly. Indeed, this growth has attracted academia and 
industry to investigate the outsourcing benefits that organisations could gain 
from outsourcing, as well as the outsourcing risks that might be encountered and 
which should be avoided when adopting such a choice. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: we discuss the types of 
outsourcing arrangements in Section 2.2. We highlight the outsourcing process in 
Section 2.3, and we discuss outsourcing benefits and risks in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 
respectively. In Section 2.6, we present security issues with outsourcing. In 
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Section 2.7, outsourcing security needs are presented. We summarise this 
chapter in Section 2.8. 
2.2 Outsourcing Arrangement 
Outsourcing arrangements can be categorised into four types [4]: general 
outsourcing, transitional outsourcing, business process outsourcing, and business 
benefit contracting. These types are summarised as follows: 
2.2.1 General Outsourcing 
This type of outsourcing has three possibilities: 
 Selective outsourcing 
The organisation chooses one area from its information system functions to be 
run by a third party, such as disaster recovery (DR) operations. The decision to 
outsource any specific area should be aligned with the organisation’s strategic 
plan, and return the expected value to the organisation [4, 25].  
 Value-added outsourcing 
Some areas of information system functions are carried out by a third party 
who is believed to add higher value to the service or support, and which cannot be 
achieved by the organisation at an appropriate cost [4, 26]. 
 Co-operative outsourcing 
The organisation and the third party co-operate jointly to perform specific 
tasks in the organisation’s information system [27]. The organisation benefits 
from the third party’s skills and knowledge and these tasks are performed 
effectively. As a result of such joint cooperation, the third party’s knowledge and 
skills will be transferred to the organisation’s staff [4]. 
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2.2.2 Transitional Outsourcing 
In this option, the organisation decides to replace their technical platform by 
another one through a third party. This replacement might be due to a new 
technology need, cost reductions, or any other reasons [4, 28]. It involves three 
phases: 
• Legacy system management. 
• New technology management. 
• New platform management and stabilisation. 
2.2.3 Business Process Outsourcing 
In this option, a third party runs all the functions of the business on behalf of 
the organisation [4, 29]. Although this option is relatively new, many 
organisations consider it as a new opportunity to gain more benefits and compete 
effectively. Examples of this option may include call centres, help desks, and 
document processing functions. 
2.2.4 Business Benefit Contracting 
In this option of an outsourcing arrangement, an organisation seeks specific 
business benefits, which they believe will be delivered effectively by a third-party 
provider. The organisation subcontracts with the third party, and defines the 
business benefits that the third party will achieve for the organisation in a 
specific period of time. Moreover, it defines the organisation’s way of paying the 
third party when the agreed business benefits have been achieved. The rationale 
behind this option is to match the cost being paid with the benefits being 
received. However, this option is not widely adopted. The main reasons for not 
adopting this option are the difficulties in measuring agreed benefits, and the 
uncertain revenue for the provider that is associated with this specific option of 
outsourcing [4]. 
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2.3 Outsourcing Process 
Outsourcing involves creating and managing a contractual agreement 
between an organisation and a third party. This process defines the services and 
obligations that both parties should achieve through this relationship. Despite 
the difficulty of identifying an accurate outsourcing process category that reflects 
the actual practice of the outsourcing process, a great deal of work has been done 
by researchers to categorise the outsourcing process. Some researchers have 
elaborated and proposed a very detailed outsourcing process, whereas others 
have proposed a very limited outsourcing process. The authors in [30] and [31] 
propose six phases for the outsourcing process. Each phase has many detailed 
activities. On the other hand, the authors in [32] propose three phases for the 
outsourcing process. Other authors have proposed five phases [33]. 
Despite the differences in defining an accurate outsourcing process, the 
outsourcing process encompasses four major phases. Those phases are Planning, 
Implementation, Operation, and Closing. Each phase consists of different 
activities. The four phases are summarised as follows [33]: 
2.3.1 Planning Phase 
At this phase, the organisation should explore and validate the reasons that 
make outsourcing an appropriate option. Expected benefits and possible 
alternatives should be identified and analysed, as well as the strategy being used 
in the outsourcing process. Vendors are evaluated using specific criteria set by 
the organisation at this phase too. The aim of this evaluation is to select the 
appropriate provider. Vendors’ evaluation is based on their responses to the 
Request For Proposal (RFP) issued by the organisation. Other factors may 
influence the result of the evaluation, such as the budget allocated to the project. 
Moreover, this phase involves contract negotiation and signing with the selected 
vendor. By the end of this phase, answers to the following questions should have 
been clearly identified: What to outsource? To whom to outsource? 
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2.3.2 Implementation Phase 
 Having answered the question about who to outsource to, and having signed 
the contract with the selected vendor, the services planned at the previous phase 
are put into practice. Human resources adjustment and communication 
management, in addition to relationship management, are carried out at this 
phase too. The relationship between the two parties involved in the outsourcing 
process (the vendor and the organisation) is controlled through the contract. A 
successful relationship relies on the way that both parties manage the 
relationship. 
2.3.3 Operation Phase 
At this phase, the services that have been developed at the implementation 
phase are operated and monitored by the provider. Any issues or defects are 
analysed and fixed in order to meet the organisation’s requirements. 
2.3.4 Closing Phase 
At this phase, the organisation evaluates the outsourcing relationship in 
terms of the benefits that have been achieved, and it analyses the lessons 
learned. Moreover, the organisation should assess whether to extend this 
contract or not, and what process changes need to be implemented for this 
contract or any other contracts in order to gain the greatest possible benefits. 
Although this phase is usually carried out just before the contract ends, it might 
be carried out at any time of the contract, especially when there are some 
indicators that might affect the contract, such as contract violations by the 
vendor. 
2.4 Outsourcing Benefits 
Although the development of information system services can be seen as the 
responsibility of the organisation’s computing department in general, different 
organisations adopt IS outsourcing because it provides many economic benefits, 
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in a business world where competition can increase rapidly [26, 34, 35]. Such 
benefits have increased the popularity of outsourcing, not only in IT 
organisations, but in different types of businesses such as financial firms, call 
centres and insurance firms [36]. Those benefits that may lead to outsourcing 
information system functions either partially or totally are summarised as 
follows: 
2.4.1 Cost Reduction 
The financial factor is one of the major factors that has strongly influenced IS 
outsourcing. By outsourcing some of their IS functions, organisations have access 
to the providers’ qualified experts. Hence, organisations neither need to hire IT 
consultants for a long time to run some IS functions that require some expertise, 
nor do they need training programmes, which add extra costs [34]. As a result, 
the organisation will have the ability to reallocate its key personnel to core 
business functions, which usually are not outsourced. Such reallocation could 
enhance productivity and increase the overall profit [6]. 
2.4.2 Enable Concentration on Core Business Activities 
Many organisations experience difficulties in focusing on all business 
activities and achieving excellence across the board when delivering services to 
their customers. When focusing on all business activities, an organisation’s 
personnel are made responsible for achieving all of the organisational goals, 
whether they are strategic or not, which might overload them and negatively 
affect their creativity. Hence, outsourcing non-strategic activities could help 
organisations to focus on their core strategic activities, rather than concentrating 
on all of them at the same time, which might consume the organisation’s 
resources and result in a loss of competences. Organisation executives should 
decide what will be considered as a core activity for the business and what will be 
not. All activities that contribute to the success of the business (normally carried 
out internally) are widely considered as core business activities. Moreover, 
activities that might add a high value to the organisation, for example enabling it 
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to compete effectively or affecting its growth, should be considered core activities 
as well [37]. 
2.4.3 Flexibility Improvement 
The enormous changes in IT that have resulted from the rapid advancements 
in this field add extra challenges to organisations. Responding to these changes 
may require a great deal of investment by organisations to upgrade their IS and 
to obtain the required support to run and maintain the upgraded part of the 
system. Although organisations may vary in their responses to upgrading their 
IS with the latest technology, upgrading gives organisations the ability to access 
new resources. This in turn might improve their agility and their ability to 
provide their customers with competitive services. Outsourcing could help 
organisations to deal with such challenges. Organisations may design their third 
parties’ contracts so that they respond properly to these changes and meet their 
IT needs. However, changes are not only experienced in IT; customer needs are 
also continuously changing. Different organisations consider outsourcing as a 
business practice that helps to improve their response to business changes and 
customers’ needs [38]. 
2.4.4 Quality Improvement 
Quality of services is one of the reasons why organisations decide to outsource 
some of their information system functions. Many organisations consider 
delivering high-quality services to their customers an important element of 
creating a good reputation. Therefore, when outsourcing, third parties should 
provide services that are higher in quality than those that have been achieved 
previously by the organisation [8, 39]. Providers may be able to achieve higher 
quality services for a number of reasons. One reason is that most providers are 
specialised in specific IT areas, such as software development, or one specific 
technology such as cloud computing. This specialisation means that they have 
spent a long time working in that specific IT area, and they have therefore gained 
a great deal of relevant skills, which enable them to perform their tasks 
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effectively. Training programmes that providers offer to their staff could also 
improve their efficiency in delivering high-quality services. Another reason is 
that providers have more access to new technologies, which afford them 
advantages in managing their tasks. This could contribute to improving 
coordination and control, and it motivates staff to do their jobs effectively. 
2.4.5 Minimising Routine Tasks 
Being able to concentrate on strategic activities is a major success factor in 
any organisation that needs to compete effectively. Although many organisations 
have their own information system experts, they are not utilised in a way that 
promotes competiveness. Experts are influenced by routine tasks such as system 
maintenance operations. Routine tasks may take much of their time and 
probably do not add much value to the organisation. To avoid overloading 
information system experts, many organisations have realised that experts 
should focus only on tasks that add higher value to the organisation. Different 
organisations have turned over their routine tasks to third-party providers in an 
effort to focus on core business activities that create competitive value for the 
organisation. Consequently, greater efficiency can be achieved as deeper 
knowledge can be gained through specific training as a result of this 
concentration. This enhances organisations’ ability to deliver better services to 
their customers with lower costs [40]. 
2.4.6 Minimising the Obsolescence Risk 
The risk of technology obsolescence is another reason why organisations 
decide to outsource some of their information system activities. The rapid 
advancement of IT leaves organisations with two options. The first one is to 
invest in their IT more often, in order to access the latest technology, which could 
help to improve the services they deliver to their customers. Consequently, this 
will increase the cost of their information system and affect their overall profit. 
The second option is to continue using their current information system with 
minimal upgrades to the latest technologies. However, this option is not even 
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beneficial. The organisation will miss the opportunity to access the latest 
technologies, which could have improved their ability to deliver better services at 
a lower cost. Organisations may encounter extra expenditures when mandatory 
new technology is implemented, for example training programmes will be 
required for staff to refresh their knowledge and skills. Outsourcing could provide 
an appropriate solution for these difficulties. If contracts with third parties are 
designed properly, organisations could access the latest technologies and be 
relieved from the obsolescence risk, as it will be the provider’s responsibility [1]. 
2.5 Outsourcing Risks 
Although outsourcing is becoming widespread among different organisations 
due to the benefits that it can provide, it is also associated with different risks 
that need to be addressed and managed properly, otherwise they could lead to 
major failures, not only in one particular project, but over the entire organisation 
[11]. Some organisations might overstate the benefits that third parties can 
achieve at the beginning of projects, which improves their first impressions. The 
benefits achieved early on may lead to the organisation neglecting risk 
management and failing to control identified risks throughout the project. As a 
result, some of these identified risks may become reality, seriously affecting the 
expected benefits from outsourcing. In the literature, researchers have identified 
different risks associated with outsourcing. Those risks are summarised as 
follows: 
2.5.1 Security Risks 
Confidentiality, which refers to protecting information from being disclosed to 
unauthorised users, is a major security issue [41]. The issue of confidentiality in 
outsourced projects arises from the nature of the work carried out by third-party 
providers. They are more likely to discover clients’ business secrets related to 
financial affairs, services or technologies, as they work with different 
organisations. Disclosing business secretes, intentionally or by mistake, may 
result in real consequences for the organisation, such as a loss of competences or 
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reputation [42]. Organisations that intend to outsource some of their information 
system functions should consider this risk seriously before starting any 
outsourced project. Decisions about security policies, in addition to security 
controls that fulfil confidentiality criteria, should be taken by the organisation 
itself. Technical aspects that protect confidentiality could additionally contribute 
to minimising this risk. Relying only on security polices and technical security 
controls might be not enough to protect confidentiality. Such drawbacks might be 
mitigated by Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs), comprehensive Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs), and contract terms [43]. 
2.5.2 Contract Violations 
Outsourcing with a third-party provider is intended to achieve particular 
requirements. When an organisation takes the decision to outsource some or all 
of its information system functions, all of the requirements for this project are 
identified and announced in the Request For Proposal (RFP) document that 
organisations usually use in outsourcing projects. Providers use this RFP to 
respond to the organisation’s requirements and to propose solutions that meet 
these requirements. Nevertheless, not all RFPs are written in a way that 
providers can discern the requirements accurately. Therefore, contract violation 
issues may arise from a lack of clarity over the project requirements in the 
client’s RFP. This might affect the preferred provider’s (the winner’s) ability to 
meet the project requirements as expected [44]. 
Misunderstanding project requirements is not the only reason for contract 
violation. Other reasons may contribute to this issue. Some providers may 
propose ideal solutions with reasonable costs that suit the project budget 
allocated by the organisation. Nevertheless, when the provider executes the 
project, the organisation realises that the solutions being executed do not match 
what has been proposed, whether in a small or a large way. This difference may 
stem from the provider’s plan to reduce costs in order to increase its overall 
profit; or it might stem from the provider’s inability to achieve what has been 
proposed due to insufficient technical experts. 
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2.5.3 Loss of Technology Skills 
The issue of losing technology knowledge and skills is another issue that 
might be encountered by organisations when outsourcing some of their 
information system functions. In outsourcing, most services are delivered by the 
provider without any participation from the organisation’s staff. Non-
participation in the development and delivery of services will gradually lead to a 
dependency on the provider’s staff for these particular services. By the end of the 
contract, the organisation may realise that the required technical skills and 
knowledge to run such services have not been gained by its staff. Hence, the 
organisation needs to consider this issue carefully before entering any outsourced 
contract, in order to avoid any technical dependency. Both parties, the 
organisation and the provider, need to work together to develop a knowledge 
transfer plan for technical skills. This will allow the organisation’s personnel to 
be technically able to run these services when the contract ends. The plan should 
be put into practice at the early stages of the project’s execution and it should be 
monitored carefully to ensure that it achieves its aim. Nevertheless, core services 
should be kept inside the organisation to avoid any loss of capability to innovate 
services that allow the organisation to compete effectively [45]. 
2.5.4 Inadequate Provider Qualifications 
Many organisations consider outsourcing as an appropriate solution to access 
the latest technologies and to employ technical experts at an appropriate cost. 
Nevertheless, not all providers meet organisations’ expectations in this regard 
[46]. Different reasons may contribute to this issue, although there are some 
variations between providers. The issue might arise at the early stages of the 
project’s execution as some providers want to find staff who have a good 
background in the client’s information system and its infrastructure. Those staff 
will transfer the required knowledge to the provider’s staff and participate in 
delivering services to the client. Previous qualified staff of the client could add a 
high value to the project, but that is not always the case. The problem arises 
when unqualified staff are hired for developing and delivering services to the 
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client. As a result, the client finds that its unqualified staff are working on its 
project. 
This risk also may arise when a provider has many projects with limited key 
personnel. The provider may move key personnel to another important project or 
may allocate them to achieve some tasks for a short time with each project. As a 
result, key personnel may lose their concentration and ability to develop 
innovative services. 
2.5.5 Hidden Costs 
Cost reduction is one of the main drivers for organisations to outsource their 
information system functions partially or totally. However, many organisations 
may realise that this benefit is not effectively achieved. This may be due to a 
failure to accurately estimate the overall cost when deciding to outsource some 
functions to a provider. These estimates usually take into account only the 
expected cost of delivering particular services requested by the organisation. 
They should, however, take into account other factors that affect the overall cost 
of the outsourcing. This includes costs encountered by the organisation when 
looking for and evaluating different providers, in order to select the most suitable 
provider for the organisation. Additionally, at the beginning of the project, the 
provider’s staff need to have some sort of knowledge transfer to ease their 
understanding of the client’s IS. Knowledge transfer is conducted by the client’s 
staff and the cost of this process should be included when estimating the overall 
project budget. The other costs that should be included are the costs of overseeing 
the project and the provider’s staff, and the costs involved with managing the 
contract. If the organisation understands the real cost of outsourcing, it can more 
accurately assess and decide whether to outsource or not, and avoid hidden costs 
[47]. 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the benefits and risks of outsourcing that 
have been presented in this chapter. 
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Table 2.1: Outsourcing Benefits and Risks Summary 
Outsourcing Benefits Outsourcing Risks 
Cost Reduction Security Risks 
Concentration on Core Business Activities Contract Violations 
Flexibility Improvement Loss of Technology Skills 
Quality Improvement Inadequate Provider Qualifications 
Minimising Routine Tasks Hidden Costs 
Minimising the Obsolescence Risk   
2.6 Outsourcing Security Issues 
Despite the fast growth of outsourcing, there are particular security issues 
that need to be analysed and monitored by organisations to mitigate their 
potential impact. Several studies have identified a great deal of security issues 
with outsourcing [2, 12, 48-50]. However, providing a complete list of outsourcing 
security issues seems to be difficult for several reasons (e.g. technology changes, 
level of IS complexity, etc.). Instead, security issues can be broadly classified into 
four categories [2, 48, 49]: organisational, technical, human, and physical and 
environmental. The following sub-sections provide more details about these 
categories and offer examples of security issues related to these four categories. 
2.6.1 Organisational Security Issues 
 This category represents issues related to the security practices of the 
organisation (the client) or the provider. The following are examples of security 
issues belonging to this category: 
• Lack of security policies and procedures. 
• Lack of clarity of security requirements. 
• Lack of or inadequate asset management. 
• Lack of clarity in contract conditions between the two parties (the 
client and provider). 
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2.6.2 Technical Security Issues 
This category involves issues that might arise due to technical issues. 
Examples of technical security issues include: 
• Software application bugs. 
• Improper firewall configuration. 
• Improper user event log. 
• Lack of intrusion detection system. 
2.6.3 Human Security Issues 
 This category represents security issues that might arise due to human 
issues. The following provides some examples of human security issues: 
• Lack of security awareness. 
• Absence of NDA. 
• Human errors. 
2.6.4 Physical and Environmental Security Issues 
In this category, issues related to physical and environmental conditions are 
involved. Examples of these issues include: 
• Lack of temperature controlled system. 
• Lack of fire resistance system. 
• Lack of physical access control. 
2.7 Outsourcing Security Needs 
As the growth of outsourcing rapidly increases, ISs become more complex and 
involve different entities. Outsourcing is not always beneficial; security risks are 
associated with it, such as confidentiality, compliance, availability of services and 
so on. It is understood that IT outsourcing might face same traditional security 
risks [51]. However, when it comes to managing the security and compliance 
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risks of outsourced IT projects effectively, a comprehensive methodology should 
be in place. This should address all potential security risks of IT outsourcing and 
propose effective security controls that mitigate their impact. The lack of such a 
methodology raises the question of whether or not the existing methodologies are 
applicable for the outsourcing context [12]. Before answering this question, 
particular outsourcing security needs should be determined, in order to assess 
the applicability of the existing methodologies in the outsourcing context. The 
following highlights the security needs for the outsourcing context [52-55]: 
• Security requirements management: the security programme or 
framework should be comprehensive and systematic as well as 
establishing a complete methodology that is capable of adequately 
managing the security requirements of outsourced IT projects. This 
includes information security policies, communications and operations 
management, access controls, IS acquisition, development, and 
maintenance, asset management, incident management and business 
continuity management. 
• Risk Management: Security risks are not only technical; therefore, the 
security programme should manage risks from different perspectives 
such as technical, human, and environmental and physical risks. 
• Consideration of Outsourced IT Projects: to mitigate the security risks 
of outsourced IT projects, the ISMS should establish a method that 
takes into consideration the outsourcing context. 
• Compliance management: The security programme should establish a 
method to enforce compliance properly. 
• Usability: The security program should be usable in the outsourcing 
context from different perspectives such as cost effectiveness, time 
efficiency and simplicity. 
2.8 Summary 
IS plays a major role in the modern businesses of most organisations. 
Although developing and maintaining the IS are traditionally seen as the 
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organisation’s responsibility, many organisations consider outsourcing to be an 
attractive alternative.  
Outsourcing can be categorised into four types: general outsourcing, transitional 
outsourcing, business process outsourcing, and business benefit contracting. The 
outsourcing process encompasses four major phases: Planning, Implementation, 
Operation, and Closing. Each phase consists of different activities. 
Different benefits can be gained from outsourcing. Cost reductions, 
concentration on core business activities, flexibility and quality improvement, 
and minimising routine tasks and the obsolescence risk, are just some examples 
of these benefits. Despite the enormous benefits that outsourcing can offer 
organisations, it might expose organisations to different risks such as security 
risks, contract violations, loss of technology skills and hidden costs. 
Previous studies have identified a great deal of security issues in outsourcing. 
For several reasons (e.g. assets involved, security practices of both parties, etc.), 
providing a complete list of outsourcing security issues seems to be difficult. To 
overcome this difficulty, security issues can be broadly classified into four 
categories: organisational, technical, human, and physical and environmental. 
To manage the security risks of outsourcing effectively, organisations need to 
take into account several elements that aim to improve the overall security 
management of the organisation. The security program or framework should 
embrace different features such as establishing a comprehensive methodology for 
managing security requirements, managing security risks from different 
perspectives, managing compliance, and being usable from different perspectives 
such as cost effectiveness, time efficiency and simplicity. 
In the following chapter, existing Information Security Management System 
(ISMS) standards and frameworks will be reviewed to assess their applicability 
to managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
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Chapter 3 Related Work 
The previous chapter gives background information about outsourcing 
business practice. This chapter reviews existing Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) standards and frameworks to investigate their 
ability to manage the security and compliance risks associated with outsourced 
IT projects. Based on this review, their focus, strengths and limitations in 
managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects can be 
identified. 
3.1 Introduction 
In modern business, where organisations are heavily dependent on their IS, 
information security become a key challenge, as it requires a great deal of 
knowledge not only about technical aspects, but also about people and 
environmental aspects [56]. Organisations have realised the importance of ISMS 
standards and frameworks in managing the security risks of their information 
systems; they are a key element of their strategy to overcome information 
security challenges [57]. The selection and implementation of an ISMS standard 
or framework should therefore provide a level of protection that mitigates the 
impact of any potential security risks. However, the selection of the ISMS should 
be made based on a deep analysis of the security threats that exist in the 
organisation [58]. It should also provide the required protection for information 
security key characteristics, e.g. confidentiality, integrity and availability [54]. 
Another key element in overcoming information security challenges is 
enforcing compliance with the chosen ISMS standard or framework. Indeed, it is 
true to say that compliance enforcement has become as valuable as the adoption 
of the security standards and frameworks, which are implemented to achieve 
organisations’ security objectives [59]. Otherwise, ISMS standards and 
frameworks might not achieve the security goals expected by the organisation 
[60]. Compliance enforcement ensures that ISMS standards and frameworks can 
work effectively to provide the required information system protection  [61, 62]. 
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: we discuss existing ISMS 
standards and frameworks in Section 3.2. We evaluate the identified ISMS 
standards and frameworks in Section 3.3. Finally, we summarise this chapter in 
Section 3.4. 
3.2 Existing ISMS Standards and Frameworks 
Different ISMS standards and frameworks have been developed for managing 
the security risks of information systems. These ISMS standards and frameworks 
may have some similarities or differences, based on the steps or procedures that 
they follow to achieve the security objectives of organisations. In order to identify 
suitable candidates from the existing ISMS standards and frameworks, we first 
classify them into four themes based on their focus [63-66]: Information Security 
Management, IT Governance and Service Management, Risk Management, and 
Security Architecture and Engineering. Each theme is then presented by 
representative examples. These ISMS representative examples have been chosen 
due to their ability to manage security risks. We tried to include only the leading 
standards and frameworks [63, 67-71] in each theme as representative examples. 
They are expected to help with managing the security risks of outsourced IT 
projects, as they are dedicated to the management of security risks partially or 
totally. 
3.2.1 Information Security Management 
This theme comprises systematic ISMS standards and frameworks that 
describe rules, processes, and procedures with regard to information security 
within an organisation. They try to explain how to protect an information system 
as a central asset of the organisation in the form of best practices or guidelines. 
The following are examples of standards and frameworks within the information 
security management theme: 
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 ISO/IEC 2700x series 
One of the most adopted ISMS is ISO/IEC 2700x series. It was originally 
developed by the UK National Computing Centre (NCC) in 1993. The first 
publication was “PD 0003 A Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management”. Two years later, the work was adopted by the British Standards 
Institute (BSI) and “BS 7799-1 IT—Security Techniques—Code of Practice for 
Information Security Management” was published as a national standard. Later 
on, the work was complemented by “BS 7799-2 Information Security Management 
Systems—Specification with guidance for use” [72]. In 2000, BS7799-1 was 
accepted and published by the International Standards Organisation (ISO) and 
the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) as the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard. Later on, ISO/IEC 17799 was renumbered to ISO/IEC 27002 and BS 
7799-2 became ISO/IEC 27001 standard [70]. Figure 3.1 shows the development 
history of the ISO/IEC 2700x. 
 
Figure 3.1: Development History of ISO/IEC 2700x [72] 
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The following highlights the most relevant ISO/IEC 2700x series publications: 
• ISO/IEC 27000: This publication provides an overview of the 
vocabulary, terms, and definitions of ISMS. It outlines other ISO/IEC 
standards covered in this series. The fundamental and basic security 
knowledge that organisations should know are covered in this standard 
too [73]. 
• ISO/IEC 27001: The ISO/IEC 27001 provides organisations with 
guidance on how to design, implement and operate their ISMS. This 
standard is based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model, which 
provides continuous improvement. The security requirement 
specifications provided in this standard are used as the basis for 
certifying organisations with ISO/IEC 27001 [74-76]. 
• ISO/IEC 27002: This standard provides a set of best practice security 
controls that are intended to achieve security requirements’ 
specifications proposed in the ISO/IEC 27001 standard. Those controls 
are optional and organisations could use their own controls as long as 
they achieve the security requirements’ specifications effectively. The 
ISO/IEC 27002 standard recommends 114 controls grouped into 14 
domains that could help organisations with achieving their security 
goals [77, 78]. 
• ISO/IEC 27003: This standard provides guidance on how to plan and 
implement a practical ISMS based on the security requirements’ 
specifications provided in ISO27001. The standard provides support to 
deal with critical activities at the early stages of ISMS implementation. 
It does not cover operational activities resulting from ISMS 
implementation [79]. 
• ISO/IEC 27004: This standard provides guidance on how to use 
measures to evaluate the effectiveness of organisations’ ISMSs 
according to ISO/IEC 27001 specifications. The results of this 
evaluation help organisations identify processes and controls that need 
to be changed or improved [70, 80]. 
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• ISO/IEC 27005: This standard provides guidance for information 
security risk management in accordance with ISO/IEC 27001. This 
standard does not follow any specific risk management methodology. It 
is the responsibility of organisations to establish or choose their risk 
management methodology that suits their contexts [70, 81, 82]. 
 NIST SP 800- series 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed a 
series of standards and guidelines about information security for federal 
agencies. The special publications (SP) of these guidelines cover different topics of 
information security, such as security plans and risk assessment. These 
standards and guidelines represent the minimum requirements for securing the 
IS of federal agencies. The following outline the most relevant NIST standards 
and guidelines: 
• NIST SP 800-18: This special publication of NIST provides guidance 
on how to develop a security plan for federal systems. The minimum 
requirements that should be covered by the security plan include 
information system name, purpose, categorisation, owner, type, 
environment, and status. Moreover, the security plan should list any 
integration with other systems, identify any related regulations or 
policies, and choose appropriate security controls [83, 84]. 
• NIST SP 800-30: This document provides guidance on how to conduct 
the risk assessment of federal systems. It starts by describing the 
process of risk assessment and the terminologies used for assessing 
information system risks. Moreover, the document describes the 
activities required before conducting risk assessment, the activities 
required to carry out risk assessment, and the activities required for 
producing risk assessment results [85, 86]. 
• NIST SP 800-34: This document provides guidance on how to develop 
contingency plans. Different types of plans are discussed in this 
document, including business and operations continuity, crisis 
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communications, disaster recovery, critical infrastructure protection, 
and cyber incident response plans. Seven steps are identified for 
developing appropriate contingency plans. Those seven steps are: 
o Develop the contingency planning policy statement. 
o Conduct the business impact analysis (BIA). 
o Identify preventive controls. 
o Create contingency strategies. 
o Develop an information system contingency plan. 
o Ensure plan testing, training, and exercises. 
o Ensure plan maintenance. 
The document provides recommendations about contingency plans for 
three types of platforms: client/server, telecommunications and 
mainframe [87]. 
• NIST SP 800-53: This document proposes a catalogue of security and 
privacy controls that can be adopted by federal systems and 
organisations. It also explains the process of selecting appropriate 
controls that help to protect an organisation’s IS from different security 
and privacy risks. The selection of appropriate controls is based on the 
risk assessment that is conducted by organisations before 
implementing any security or privacy controls. The proposed controls 
are comprehensive and customisable to meet different business types 
and missions. Those controls address security from two perspectives: 
functionality and assurance [88, 89]. 
• NIST SP 800-55: This document provides guidance on how to develop 
and implement appropriate measures that assist organisations in 
assessing the effectiveness of their chosen security controls. Those 
measures should identify any performance issues related to the 
security program, and provide appropriate corrective actions that need 
to be implemented to resolve these performance issues [90, 91]. 
• NIST SP 800-137: This document provides guidance on how to develop 
and implement a strategy for information security continuous 
monitoring of federal systems and organisations. The aim of this 
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continuous monitoring is to enhance the awareness of vulnerabilities 
and threats associated with IS. A robust continuous monitoring 
strategy should be comprehensive, and should take into account 
different factors such as technology, environment, people and processes  
[92]. 
 GMITS (ISO/IEC 13335) 
The Guidelines for the Management of IT Security (GMITS), known also as 
ISO/IEC 13335, is a comprehensive programme for managing IT security. It has 
been developed by the ISO and the International Electro-technical Commission 
(IEC). GMITS manages IT security from different perspectives such as technical, 
physical, and managerial. It is grouped into five parts. The first part, called 
Concepts and Models for Information and Communications Technology Security 
Management, describes the basic definitions, concepts and models that need to be 
understood by managers responsible for the organisation’s overall IT security 
programme. The second part, known as Managing and Planning IT Security, 
covers aspects related to managing and planning an effective security 
programme. It targets managers involved in designing and overseeing the 
organisation’s security programme. The third part, called Techniques for the 
Management of Information Technology Security, describes security risk 
approaches that can be used by those involved in assessing IT security risks. The 
fourth part, called Selection of Safeguards, provides guidance on how to choose 
appropriate safeguards that help to reduce IT security risks. The fifth part, called 
Management Guidance on Network Security, provides guidance on how to address 
the security requirements of networks and communications when using external 
or public communications [93, 94]. 
3.2.2 IT Governance and Service Management 
This theme includes ISMS standards and frameworks that provide a 
governance or methodology for implementing processes, structures and 
relationships. These enable IT and business strategy administrators to execute 
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their responsibilities with regard to achieving the expected business values [95]. 
The following are examples of standards and frameworks within this theme: 
 COBIT 
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) is a 
comprehensive framework that was developed by an international professional 
association called the Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
(ISACA) in 1996. Its aim was to help enterprises to achieve optimal values from 
their IT by balancing benefits realisation, and optimising risk levels and the use 
of resources. The framework consists of a set of best practices for IT governance 
and management that have evolved over the last two decades [96, 97]. 
The latest version, COBIT 5, has five principles and seven enablers, as shown 
in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 respectively. The two domains that are covered are 
governance and management. The governance domain consists of five processes 
whereas the management domain has 32 processes. Those processes act as 
guidance for enterprises that intend to implement COBIT 5 [98]. 
 
Figure 3.2: COBIT Principles [99] 
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Figure 3.3: COBIT Enablers [99] 
 ITIL 
The Information Technology and Infrastructure Library (ITIL) framework 
has been developed by the UK government’s Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) for IT service management. The framework is a set of best practices that 
can be used to improve enterprises’ performance in managing their IT services 
[100, 101]. Different benefits can be achieved by using the ITIL framework, such 
as cost reductions, IT service improvement, and IT services aligned with the 
enterprise’s business needs [102]. ITIL has been developed to cover the lifecycle 
of a service, which has five stages: Service strategy, Service design, Service 
transition, Service operation, and Continual service improvement [103]. Those 
stages are presented in Figure 3.4 and summarised as follows: 
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Figure 3.4: ITIL Lifecycle Stages [103] 
• Service Strategy: at this stage of a service lifecycle [104], the 
framework provides guidance on how to design, manage and operate 
services that satisfy customers’ needs and are in line with the 
enterprise’s IT capabilities and resources. The core topics at this stage 
include market establishment for the enterprise services, services’ 
assets, and ITIL implementation strategy for the lifecycle of the 
services. Basic principles of IT service management such as concepts, 
processes, and references are presented at this stage.  
• Service Design: at this stage [105], the framework provides guidance 
for designing, developing, and managing IT services effectively. 
Processes and methods that help with transferring enterprises’ 
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strategic objectives into services’ portfolios and assets are covered at 
this stage. Core topics of the Service Design Stage include: 
improvements and changes of services that lead to increasing customer 
satisfaction, service continuity, and service compliance with standards 
and regulations.  
• Service Transition: at this stage [106], the framework provides 
guidance on how to implement strategic services that have been 
designed and tested. The expected values of the services are realised at 
this stage. Configuration management and knowledge management are 
examples of the topics covered at this stage.  
• Service Operation: at this stage [107], the framework provides 
guidance on how to manage services’ daily operations. This includes 
managing performance levels so that they meet customers’ 
requirements, resolving service issues that might arise, and handling 
customers’ new requests. Event, incident and access management are 
examples of processes that are covered at this stage 
• Continual Service Improvement: at this stage of the lifecycle of a 
service [108], the framework provides principles and methods that help 
to improve service quality. Moreover, it guides enterprises on how to 
measure processes’ efficiency and effectiveness in order to meet 
customers’ expectations. Mechanisms for managing incremental 
changes and improvement are covered at this stage as well. 
3.2.3 Risk Management 
This theme encompasses risk management methods that can be used by 
organisations to identify and assess the security risks of their IS. The following 
are examples of standards and frameworks within this theme: 
 OCTAVE 
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) is a self-directed approach for evaluating the security risks associated 
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with the existing security practices and processes of an organisation. It was 
developed by Carnegie Mellon University in 1999. The approach does not 
concentrate on technological risks only, but takes into account other risks such as 
strategic and security practices. The evaluation is conducted by a small team 
from different units of the organisation, including IT, business and operations 
departments. The result of this evaluation is the identification of the 
organisation’s security needs from three balanced perspectives: operational risks, 
security practices, and technological perspectives [109, 110]. 
The OCTAVE approach consists of three phases [109, 111, 112]: Build Asset-
Based Threat Profile, Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities, and Develop 
Security Strategy and Plan. Those phases, as shown in Figure 3.5, are 
summarised as follows: 
• Build Asset-Based Threat Profile phase: at this phase, the evaluation 
team identifies assets that are important to the organisation, and 
evaluates the security practices being used to secure them. Following 
that, the team selects the organisation’s most critical assets and 
identifies the security requirements for each one of them. At the end, a 
threats profile is created based on each asset threat. This phase is 
considered as an evaluation at organisational level. 
• Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities phase: at this phase, the 
evaluation team assesses the organisation’s technical infrastructure 
components in order to identify any possible access paths to critical 
assets that might expose them to security risks. This phase is 
considered to be an information infrastructure evaluation. 
• Develop Security Strategy and Plan phase: at this phase, risks 
associated with critical assets are identified by the evaluation team. 
Based on that, the evaluation team develops a strategy plan for 
protecting the organisation’s critical assets from identified risks. 
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Figure 3.5: OCTAVE Phases [113]  
  CORAS 
CORAS is a qualitative model-based approach designed for security risk 
analysis. It was developed under the Information Society Technologies (IST) 
programme. It is a European research and technological development project that 
resulted in a security risk framework (CORAS). It uses the Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) to model the security risks of critical systems [114, 115]. 
CORAS uses eight steps for conducting security risk analysis as summarised in 
the following steps [116, 117]: 
  
41 
 
• Step 1: This initial step (preparation step) is used to identify the target 
and the size of the risk analysis. 
• Step 2: The second step involves an introductory meeting with the 
customer the analysis will be conducted for. The aim is to obtain the 
overall goals of the security analysis and the most important concerns 
that need to be analysed. By the end of this step, the overall goals, 
focus, scope and plans for the security analysis are identified. 
• Step 3: The third step ensures a common understanding of the 
outcomes from step 2 between the team and the customer. The overall 
goals, along with their focus and scope, are finalised. The main assets 
that need to be protected, the major threat scenarios, and 
vulnerabilities are identified at the end of this step. 
• Step 4: in this step, the customer ensures that the overall goals, scope 
and focus are complete and correct. Assumptions and preconditions are 
made. The targets are modelled using UML and the risk evaluation 
criteria for each asset are identified at the end of this step. 
• Step 5: this step is called the risk identification step and it is carried 
out as a structured brainstorming by analysts. The outcome of this step 
involves identifications of threats, unwanted incidents, threat scenarios 
and vulnerabilities for all assets that have been identified. 
• Step 6: in this step, the risk level is determined by estimating the 
likelihood and consequences of the identified risks. 
• Step 7: in this step, the risk evaluation criteria are used to decide 
whether the identified risks are acceptable or not. If not, further 
evaluation for possible treatment is conducted. 
• Step 8: in this step, the risks that are found to need more treatment 
are analysed in order to reduce their likelihood and/or consequences. 
 CRAMM 
The CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) was developed 
by the UK Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) in 1985. 
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The main objective of CRAMM was to provide a qualitative risk analysis and 
management tool for the security of IS. CRAMM is currently used in around 20 
countries in trade and non-trade organisations due to its robust performance in 
securing IS against risks [118]. The method involves three stages: asset 
identification and valuation, threat and vulnerability assessment, and 
countermeasure selection and recommendation [86]. The following summarises 
these three stages [119]: 
• Asset identification and valuation: in this stage, the assets of the 
organisation that support the business process are identified and 
valued. 
• Threat and vulnerability assessment: in this stage, threats that might 
affect information system assets, and information system 
vulnerabilities, are identified. Risks are then analysed and assessed. 
• Countermeasure selection and recommendation: in this stage, the 
countermeasures that are expected to mitigate the identified risks are 
proposed. This also includes improvements to the existing 
countermeasures. 
3.2.4 Security Architecture and Engineering 
This theme involves frameworks that suggest securing organisations’ IS 
through secure enterprise architecture or processes and methods that can be 
used to evaluate how good the security engineering process of organisations is. 
The following are examples of standards and frameworks within this theme: 
 SABSA 
The Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) is an open-
source framework for developing the risk-driven security architecture of 
enterprises. It is registered as a trademark of the SABSA limited organisation. 
The framework is a layered model, and it has been developed based on six 
vertical layers, as shown in Figure 3.6. Those layers are: Contextual Security 
Architecture, Conceptual Security Architecture, Logical Security Architecture, 
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Physical Security Architecture, Component Security Architecture, and Security 
Service Management Architecture [120-122]. 
 
Figure 3.6: SBSA Layered Model [121] 
The six vertical layers of the SABSA framework are integrated with six 
horizontal elements. The six elements are assets, motivation, process, people, 
location, and time. The vertical layers and horizontal elements provide 36 cells, 
which represent the framework matrix. Addressing the issues related to all 36 
cells should cover the entire security architecture of enterprises [121-123]. 
The SABSA lifecycle consists of four phases as presented in Figure 3.7, which 
represent the entire development process of the enterprise security architecture. 
Those phases are: Strategy and Plans, Design, Implement, and Manage and 
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Measure. The Strategy and Plans phase embraces processes related to the first 
two layers’ contextual and conceptual architectures, whereas the remaining 
layers are embraced in the Design phase. Processes that have been planned and 
designed are put into practice in the Implementation phase. The last phase is 
used to detect any performance deviation from what has been planned [124]. 
 
Figure 3.7: SABSA Lifecycle 
 SSE-CMM 
The Systems Security Engineering - Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), 
which became ISO/IEC 21827, is a process-model project that was originally 
sponsored by the National Security Agency (NSA). The SSE-CMM describes the 
essential features of the security engineering process that organisations must 
have to maintain an acceptable level of security engineering. To promote and 
advance the development of the model, the International Systems Security 
Engineering Association (ISSEA) was established. The model is based on two 
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categories, domain and capability. The domain category, which is called base 
practices, has 129 base practices grouped into 22 process areas, which are further 
grouped into three domains: security engineering, organisation, and project 
domains. The security engineering domain is categorised into three areas: risk, 
engineering, and assurance. The base practices represent the best practices 
required to ensure good security engineering processes. The capability category, 
which is called generic practices, has five Capability Levels. The generic practices 
represent activities that are not security-specific, but can be applied to different 
domains such as management and measurement. The generic practices should be 
performed as part of the base practices [13, 94, 125]. 
The SSE-CMM model can be seen as a tool for describing essential security 
activities that need to be achieved by organisations to maintain a good security 
engineering process. Additionally, the SSE-CMM model can be used to evaluate 
how good the security engineering process of organisations is [126]. 
3.2.5 ISMS Standards and Frameworks Summary 
In Table 3.1, we provide a summary of the ISMS standards and frameworks 
[63-69, 71, 127-129] discussed in the previous sub-sections. 
Table 3.1: ISMS Standards and Frameworks Summary 
Approach Main Focus Strengths Weaknesses 
ISO/IEC 
2700x series 
Information security 
management 
Comprehensive 
approach for 
information security 
management. 
Low usability. 
Generality. 
Lack of adequate 
consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
NIST SP 800 - 
series 
Information security 
management 
Comprehensive 
Approach for 
managing 
information security. 
Low usability. 
Generality. 
Lack of adequate 
consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
GMITS Information security management 
Provides a good 
foundation for 
managing 
information security.  
Low usability. 
Lack of adequate 
consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
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Approach Main Focus Strengths Weaknesses 
COBIT IT governance and service management 
Holistic approach for 
IT governance. 
Can be integrated 
with other standards. 
Lack of adequate 
consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
Low usability. 
ITIL IT governance and service management 
Alignment with 
business needs. 
Service delivery 
efficiency. 
Lack of adequate 
consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
Low usability. 
OCTAVE Risk management  
Critical assets 
identification. 
Risks analysis focus. 
High usability. 
Inadequate 
security 
requirements 
management. 
No compliance 
management. 
No consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
CORAS Risk management  
Assets identification. 
Threat Scenarios. 
Incident 
Identification. 
Inadequate 
security 
requirements 
management. 
No compliance 
management. 
No consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
CRAMM Risk management  
Assets identification. 
Threat Identification. 
Security Controls 
Identification. 
Inadequate 
security 
requirements 
management. 
No compliance 
management. 
No consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
SABSA Security architecture and engineering 
Comprehensive 
approach for 
enterprise security 
architecture. 
Can be integrated 
with other standards. 
Low usability. 
Lack of details of 
how to implement 
it. 
Lack of adequate 
consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
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Approach Main Focus Strengths Weaknesses 
SSE-CMM Security architecture and engineering 
Advanced security 
engineering as a 
defined, mature, and 
measurable 
discipline. 
Low usability. 
More focused on 
system and 
software 
development. 
Lack of adequate 
consideration of 
outsourced 
projects. 
 
3.3 ISMS Standards and Framework Evaluation 
The outsourcing context differs from the conventional one. In the outsourcing 
context, environments are less stable and more systems are integrated together 
[130]. Therefore, it is more likely that existing ISMS standards and frameworks 
achieve different results to those they were intended to achieve. The outsourcing 
background given in the previous chapter (Section 2.7) showed the specific 
security needs that should be taken into account in order to effectively manage 
the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. We will use these 
security needs to review the existing ISMS standards and frameworks to assess 
their applicability to managing outsourcing security risks effectively. Utilising 
the review outcome, we can decide whether we can customise one of them or 
whether we have to propose a new approach capable of managing the security 
risks of outsourcing effectively. 
3.3.1 Evaluation Criteria 
To explore the ability of existing ISMSs to manage the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects, we propose specific criteria based on 
the security needs that have been identified in Section 2.7. These criteria were 
drawn up based on the analysis of outsourcing business practices and the 
available literature provided in the previous chapter (specifically Sections 2.6 and 
2.7). The proposed criteria are restated as follows: 
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• Security Requirements Management: the ISMS should be 
comprehensive. It should establish a complete methodology that is 
capable of managing security risks effectively. To do so, the ISMS 
should cover different security items. It should at least cover the 
following items: 
o Information Security Policy. 
o Communications and Operations Management. 
o Access Control. 
o IS Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance. 
o Asset Management. 
o Incident Management. 
o Business Continuity Management. 
• Security Risks Management: security risks are not only technical. 
Therefore, any ISMS for managing the security risks of outsourced IT 
projects should manage security risks from different perspectives. 
ISMS should at least cover the following items: 
o Technical Risks. 
o Physical and Environmental Risks. 
o Human Resources Risks. 
• Consideration of Outsourced IT Projects: to mitigate the security risks 
of outsourced IT projects, the ISMS should establish a method that 
takes into consideration the outsourcing context. 
• Compliance management: The security programme should establish a 
method to enforce compliance properly. 
• Usability: The ISMS should be usable for the outsourcing context from 
different perspectives. Outsourced projects usually last for a specific 
period of time. Therefore, the ISMS for managing the security risks of 
outsourced IT projects should be usable for this context. At least, the 
ISMS should be usable from the following perspectives: 
o Cost effectiveness. 
o Time efficiency. 
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o Simplicity and ease of use. 
3.3.2 Evaluation Results 
 Having provided an overview for each ISMS standard and framework and 
identified the evaluation criteria, we have evaluated the existing ISMS standards 
and frameworks. The evaluation results are based on our own assessment and 
previous studies available in the literature [63-69, 71, 127-129]. In Table 3.2, we 
present the evaluation results. 
In Table 3.2, there are three options, which represent the result of each 
criterion or factor: 
• (√) when the criterion or factor is supported by the framework or 
standard. 
• (≈) when the criterion or factor is partially supported by the framework 
or standard. 
• (×) when the criterion or factor is not supported by the framework or 
standard. 
Table 3.2: ISMS Standards and Frameworks Evaluation Results 
Criteria  
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1-Security 
Requirements 
Management:                     
Information Security 
Policy √ √ √ √ √ × × × √ √ 
Communications and 
Operations 
Management 
√ √ √ √ × ≈ × × √ √ 
Access Control √ √ ≈ √ √ × × × √ √ 
Information Systems 
Acquisition, 
Development, and 
Maintenance 
√ √ √ √ × × × × √ √ 
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Criteria  
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Asset Management √ √ ≈ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Incident Management √ √ √ √ √ × × × ≈ ≈ 
Business Continuity 
Management √ √ √ √ √ × × × √ ≈ 
2- Risks 
Management:       
    
          
Physical and 
Environmental Risks √ √ √ ≈ × ≈ ≈ ≈ √ √ 
Human Resources 
Risks √ √ √ ≈ × ≈ ≈ ≈ √ √ 
Technical Risks √ √ √ ≈ ≈ √ √ √ √ √ 
3- Consideration of 
outsourced projects: ≈ ≈ ≈ × × × × × ≈ × 
4- Compliance √ √ √ √ √ × × × √ √ 
5- Usability:                     
Cost effectiveness × × × × × √ √ √ × × 
Time  efficiency × × × × × √ ≈ √ × × 
Simplicity and 
easiness × × × × × √ √ √ × × 
 
3.3.3 Evaluation Analysis 
As can be seen from Table 3.3, the ISO/IEC 2700x and NIST SP 800 series 
met 73% of the evaluation criteria. However, 80% of the organisations around the 
world use the ISO/IEC 2700x series for the monitoring, review, maintenance and 
improvement of their information security management systems [71]. The wider 
concept and scope provided by the ISO/IEC 2700x series make them more 
applicable to all organisations for internal information security management, 
regardless of their shapes and sizes [68]. 
Although ISO/IEC 2700x and the NIST SP 800 series play a very important 
role in managing internal information security management, they suffer from low 
usability (cost effectiveness, time efficiency, simplicity and ease of use) in the 
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outsourcing context. In order to implement them effectively, the organisation 
would need access to a large bank of resources. When outsourcing, budget 
constraints and adherence to the project schedule are important; therefore ease of 
use, cost effectiveness, simplicity and time efficiency are paramount [67]. 
Table 3.3: Criteria Summary 
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Count 
√ 11 11 9 8 6 5 4 5 10 9 
≈ 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 
× 3 3 3 4 8 7 8 8 3 4 
Percentage 
√ 73% 73% 60% 53% 40% 33% 27% 33% 67% 60% 
≈ 7% 7% 20% 20% 7% 20% 20% 13% 13% 13% 
× 20% 20% 20% 27% 53% 47% 53% 53% 20% 27% 
 
Based on the results in Section 3.3.2, the main weaknesses of ISMS standards 
and frameworks are summarised as follows: 
• Lack of or weak comprehensive security methodology: most of the 
reviewed ISMSs suffer from a lack of comprehensive security 
methodology. Only general recommendations are provided without a 
clear explanation of how to apply them. 
• Lack of adequate consideration of compliance: ISMSs suffer from the 
lack of a robust method for compliance enforcement. The majority of 
them provide only general recommendations for compliance without 
any explanation of how to enforce compliance. 
• Usability: most of the ISMSs reviewed in this chapter, except the risk 
management standards and frameworks, suffer from low usability as 
their correct implementation requires large amounts of resources [67]. 
In our criteria, the usability criterion consists of three factors: cost 
effectiveness, time efficiency, and simplicity and ease of use. 
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o Cost effectiveness: the reviewed ISMSs require a large budget 
for a security programme to be established within an 
organisation. For many organisations, especially organisations 
with senior managers who do not adequately realise the 
importance of information security, the required budget is high 
and difficult to justify. 
o Time efficiency: the time required to complete the 
implementation of the reviewed ISMSs is relatively long. The 
ISMSs require different aspects to be covered, such as those 
related to people, and technical and physical aspects. 
Implementing the processes and procedures proposed by the 
ISMSs to mitigate the risks associated with these aspects might 
in many cases exceed the time required for the execution of 
outsourced IT projects. 
o Simplicity and ease of use: the reviewed ISMSs require 
professional knowledge and skills to plan, develop, and maintain 
them. With a lack of detailed guidelines that explain how to 
implement ISMSs, in many cases organisations are left without 
the knowledge or skills necessary to implement the ISMSs 
effectively. 
In the context of outsourced projects, the ISMS needs to be clear and 
easy, inexpensive, and it should be possible to implement it in a short 
period of time. Otherwise, the project schedule and budget might be 
seriously affected. 
• Generality: the reviewed ISMSs in general represent general best 
practices and recommendations that can be used to mitigate the 
security risks associated with information systems. Nevertheless, 
security requirements differ from one organisation to another. This 
variation in security requirements is not addressed properly by these 
ISMSs [13]. This does not mean that there is a complete failure to 
address the different security requirements of organisations, but it 
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means that what might be neglected by one ISMS is covered by another 
and vice versa, according to the main focus of each ISMS. 
• Lack of adequate consideration of outsourced projects: ISMSs are 
mainly designed to deal with the internal processes of organisations. 
They are not designed to deal with the security risks of outsourced IT 
projects [14]. Such risks are rarely addressed, and if they are, they are 
no more than general requirements without detailed guidelines that 
explain how to comply exactly with these requirements. 
Based on the results provided in Section 3.3.2, the following points can be 
extracted: 
• There is no single framework or standard that satisfies all the security and 
compliance needs for managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects. 
• All reviewed standards and frameworks are not designed specifically for 
managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
Therefore, updating these standards and frameworks to fit the outsourced 
IT projects context makes them more complicated, thus consuming more 
time and resources. 
• The reviewed standards and frameworks differ in their strengths and 
weaknesses. For instance, risk management standards and frameworks 
provide high usability but low security requirements management, 
whereas the standards and frameworks of information security 
management provide high security requirements management but low 
usability. Therefore, any proposed solution should benefit from the 
strengths of existing ISMS standards and frameworks and provide some 
solutions that could overcome their weaknesses. 
• The usability criterion has the lowest support from all standards and 
frameworks, with the exception of the risk management standards and 
frameworks. 
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As a conclusion, the reviewed ISMS standards and frameworks have 
contributed to improving information security management in general. However, 
it can be seen from the evaluation results that the security and compliance 
management of outsourced IT projects have still not been studied in depth. This 
gap needs to be investigated and studied in order to resolve it. To manage the 
security risks of outsourcing effectively, several elements need to be taken into 
consideration, such as establishing a comprehensive methodology for managing 
security requirements, managing security risks from different perspectives, 
managing compliance, and being usable from different perspectives (e.g. cost 
effectiveness, time efficiency and simplicity). 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, existing ISMS standards and frameworks have been 
categorised into four themes: Information Security Management, IT Governance 
and Service Management, Risk Management, and Security Architecture and 
Engineering. For each theme, representative examples of leading ISMS 
standards and frameworks have been provided. Their ability to effectively 
manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects was assessed 
based on specific criteria identified for this purpose. These criteria involve 
security requirements management, risk management, the consideration of 
outsourced projects, compliance and usability. 
Despite the enormous benefit of ISMSs with regard to achieving information 
system confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and mitigating security risks, 
they still do not satisfy the security and compliance needs of outsourced IT 
projects. Most of the reviewed ISMSs do not take into consideration the 
outsourcing context. In the outsourcing context, where environments are less 
stable and more systems are integrated together, ISMSs should be 
comprehensive. They should establish a complete methodology that is capable of 
managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects effectively. 
The ISMS should manage a range of security risks, such as technical, human 
resources, physical and environmental risks. As outsourced IT projects usually 
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last for a specific period of time, the ISMS should take this into consideration and 
be usable for the outsourcing context in terms of cost effectiveness, time 
efficiency, and simplicity and ease of use. The reviewed ISMSs have many 
weaknesses such as low usability and generality, and the lack of adequate 
consideration of the security risks associated with outsourced IT projects. 
In the following chapter, and based on the Chapter 2 and 3 outcomes, the 
requirements for effectively managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects will be identified. 
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Chapter 4 Requirements for Managing the Security 
and Compliance Risks of Outsourced IT Projects 
The previous chapter reviewed existing ISMS standards and frameworks. 
Their strengths and weaknesses in managing the security and compliance risks 
of outsourced IT projects were identified. The gap in the literature and the need 
for a new approach that could tackle the weaknesses of existing frameworks were 
also discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, the requirements for 
effectively managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects 
will be determined. 
4.1 Introduction 
Before we proceed to developing a solution for managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects, we need to identify the requirements 
that the proposed solution should fulfil. The following sub-sections discuss these 
requirements. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: we identify the security and 
compliance requirements in Section 4.2. The case study of outsourced IT projects 
is presented in Section 4.3. We finally summarise this chapter in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Security and Compliance Requirements 
In order to design a solution that satisfies the security and compliance needs 
of outsourced IT projects, it is important to firstly specify the requirements that 
need to be considered when developing the proposed solution. The following 
requirements were proposed after reviewing existing ISMS standards and 
frameworks and identifying their weaknesses, in addition to analysing the 
literature in the previous chapters. 
The requirements take into account the importance of aligning the security 
management of outsourcing with project management, as well as considering 
factors that contribute to building secure and protected environments. Security 
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risks in the outsourcing context are taken into consideration from different 
perspectives. Compliance enforcement, usability, flexibility and reusability are 
taken into consideration as well. 
4.2.1 Aligning Security Management with Project Management 
Modern project management emerged and became a discipline in the late 
1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s [131]. Since then, different project 
management standards have been developed and practised across different 
industry domains [132]. The uncertainty associated with project failures has 
increased the adoption of project standards among different types of 
organisations [133]. Project management standards provide structured methods 
for managing projects with the aim of completing projects successfully, which 
achieves organisations’ objectives. Such standards can be applied to any type of 
project, regardless of their cost, time, or any other constraints [132]. 
Today, there are several leading standards and frameworks for project 
management that can be used. These standards and frameworks are available for 
project managers who are responsible for delivering projects to their customers 
according to their requirements [134]. Although project management standards 
and frameworks do not guarantee any success, they provide general best 
practices that can be tailored to suit projects in order to improve the planning 
and controlling of such projects. Several project standards, such as the Project 
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK), provide educational and training 
programmes that confer certifications [135]. 
Aligning security management with project management could provide 
several benefits. Project phases could help with allowing separate security risk 
management. The rationale behind this separation is that it allows security 
requirements to be identified and broken down based on the project phases, 
instead of setting security requirements for the whole project. This will allow the 
project team to identify security requirements more easily and they can then 
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concentrate on activities that belong to each particular phase. Other resources 
can be utilised in other project activities. 
The separation could also help with achieving security requirements on time. 
Each project phase has its own security activities. Such separation provides a 
better understanding of security requirements. If project resources are allocated 
efficiently, the project’s execution time will not be affected. 
The following sub-sections provide an overview of three of the leading project 
management standards [135, 136]. Those standards are Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK), Projects In Controlled Environments (PRINCE2), 
and International Competence Baseline (ICB). 
 PMBOK 
The PMBOK standard has been developed by a US non-profit organisation 
called the Project Management Institute (PMI). The first white paper of PMBOK 
was published in 1987. This standard provides best practices related to processes, 
techniques, and tools that can be used to enhance a project’s success. It can be 
applied to any type of project across different industry types. The PMI is widely 
recognised worldwide, with more than half a million members and a continuous 
annual growth in more than 180 countries [135, 137]. 
The PMBOK standard provides guidance for project management in five 
process groups[132]. The process groups are: Initiating, Planning, Executing, 
Monitoring and Controlling, and Closing. In the process groups, there are 47 
processes, divided into ten knowledge areas: 
• Integration Management 
• Scope Management 
• Time Management 
• Cost Management 
• Quality Management 
• Human Resource Management 
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• Communications Management 
• Risk Management 
• Procurement Management 
• Stakeholder Management 
 PRINCE2 
The Projects In Controlled Environments (PRINCE2) is a project 
management standard that has been developed by a UK agency called the Office 
of Government Commerce (OGC). It was first published in 1996 [135]. PRINCE2 
was derived originally from a previous method called PROMPTII, which was 
used to develop PRINCE in 1989 [133]. The standard is a process-based method 
developed to be used as a de facto standard for IT projects across government 
agencies in the UK. Since then, the standard has been recognised internationally, 
especially in Europe and Australia. It has been adopted by different agencies in 
public and private domains [138]. 
PRINCE2 provides guidance on how to manage projects successfully by using 
seven principles, seven themes, and seven processes. The seven principles are 
business justification, lessons learned, defining roles and responsibilities, 
managing by phases, managing by exception, being product focused, and tailored 
to fit the project environment. The seven themes are business case, organisation, 
quality, plans, risks, changes and progress. The seven processes, which have 40 
activities, are starting a project, initiating a project, directing a project, 
controlling a stage, managing stage boundaries, managing product delivery and 
closing a project [135, 139]. 
 ICB 
The International Competence Baseline (ICB) standard was developed by a 
non-profit international organisation called International Project Management 
Association (IPMA). The IPMA is one of the oldest project management 
organisations, and it has a strong presence in European countries. The first 
version of the ICB standard was made public in 1998. The ICB standard forms the 
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fundamental knowledges required for project personnel who are seeking to 
achieve the four-level ICB certifications. These certifications represent a career 
path in project management, from entry level (level D) to the highest level (level 
A) [135, 140, 141]. 
The ICB standard divides project management into 46 elements of 
competences. Those 46 elements are clustered into three groups: technical (20 
elements), behavioural (15 elements), and contextual competences (11 elements). 
For each of the three competence groups, ICB provides an introduction, process 
stages, topics, certification grades and other competences related to the current 
competences. The ICB applies the 46-competence elements to the project 
manager and project teams in order to improve the project success rate. It focuses 
on project personnel skills and capabilities [135, 142]. 
 Analysis 
The processes of PRINCE2 are similar and comparable to the PMBOK 
process groups. Although the number of processes is different (40 in PRINCE2 
and 47 in PMBOK), the major activities are covered in both standards. Also, the 
PRINCE2 themes and the PMBOK knowledge areas are similar, with the 
exception of procurement in PMBOK, which is not covered in PRINCE2. While 
PRINCE2 focuses on key risks to improve the project success rate, PEBOK 
focuses on applying processes, techniques and tools. Projects are driven by 
business cases in PRINCE2 while projects are driven by stakeholders’ 
requirements in PMBOK [135, 140]. 
For the ICB standard, the differences are more obvious. ICB focuses on 
project personnel skills and capabilities to improve the project success rate. In 
contrast, PMBOK concentrates on project processes and techniques that might be 
employed by project managers and teams. Behavioural competences (personal 
relationships) are emphasised in ICB whereas technical skills are emphasised in 
PMBOK. Both skills are important in projects and it is critical to balance them in 
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order to improve the project success rate [135]. Table 4.1 presents the key 
characteristics of these three standards. 
Table 4.1: Standards’ Characteristics 
 PMBOK PRINCE2 ICB 
Standard Type Process-focused 
guidance 
Product-focused 
methodology 
Competence-focused 
guidance 
Method 10 Knowledge areas 
(47 processes) 
7 Principles, 7 Themes, 
7 Processes (40 
activities) 
46 Competences 
Focus Processes and 
technical skills focus. 
More comprehensive 
approach. 
Project requirements 
emphasis. 
Project key risks focus. 
Project control 
enhancement. 
Business case use. 
 
Capability and skill 
assessment focus. 
Behavioural 
competences 
emphasis.  
Satisfaction and 
quality prominence. 
Although different project management standards are available, PMBOK is 
considered internationally as a de facto standard for managing projects [140]. 
The standard provides a more comprehensive approach than the other project 
management standards. It is preferred with outsourced IT projects, which 
require large teams for project implementation, engagement with different 
stakeholders, and high commitment for clients [132]. The following summarises 
the benefits of PMBOK compared to the other standards [135, 140, 143]: 
• Knowledge-based approach with comprehensive coverage of a wide 
range of project practices. 
• Forms the base for most other project management standards. 
• Easy and learnable knowledge areas. 
• Can be applied to all project types and sizes. 
• Stronger approach for the integration of project processes. 
• Stronger approach for project communication management. 
4.2.2 Managing Security Requirements 
To manage the security requirements of outsourced IT projects effectively, the 
security programme or framework should establish a complete and clear 
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methodology that is capable of managing the security of outsourced IT projects 
adequately. It should consider all of the factors that contribute to achieving a 
comprehensive security programme or framework. To do so, the following items 
at least should be included in such a programme: 
• Information Security Policy. 
• Communications and Operations Management. 
• Access Control. 
• Information Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance. 
• Asset Management. 
• Incident Management. 
• Business Continuity Management. 
4.2.3 Managing Security Risks 
The security risks of outsourced IT projects are not only technical. Therefore, 
any security programme or framework for managing the security risks of 
outsourced IT projects should manage risks from different perspectives. The 
programme or framework should cover at least the following items: 
• Technical Risks. 
• Physical and Environmental Risks. 
• Human Resources Risks. 
Threat classification plays a vital role in managing the security risks of 
outsourced IT projects. It is used to identify potential security threats to the 
project assets at early stages of the project’s execution. Threat classification is 
not a brainstorming process that the project teams can use to investigate security 
threats. Such a brainstorming may miss large threat possibilities, which might 
be exploited by attackers. Attackers may need only one security weakness to 
break the entire system. Threat classification should follow a systematic 
approach to capture the potential threats that the project might face [144]. 
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In the literature, researchers from diverse domains have investigated threat 
classification. Different approaches for classifying threats have been proposed. 
National and international organisations such as ISO and NIST have also 
proposed other threat classification taxonomies. The literature review has shown 
several attempts at classifying the threats that face information systems. Those 
threat classification approaches can be classified into two main categories: 
approaches based on attack techniques, and approaches based on attack impacts 
[145]. 
• Threat classification approaches based on attack techniques: in this 
type of threat classification, techniques that are used by attackers to 
exploit any system vulnerabilities are used to classify information 
system threats. The following represent examples of this classification. 
o The three dimensional model: in this approach, the threats are 
classified using three factors: agent, motivation and localisation. 
The agent factor is a threat actor that imposes a security risk on 
an information system. It is classified into human, technological 
or majeure. The motivation factor is either deliberate or 
accidental threats, which represent the cause for committing 
this action. The localisation factor represents the threat source, 
which can be classified as either an internal or external threat 
[145]. 
o The threat cube model: this model uses three criteria for 
classifying information system threats: threat frequency, threat 
area and threat source. The threat frequency represents how 
often the threat takes place. The threat area focuses on which 
part of the system will be exploited by the threat. The threat 
source is categorised into two types: insiders and outsiders [145, 
146]. 
o The threat pyramid model: this threat classification technique is 
used to model deliberate threats using three factors: prior 
knowledge that attackers possess about the system, area 
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criticality and loss. The first factor represents how much 
knowledge attackers may have about areas such as system 
design and system infrastructure. The second factor represents 
the criticality of the part of the system being exploited by the 
attacker. The third factor represents the potential losses that 
will be experienced if the threat occurs [145, 147]. 
• Threat classification approaches based on attack impact: in this type of 
threat classification approach, the goals of attackers are used to 
classify threats. The following are examples of these approaches. 
o Microsoft STRIDE model: this approach classifies threat impact 
into six categories: Spoofing identity, Tampering with data, 
Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and 
Elevation of privilege. The first letter of each category is used to 
form the STRIDE acronym [148, 149]. 
o ISO 7498-2 model: in this threat classification approach, the 
threat impact is classified into five categories: information or 
resource destruction, information corruption or modification, 
information or resource theft, removal or loss, information 
disclosure, and service interruption [145]. 
Although many threat classification approaches have contributed to 
identifying information system threats more accurately, they still suffer from 
some limitations. The main limitation is that most of these approaches use only 
two or three criteria for classifying system threats. This limitation affects the 
approaches’ ability to provide a comprehensive classification that is capable of 
identifying potential security threats. As a result, they are not exhaustive and do 
not provide a comprehensive list of potential security threats. Such approaches 
might be beneficial in stable environments such as small businesses where 
threats are relatively low and stable [145, 146]. 
In order to manage the security threats of outsourced IT projects properly, the 
threat classification approach needs to be comprehensive and take into 
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consideration the context of outsourcing. Threats in this context are imposed by 
different parties such as providers, the client, and so on. Therefore, security 
threats need to be managed from different perspectives, which suit the 
outsourcing context. Moreover, the threat classification approach needs to 
achieve some desired properties to provide a comprehensive threat classification. 
Those properties are described briefly as follows [145, 150, 151]: 
• Mutually exclusive: every threat should fit into only one category and 
there is no overlapping between categories. 
• Collectively exhaustive: every category should include all possible 
potential threats. 
• Unambiguous criteria: categories are clear and there are specific 
criteria to identify each category of threat. 
• Repeatable: the result of threat classification for the same application 
is generally the same, regardless of who carries out the threat 
classification. 
• Comprehensible and useful: provides comprehensive results and is 
useful not only for security experts, but also for users with no deep 
security background. 
Following threat identification, the security risks associated with these 
threats need to be estimated. Different risk estimation techniques (e.g. 
qualitative, quantitative, semi-quantitative) can be used to estimate the 
likelihood and magnitude of the security risks that affect confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. 
• Qualitative techniques: are subjective and based on security experts’ 
judgements and perceptions as they carry out the risk assessment 
processes. The results are usually expressed in qualitative categories 
such as high, medium, or low. Scenarios and questionnaires might be 
used to estimate risk categories. Qualitative techniques do not require 
a deep mathematical background, which make them easier and simpler 
than other methods [18]. 
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• Quantitative techniques: use different mathematical methods such as 
Bayesian networks and fuzzy logic to express risk values based on 
numbers. Although these techniques might provide more accurate 
results of risk assessment, especially when they are carried out by 
experts, they consume much more time than qualitative techniques 
and are more difficult to understand for non-experts [18]. Figure 4.1 
gives some advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. 
 
Figure 4.1: Qualitative and quantitative techniques’ advantages and disadvantages [18] 
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• Semi-quantitative techniques: express risk assessment results using a 
combination of number ranges such as 1-25, 26-75 and 76-100 and 
categories such as low, medium and high. Such techniques combine 
qualitative and quantitative advantages. For instance, when the risk is 
assessed as 80, the number can be easily interpreted against a level 
category (high), which can be understood easily by non-experts such as 
decision makers [19]. 
Having identified security threats and estimated their impact on 
confidentiality, integrity and the availability of project assets, countermeasures 
(controls) that mitigate security risks need to be proposed and implemented. To 
manage the implementation of security countermeasures accurately, roles and 
responsibilities need to be determined clearly. Various methods exist for 
managing human resource roles and responsibilities. The majority of these 
methods fall into three categories: the hierarchical method, matrix method and 
text-oriented method [152]. 
• Hierarchy-based method: in this method, the structure of organisations 
(top-down format) is used to show high-level areas of roles and 
responsibilities, and the relationships between the organisation 
departments, units and teams. Figure 4.2 shows a representative 
example of hierarchy-based methods. 
 
Figure 4.2: Hierarchy-based method [152] 
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• Matrix-based method: in this method, activities are assigned to team 
members using the Responsibility Assignment Matrix (RAM). 
Responsible, Accountable, Consult and Inform (RACI) represents an 
example of RAM, as shown in Figure 4.3.  If a person is responsible for 
a task, he has to carry out the task. If the person is accountable for the 
task, he is answerable for the task or any decisions related to it. Only 
one person can be assigned to the task with the role “Accountable”. The 
“Consult” role is assigned to the person who will be consulted prior to a 
decision or action for a given task, whereas the person who needs to be 
informed after completing the task or taking a decision related to it 
takes the role “Inform” [153]. 
  
Figure 4.3: Matrix-based method [152] 
• Text-oriented method: in this method, the responsibilities of team 
members are detailed using a text format, as shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: Text-oriented method [152] 
4.2.4 Managing Compliance 
The security programme or framework should establish a method to enforce 
compliance properly. Ensuring compliance with security requirements is an 
essential part of information systems security, as unenforced security 
requirements will not achieve the expected security goals [59]. Compliance 
management should at least take into consideration the following items: 
• Compliance with security requirements. 
• Compliance with laws, regulations, contracts, SLAs, etc. 
4.2.5 Enhancing Flexibility 
In the outsourcing context, where environments are less stable and more 
systems are integrated together, it is more likely that the planned security 
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solutions will change over the project’s phases, in order to meet new security 
requirements or to provide more efficient methods for dealing with the current 
security requirements. The security programme or framework should therefore 
embrace a flexibility feature to accommodate any need for change or 
improvement. The Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model [154] is an example that 
can be used to continuously improve security solutions during the project phases. 
4.2.6 Improving Usability 
Outsourced projects usually last for a specific period of time. Therefore, any 
security programme or framework for managing the security of outsourced IT 
projects should be usable for this context from different perspectives. At least, the 
programme or framework should be usable from the following perspectives: 
• Cost effectiveness. 
• Time efficiency. 
• Simplicity and ease of use. 
4.2.7 Enhancing Reusability 
Outsourced IT projects may have different things in common such as 
environments, assets, etc. Therefore, any security programme or framework to be 
used for managing the security of outsourced IT projects should utilise previous 
threat identification and risk assessment for new outsourced IT projects. This 
will speed up the process and provide a more efficient way to allocate resources 
(these can be allocated to other tasks instead of repeating previous tasks). The 
framework should also be independent from different constraints such as the 
project type, cost, or size, in order to provide a general methodology that can be 
tailored to fit any project. It is essential that the security programme or 
framework is developed to fit different project types, sizes or missions. 
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4.3 IT Outsourcing Case Study 
This case study represents a simplified but real outsourced IT project. It was 
used to assess the applicability of the existing ISMS standards and frameworks, 
which were discussed in Chapter 3, to managing the security and compliance 
risks of outsourced IT projects. It will also be used in Chapter 5 when developing 
the new framework, which will be used for managing security and compliance 
risks in the outsourcing context. 
In the case study, a Middle-East country wishes, through its technical agent 
(we call this the client), to contract with a single preferred provider for designing, 
developing, and implementing a system that will collect and process Advanced 
Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Records (PNR). All airlines 
flying to, out or within the country must provide the client with the booking 
information (PNR) and the check-in data (API) of all passengers. 
The API/PNR system will interface with airlines’ Reservation Control 
Systems (RCS) to collect PNR data, and with airlines’ Departure Control Systems 
(DCS) to collect the API data of all the passengers (inbound, outbound, transit or 
domestic). Small airlines (also buses and ships for land and sea borders) that do 
not have RCS or DCS will be able to provide their passengers’ data over the 
Internet using the client’s website. 
The API/PNR system will be integrated with the client’s existing critical 
applications, opened to the Internet, and executed on-site with the ability of the 
provider’s staff to access different client data centres. The client’s assets, 
including its watch list data and the API/PNR assets, must be protected from 
internal and external threats in order to achieve confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the client information system, as well as the APP/PNR data and 
information provided. The question is how to effectively manage the security and 
compliance risks of the API/PNR system? The API/PNR system is large and 
complex as it will be integrated with the client’s and stakeholders’ systems. It 
also has a tight schedule and must be executed within 18 months. With the 
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existing ISMS standards and frameworks, the following issues will be 
encountered: 
• Lack of a comprehensive methodology that tells project teams how to 
manage the security risks that might take place while implementing 
the project. With the lack of such a methodology, project teams will 
have to spend a great deal of time finding suitable security 
recommendations that are applicable to the API/PNR project. 
• Absence or weak methods for enforcing compliance with security 
requirements and controls. Clients in many cases are left with an 
inability to enforce compliance properly. If they want to audit 
compliance, they might have to hire external auditors, which will add 
extra costs and time. 
• Flexibility and usability difficulties. In outsourcing projects, it is 
expected that security requirements change over time due to new risks 
or environment changes. Without a clear method to implement 
changes, these changes might introduce new risks. These difficulties 
can also lead to delays in the project schedule and increase costs, as 
resources will be needed to analyse and plan the new changes. 
• Weak threat classification approaches. In the outsourcing context, 
threats arise from different agents such as providers, clients, external 
attackers, and environmental and physical threats. Therefore, the 
threat classification approach used should be systematic and 
comprehensive. It should also consider risks from different perspectives 
to be able to identify the potential security threats that the project 
might face. 
In the above case study, existing ISMS standards and framework are not able 
to effectively manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
In Chapter 5, we will use this case study to illustrate how the OSCR framework 
overcomes these issues. 
  
73 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the requirements for managing the security and compliance 
risks of outsourced IT projects have been identified. To design an effective 
solution, the security programme or framework should meet specific 
requirements such as aligning security management with project management, 
establishing a comprehensive methodology for managing security requirements, 
managing security risks from different perspectives, managing compliance, 
enhancing flexibility and reusability, and improving usability. 
The case study presented in this chapter shows that different security and 
compliance risk issues exist when using existing ISMSs. The Lack of a 
comprehensive methodology, improper compliance enforcement, and weak threat 
classification approaches are examples of these issues.  
In the next chapter, a framework will be designed for managing the security 
and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. It will be designed to meet these 
requirements and to be able to manage the variation of security requirements, as 
well as to provide a methodology that guides organisations for the purpose of 
security management and implementation. 
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Chapter 5 Management of Outsourced IT Project 
Security and Compliance Risks  
The previous chapter proposed specific requirements for effectively managing 
the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. These requirements 
provide a broad and comprehensive base for developing any solution to be used in 
an outsourcing context. In this chapter, we present our framework, which is 
designed to meet the proposed requirements. 
5.1 Introduction  
Although the framework that will be introduced in this chapter for managing 
the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects is independent from 
any project management standard or framework, the five process groups  (project 
phases) of the Project Management Body of Knowledge Standard (PMBOK) will 
be utilised. PMBOK is considered internationally as a de facto standard for 
managing projects [155], and it is expected that the majority of providers use this 
standard. For these reasons, we have built our framework on the project phases 
of the PMBOK standard. Nevertheless, the framework can work with or without 
any project management standard. Its own activities are identified and 
independent from any standard. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: we introduce the framework 
to be used for managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT 
projects in Section 5.2. We discuss the framework features in Section 5.3, and we 
summarise this chapter in Section 5.4. 
5.2 Managing the Security and Compliance Risks of 
Outsourced IT Projects 
In this section, we propose a framework for managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects, called the OSCR framework 
(Outsourcing Security and Compliance Risks framework). The OSCR framework 
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utilises project phases (initiating, planning, execution, monitoring and 
controlling, and closing) and the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model. Each project 
phase has its own security activities. During the planning, execution, and 
monitoring and controlling phases, the PDCA model is applied. Managing project 
security and compliance risks should be aligned with the project phases as 
discussed in the previous chapter, with the consideration of improvements during 
the project’s execution to improve flexibility. Figure 5.1 presents the main 
architecture of the OSCR framework, while Table 5.1 provides a summary of the 
phases, main units, deliverables and responsibilities of the OSCR framework. 
The workflow of the OSCR framework is presented in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.1: OSCR Framework 
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Table 5.1 : OSCR Framework’s Units, Deliverables and Responsibilities 
  Main Units Main Deliverables Responsibility 
Initiating 
Phase 
Project Unit Project data identification  
The Client Stakeholders’ Unit Project stakeholders’ data  
Potential Security Risks 
Unit Potential security risks list  
Planning 
Phase 
Security Requirements 
Unit Security requirements list 
The Client & 
Provider 
Assets Unit Assets list 
Threat Classification 
Unit Threats list 
Risk Assessment Unit Risks exposure and prioritisation 
Security Controls Unit Security controls list 
Roles And 
Responsibilities Unit 
Roles and responsibilities 
details 
Risk Repository Unit Risks document 
Security Plans Unit Security plans  
Executing 
Phase 
Performance Unit Performance reports 
The Client & 
Provider 
Security Issues Unit Security issues reports 
Change Request Unit Change requests  
Security Deliverables 
Unit Security deliverables 
Monitoring 
and 
Controlling 
Phase 
Evaluation Unit Performance improvements  
The Client & 
Provider 
Issues Resolution Unit Issues resolution  
Change Approval Unit Changes approval  
Deliverables Approval 
Unit 
Deliverables approval 
Project plans and document 
updates 
Closing 
Phase 
Auditing Unit Auditing report 
The Client & 
Provider Lessons Learned Unit Lessons learned list 
Closure Unit Formal closure certificate 
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Figure 5.2: OSCR Framework Workflow 
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The following sub-sections detail the OSCR framework components and 
explain how it works using the API/PNR case study. 
5.2.1 Initiating Phase 
 
Figure 5.3: Initiating Phase 
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The aim of this phase is to establish the project’s unique data, and identify 
the main project stakeholders and general security risks to which the project 
might be exposed. The client is responsible for this phase, as no provider has yet 
been selected. This phase achieves its objectives through the following units: 
 Project Unit 
This unit handles all of the project’s essential data. If the project is new, the 
client uses this unit to produce the project data details such as project ID, name, 
code etc. If the project already exists, the client can update any project details, if 
there is a need for such an update. The project ID will be the primary key, used 
to distinguish the project from other projects. All security risks and plans, or any 
other security works related to this project, will use the unique project ID. If the 
client has a Project Management Office (PMO), then the project unit should be 
produced and managed by the PMO team. If not, then the projects department or 
any other department should be responsible for the project unit. In our case study 
(API/PNR), the output of this unit is presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Project Essential Data 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Project Name Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record 
Project Type Web Application 
Project Start Date 01/01/2012 
Project End Date 01/01/2017 
Project Duration 60 Months 
Project Owner Moneef Almutairi 
Project Provider XYZ Company (if it is known) 
Project Manager Thomas Marten (if it is known) 
Project Cost $ 100000000 
 Stakeholders Unit 
The aim of this unit is to identify the project stakeholders who will be 
involved in the project. If security risks are to be managed appropriately, it is 
essential to firstly identify all the parties involved in the project implementation, 
and secondly to identify their roles and responsibilities in the project execution. It 
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should be noted that stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities differ based on their 
level of involvement in the project execution. Some stakeholders might be 
involved in executing some security plans partially or totally developed by the 
project team, whereas other stakeholders may receive some security awareness 
sessions only.  
Table 5.3 presents an example of the stakeholders of the API/PNR project. 
Table 5.3: Stakeholders’ Data 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Stakeholders’ Data 
Stakeholder Name Stakeholder Type Stakeholder Role 
General Immigration 
Directorate Government Sector End user 
Security Affairs 
Directorate Government Sector 
General background check of 
outsourced staff 
General investigation 
Directorate Government Sector Watch list administrator 
 Potential Security Risks Unit 
The aim of this unit is to identify potential security risks that might take 
place while executing the project. These potential security risks are identified by 
the client’s staff working in the security department, or they can be derived from 
the historical data of similar projects. Although the output of this unit is not a 
comprehensive security analysis, it gives the client’s decision makers a general 
overview of the potential security risks that the organisation might face as a 
result of executing this project. Based on this overview, the decision makers can 
decide whether to implement this project or not, or to implement appropriate 
security controls before implementing the project. In our case study, the potential 
security risks can be similar to the ones in Table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4 : Potential Security Risks 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Potential Security Risks 
RISK ID Risk Description  
1 Information disclosure by provider’s staff 
2 DoS attacks  
3 Unauthorised data centre access by provider’s staff 
4 Malware and Virus  
5 SQL injection attack  
6 Spoofing  
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5.2.2 Planning Phase 
 
Figure 5.4: Planning Phase 
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The planning phase, which represents the (Plan) stage of the PDCA model, is 
the core part of the OSCR framework. The main parties involved in the project 
execution carry out all of the core security activities at this phase. The primary 
parties are the client and the provider. If other stakeholders are involved in 
executing security activities, then they participate with the primary parties in 
preparing the required security analysis and plans. The following sub-sections 
describe the planning phase units in more detail: 
 Security Requirements Unit 
The aim of this unit is to clearly identify the security requirements of the 
project. Without clear security requirements, security analysis and plans may not 
achieve their goals properly. The first step in identifying the security 
requirements is to refer to what has been written by the client in the Request For 
Proposal (RFP) with regard to security requirements. However, the security 
requirements in the RFP might have been changed over time. To make sure that 
security requirements are up to date, the provider needs to review them with the 
client’s related departments. This can be done through workshops or direct 
meetings. When the review of security requirements is complete, the provider 
must document them and both parties, the client and the provider, need to sign 
the document, which represents the output of this unit. Example of API/PNR 
security requirements are presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Security Requirements 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Security Requirements 
Requirement ID Requirement Description 
RQ-1 All messages outside the client’s private intranet must be encrypted 
RQ-2 The system must provide extensive auditing capability, able to record all users and system events 
RQ-3 The system must ensure the confidentiality of the client and the system information  
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Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Security Requirements 
Requirement ID Requirement Description 
RQ-4 The availability of the system must achieve 99.999%. 
RQ-5 The system must support role-based access control 
RQ-6 The system must maintain the privacy and security of traveller data 
RQ-7 The system must be designed to support zoning architecture to separate traffic 
RQ-8 The system must be backed up regularly according to the client’s backup policy 
 Assets Unit 
One crucial step towards managing the security of outsourced IT projects is 
asset identification and categorisation. Without knowing what needs to be 
protected, it might be difficult to identify potential security threats, and to select 
the right security countermeasures to mitigate their impact. 
The first step in this unit is identifying all assets that will be delivered or 
affected by the project. The second step is to categorise the assets into groups. 
Identifying security threats for each asset might be challenging and time 
consuming as large projects usually involve a huge number of assets. Hence, 
categorising them into groups decreases the complexity and difficulty of 
identifying all threats for each asset. However, if the number of assets is not 
large and resources are available, all assets should be identified. The project 
assets can be categorised into the following groups [18, 156]: 
• Software: this includes all applications that will be included in the 
project’s execution. 
• Hardware: this includes all hardware (servers, PCs, etc.) that will be 
included in the project’s execution. 
• Network: this includes all network devices such as switches, routers, 
communications and firewalls that will be included in the project’s 
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execution. It should be noted that network devices can be included in 
the previous group, but have been excluded to better allow the network 
team, which is usually a different department from the hardware 
(servers, hosts, PCs, etc.) department, to concentrate on and manage 
the security risks related to their department’s assets (network assets). 
• Information: this includes all data that will be processed by the project 
or any information produced or stored by the project.  
Table 5.6 provides an example of the project assets for the APP/PNR project. 
Table 5.6: Project Assets 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Project Assets 
Asset Type Asset ID Asset description 
Hardware HW-1 HP 7000 Blade enclosure  HW-2 HP BL460c Blades  
Software 
SW-1 Apache Web Server 
SW-2 Apache Tomcat Application Server 
SW-3 Redhat linux 
SW-4 I2 Analyst Notebook 
Network 
NW-1 Cisco ASA 5520 Firewall 
NW-2 Cisco Load Balancer 
NW-3 Cisco Layer 3 Switch  
Information  IN-1 Traveller information IN-2 The client’s information 
 Threat Classification Unit 
Bearing in mind the limitations of existing threat classification approaches 
explained in the previous chapter, such as the lack of using exhaustive criteria 
and the lack of consideration of the desired properties, we propose a new hybrid 
thread classification approach (called the outsourcing threat classification 
approach) for identifying security threats in an outsourcing context. The 
outsourcing classification approach combines different threat classification 
criteria and takes into consideration the desired properties that good threat 
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classification approaches should have (discussed in Chapter 4). It is a systematic 
and comprehensive approach that takes into account threats from different 
perspectives such as external threats, provider threats, client threats, physical 
and environmental threats. The threat classification criteria that we use in the 
outsourcing threat classification approach are shown in Figure 5.5, and described 
as follows: 
• Threat Source: the origin of the threat, which can be external threats, 
client threats, provider threats, or environmental and physical threats. 
• Threat agent: the agent that causes the threat. This can be technical, 
human, or organisational. 
• Asset type: the type of asset impacted by this threat. It can be 
networks, software, hardware or information. 
• Threat intention: the type of human behaviour that caused the threat. 
It can be accidental or intentional.  
• Environmental and physical threat type: the type of environmental and 
physical threat. It can be controlled or non-controlled. 
• Threat impact: the result of the threat on the information system. It 
can affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability (C-I-A). 
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Figure 5.5: Outsourcing Threat Classification 
In the outsourcing context, where different parties are involved in the 
project’s execution, we suggest that the source of threats can be one of four: 
external attackers, the provider itself, the client, and environmental and physical 
threats. The results of any threat from any source could lead to major security 
risks involving confidentiality, integrity or availability. 
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External threats are either technical or human. Technical threats are those 
that target one or more of the project’s or organisation’s assets. They can target 
the network, software, hardware, or information assets. Such threats employ 
technology (e.g. the internet) to attack the project and organisational assets. 
Human threats might be accidental or intentional and they represent threats 
that are imposed by non-technical actions such as accessing buildings and 
collecting sensitive information without permission. This can be similar to our 
case study external threats shown in Table 5.7.   
Table 5.7: External Threats 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
External Threats Impact 
Technical     
C-I-A 
Software:   
  Malware and virus 
  SQL injection attack 
 Intellectual property theft 
Hardware:   
  Denial of service attack 
  Hardware destruction 
Network:  
  IP spoofing 
  Packet sniffing 
  Session hijacking 
Information:   
  Information intercept 
  Phishing  
Human Accidental:   
  Information disclosure 
Intentional:   
  Unauthorised data or document collection 
The provider threats category represents threats that are imposed by the 
provider who executes the project. Provider threats are divided into three 
categories: technical, human and organisational. Technical threats represent 
threats that affect one or more of the project’s or client’s assets. They can affect 
the network, software, hardware or information assets. Such threats use 
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technology to affect the assets (e.g. software bugs). Human threats might be 
accidental or intentional and they represent threats that are imposed by non-
technical actions such as accessing client data centres without permission and 
collecting sensitive information about the client. The organisational threats 
represent threats imposed by a lack of adequate security procedures and 
processes (e.g. lack of security policies), which might impose security threats on 
both the client and the provider. An example of provider security threats for 
API/PNR project is presented in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8: Provider Threats 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Provider threats Impact 
Technical     
C-I-A 
Software:   
  Lack of event logs 
  Malware and virus 
  Application bugs 
  Improper authentication  
Hardware:   
  Un-patched servers 
  Faulty hardware 
Network:   
  Usage of default configuration  
  Unencrypted messages  
Information:   
  Information destruction 
  Information tampering 
Human Accidental:   
  Information disclosure 
  Human error 
Intentional:   
  Neglecting security policies 
Organisational   Lack of business continuity management 
  Lack of disaster recovery planning 
  Lack of configuration management  
  Lack of incident management 
The third category is client threats. This category has greater importance, 
especially when there is any type of integration with the client’s existing systems. 
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Such integration might affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the 
client’s existing systems. The client threats contain the same categories as the 
provider threats. This category is designed to overcome the limitations of some 
existing threat classification approaches that do not take into consideration 
insider security threats. For our case study, this can be similar to the threats 
presented in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9: Client Threats 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Client threats Impact 
 
Software:   
C-I-A 
  Integration bugs 
  Unauthorised resources access  
Hardware:   
  Hardware failure 
  Hardware obsolescence 
Network:   
  Lack of anti-virus 
  Usage of default configuration  
  Lack of intrusion detection systems 
Information:   
  Information destruction 
  Information intercept 
  Information tampering 
Human Accidental:   
  Information disclosure 
  Accidental bad data entry 
Intentional:   
  Neglecting security policies 
Organisational 
  Improper hardware and data disposal 
  Inadequate assets management 
The fourth category is environmental and physical threats. This category 
represents threats that arise from the environmental and physical conditions. 
These threats might be controlled, such as controlling the temperature of the 
data centre, or uncontrolled, such as earthquakes. Table 5.10 presents an 
example of environmental and physical threats for API/PNR project. 
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Table 5.10: Environmental & Physical Threats 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Environmental & Physical Threats Impact 
Controlled: 
Lack of temperature controlling system 
C-I-A 
Lack of fire resistance system  
Lack of redundant electricity power  
Non-Controlled: 
Earthquakes 
Flood 
Terrorism  
  Risk Assessment Unit  
The ultimate aim of this unit is to estimate and prioritise potential security 
risks’ impacts on project assets. The risk assessment unit has five steps: 
vulnerabilities identification, risk likelihood determination, risk magnitude 
determination, risk estimation and risk prioritisation [19, 157]. These five steps 
are described as follows: 
• Vulnerabilities identification: Vulnerabilities do not harm the 
information system by themselves, but they might be exploited by 
threats to damage the information system or they might cause 
undesired effects on it [158]. Therefore, it is essential to identify all 
vulnerabilities that might be used by the threat sources identified in 
the previous section. 
• Risk likelihood determination: the OSCR framework divides the 
likelihood of the risk into five number ranges (0-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80 
and 81-100). These ranges represent five level values – very low, low, 
moderate, high and very high, respectively. Table 5.11 shows the threat 
likelihood values and their description for the OSCR framework [19]. 
Table 5.11: Threat Likelihoods 
Qualitative 
Values Categories  Description  
Very High 81-100 
Almost certain that threat will be initiated by 
threat sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
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Qualitative 
Values Categories  Description  
High 61-80 
High likely that threat will be initiated by 
threat sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
Moderate 41-60 
Somewhat likely that threat will be initiated 
by threat sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
Low 21-40 
Unlikely that threat will be initiated by threat 
sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
Very Low 0-20 
High unlikely that threat will be initiated by 
threat sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
• Risk magnitude determination: In a similar way to the risk likelihood 
categories, the magnitude or impact of the risk is divided into five 
number categories (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), which represent five level values – 
minor, moderate, major, critical and severe, respectively. Table 5.12 
shows the threat impact values and their description for the OSCR 
framework [19].    
Table 5.12: Threat Impacts (magnitudes) 
 
• Risk estimation: In the OSCR framework, we will use a semi-
quantitative method to estimate the security risks of outsourced IT 
projects, as shown in Table 5.11 and Table 5.12. This will allow 
Qualitative 
Values Categories Description  
Severe 5 Multiple severe or catastrophic impacts on the project or organisational assets if the threat occurs. 
Critical 4 Severe or catastrophic impact on the project or organisational assets if the threat occurs. 
Major 3 Serious impact on the project or organisational assets if the threat occurs. 
Moderate 2 Limited impact on the project or organisational assets if the threat occurs. 
Minor 1 Negligible impact on the project or organisational assets if the threat occurs. 
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decision makers to understand risk assessment results easily and it 
will also help risk assessors to assess risks more accurately and to 
interpret them as an understood value (e.g. 80 interpreted as high).   
We will also use the ordinary Risk Exposure (RE) equation, which has 
been used in many risk assessment analyses for risk estimation.  In the 
RE equation, the risk exposure is the result of the likelihood multiplied 
by the magnitude (the impact) of the risk. The RE equation is used as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ∗  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙  
Following the above guidance and explanation, security risks can be 
estimated easily using the risk exposure equation. For instance, in the APP/PNR 
case study, if we take a web server as an example of a project asset, and a Denial 
of Service (DoS) attack as an example of a threat to that asset, and if we assume 
that there are no intrusion detection systems in place, we can estimate the risk 
exposure as shown in Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13: Risk Estimation 
Project ID 1 Project Code APP/PNR 
Risk ID R2 
Asset Type Hardware 
Asset ID HW-1 
Asset Name Web server 1 
Threat  DoS 
Threat source External threat 
Vulnerability  Lack of intrusion detection systems 
Risk Likelihood 0.95 
Magnitude  4 
Risk Exposure 0.95 * 4 = 3.80 
• Risk prioritisation: the last step in this unit, but by no means the least 
important, is to prioritise the risks estimated in the previous step. The 
aim of this step is to allow project teams to concentrate on the risks 
that potentially have the highest impact on the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of project assets. Table 5.14 shows a 
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representative example of the risk prioritisation of the APP/PNR 
project. 
Table 5.14: Risk Prioritisation 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Risk ID Threat Source Risk Description RE 
R1 External Threat Malware and virus 4.5 
R2 External Threat DoS 3.80 
R3 Client Threat Information disclosure 3.6 
R4 Provider Threat Unencrypted messages  3.2 
R5 External Threat SQL injection attack 3 
R6 Environmental & Physical Threats Terrorism  2.5 
R7 Provider Threat Improper authentication  1.8 
R8 Provider Threat Application bugs 1.8 
R9 Client Threat Usage of default configuration  1.6 
R10 External Threat Unauthorised building access 1.2 
R11 Provider Threat Un-patched servers 0.6 
R12 Provider Threat Faulty hardware 0.2 
 Security Controls Unit 
Having identified the threats of outsourced IT projects, and after assessing 
and prioritising the risks associated with these threats, the project team needs to 
plan security controls (countermeasures) that can mitigate such security risks. 
Countermeasures answer the question of how to protect project assets. 
Security countermeasures should mitigate security risks in a cost-effective 
and efficient way that helps to achieve confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Not all organisations are able to implement security countermeasures at any 
cost, but they aim to implement countermeasures that mitigate the security risks 
efficiently, within the organisation’s cost boundaries [20, 159].  
Security countermeasures are not only technical; other countermeasures such 
as organisational and human play an important role in achieving security goals. 
Therefore, the OSCR framework categorises security countermeasures into three 
groups: technical, organisational and human [20, 159, 160]: 
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• Technical countermeasures: technical solutions that aim to mitigate 
security risks. Technical solutions might be designed for controlling 
hardware, software, network or information risks. Examples of 
technical countermeasures include cryptography, intrusion detection 
systems and role-based access controls. 
• Organisational countermeasures: represent controls that are designed 
to mitigate non-technical security risks. They are administrative and 
legal activities that facilitate building secure and protected 
environments. Examples of organisational countermeasures include 
security polices, contracts, and audit and compliance processes. 
• Human countermeasures: activities designed to educate, train, 
motivate, and improve the security awareness of employees, in order to 
help achieve the organisation’s security goals.   
Table 5.15 shows an example of security countermeasures for the APP/PNR 
case study. 
Table 5.15: Security Countermeasures 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Risk ID Countermeasure Type Security Countermeasures  
R1 Technical  Anti-virus 
R2 Technical  Intrusion detection system, firewalls 
R3 Organisational Non-disclosure agreement 
R4 Technical  Cryptography 
R5 Technical  Anti-virus, intrusion detection system, firewalls 
R6 Organisational Disaster recovery site 
R7 Technical  Role-based access control 
R8 Human Training  
R9 Technical  Disabling of unused ports 
R10 Organisational Physical access control, CCTV 
R11 Technical  Regular updates 
R12 Technical  Prior production tests 
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 Roles and Responsibilities Unit 
The aim of this unit is to assign security activities to project teams using a 
clear method that helps to prevent any ambiguities between the project teams, 
especially if the client and stakeholder teams are involved.  
In the OSCR framework, we propose a role-based RACI method for assigning 
the roles and responsibilities of project security activities. The role- based RACI 
suits the context of outsourced projects, as their resources are not stable and they 
might play a part in the project activities in specific phases only (e.g. planning 
phase) [161]. However, if the project is large and further breakdown is required, 
name-based RACI can be used to complement the role-based RACI. Table 5.16 
provides a representative example of our proposed RACI for the API/PNR project. 
Table 5.16: Roles and Responsibilities 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Security Activity Project Owner 
Project 
Manager 
Business 
Analyst 
Security 
Architect 
Development 
Team 
Security 
requirements  I A R I I 
Project assets I A I R C 
Threat classification I A I R C 
Risk assessment I/A R C C I 
Security controls I A C R C 
Intrusion detection 
system 
implementation 
I A I R C 
Cryptography I A I C R 
Role-based access 
control I A I C R 
Non-disclosure 
agreement A R I I I 
Prior production 
tests I A R I C 
 Risk Repository Unit 
Risks that have been identified, assessed, and prioritised during the planning 
phase or any later phases of the project execution need to be documented and 
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made available for project members’ access whenever needed. The risk repository 
unit achieves this aim and contains all the project security risks that have been 
identified so far. Any risk that has been logged into the risk repository unit 
should have sufficient information about that risk, such as risk ID, description, 
impact, asset name and so on. This information allows the project members to 
have a full understanding and awareness of all the potential security risks, even 
if they are not specialised in security. Table 5.17 provides a representative 
example of a risk repository unit entry.  
Table 5.17: Risk Repository Entry 
Project ID 1 Project Code APP/PNR 
Risk ID R2 
Asset Type Hardware 
Asset ID HW-1 
Asset Name Web server 1 
Threat  DoS 
Threat Source External threat 
Vulnerability  Lack of intrusion detection systems 
Risk Likelihood 0.95 
Magnitude  4 
Risk Exposure 0.95 * 4 = 3.8 
Risk Description 
Web server 1 might be affected by DoS 
attack leading to unavailability of services 
provided by this sever 
Impact on Security Availability  
Security Controls Use of intrusion detection system 
 Security Plans Unit 
The planning phase in the OSCR framework ends with the security plans 
unit. This unit is responsible for developing security plans that will be used to 
achieve the project’s security goals and thus contributes to building a secure and 
protected environment. As they vary from one organisation to another for several 
reasons (e.g. infrastructure design, assets importance, cost) the contents of these 
plans are outside the scope of this research.  Security plans in this unit may 
include the following, which represent an example of API/PNR security plans: 
• Information security policy. 
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• Communications and operations management plan. 
• Access control plan. 
• Information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance plan. 
• Asset management plan. 
• Incident management plan. 
• Business continuity management plan. 
Outsourced IT projects vary in their objectives, assets, threats, risks and so on. 
Therefore, security plans developed in this unit should take into consideration 
this variation and design the required security plans (e.g. business continuity 
plan) so that they suit the project’s context and objectives.   
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5.2.3 Executing Phase 
 
Figure 5.6: Executing Phase 
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In this phase, which represents the (Do) stage of the PDCA model, the 
security plans and controls that were proposed in the previous phase are put into 
practice. Any security issues that might be experienced are documented and 
monitored. If there is any need for improvements or changes, the project team 
will record that. The executing phase achieves its objectives through the 
following units:  
 Performance Unit 
While project personnel engage in executing security activities, they assess 
the performance and report any issues to the management team. The project 
manager monitors and assesses project teams’ performance with regard to 
security activities. If there is any deviation from what has been planned, the 
project manager should take corrective actions. The deviation might result from a 
lack of clarity in security plans, or a lack of personnel skills. Regardless of the 
reason, the project manager is responsible for resolving any deviation.  All 
performance reports should be documented and shared with the project steering 
committee, which should include a project sponsor, program manager, security 
expert and PMO officer from the client. It should also include a program manager 
and security consultant from the provider. The main responsibility of the project 
steering committee is to provide support to the project manager and resolve any 
project issues.     
 Security Issues Unit  
Not all security activities, controls, and plans work as planned. Different 
issues might be experienced by the project. Technologies keep changing over time 
and what might work effectively today could not meet tomorrow’s expectations. 
Other circumstances might contribute to security issues. The complexity of 
environments might lead to conflict and affect the desired security goals that the 
project teams seek. Changes in client environments or security requirements are 
examples of causes that could lead to various security issues. The project teams 
should assess these issues and take corrective actions. Whatever the reasons for 
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security issues, they must be documented by the project manager through this 
unit.  
 Change Requests Unit 
  The aim of this unit is to record all security change requests raised by the 
project manager. If security issues recorded in the previous unit cannot be 
resolved without making changes to what has been planned, then a change 
request must be raised by the project manager through this unit. It is designed to 
control changes and to allow the provider and client to agree on a new plan that 
suits all parties, and, more crucially, one that achieves the desired security goals. 
Moreover, not all new plans can be implemented with the same cost; extra funds 
might need to be allocated by either the provider or the client. The new security 
plans might also conflict with other security plans and controls, which explains 
why this unit is needed.  
 Security Deliverables Unit 
The execution of the project involves achieving project deliverables according to 
the agreed master schedule.  Security deliverables should be monitored by the 
project manager to avoid any delay. The delay in achieving project deliverables, 
regardless of whether or not they are security deliverables, might lead to 
penalties. When security deliverables are achieved, they must be reviewed by the 
project manager to make sure that they meet the project and client’s 
requirements. If they meet the agreed requirements, then they are recorded in 
this unit and will be signed later on by all parties. 
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5.2.4 Monitoring and Controlling Phase 
 
Figure 5.7: Monitoring & Controlling Phase 
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The project execution needs to be monitored and controlled not only by the 
project manager, but also by the project steering committee, to make sure that it 
meets its requirements and to provide all the support required for project 
execution so that it achieves its security and non-security goals. The aim of this 
phase, which represents the (Check) and (Act) stages of the PDCA model, is to 
evaluate the execution performance reports, and assess if there is any need for 
improvements. Moreover, the project steering committee supports the project 
manager in resolving security issues that require their intervention. Security 
change requests and security deliverables are reviewed and approved or rejected 
at this phase too. The monitoring and controlling phase has the following units:  
 Evaluation Unit 
As mentioned in the previous phase, the performance of project execution, 
including security activities and plans, is monitored and documented by the 
project manager and their teams. All performance reports are documented 
through the performance unit. Those reports are reviewed and assessed at this 
phase through the evaluation unit. Based on this review, the project steering 
committee may propose some improvements that could help to achieve project 
security goals in an effective and efficient way. If the performance is good and 
there is no need for any improvement, then the steering committee signs off 
existing performance reports.  
 Issues Resolution Unit  
The aim of this unit is to resolve security issues that might be experienced 
during the project’s execution. Security issues resolution might be beyond the 
ability of the project manager (e.g. client environment change). Therefore, 
intervention from the project steering committee might help to resolve some 
security issues. It should be noted that some security issues might already have 
been resolved by the project manager and their teams, but they are still recorded 
in order to allow the project steering committee to be up to date with all security 
issues.  
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 Change Approval Unit 
Changes in security requirements, controls, or plans need to be approved by 
the client and the provider. These changes might lead to other impacts such as 
project security controls, budget increase or schedule extension. Therefore, the 
aim of this unit is to allow the project steering committee to analyse these 
changes and assess their potential impacts on the project. If these changes can be 
tolerated by both parties, then they approve them. However, approved changes 
may require the project team to update other security controls or plans in order 
to avoid any conflict that might lead to new security issues. 
 Deliverables Approval Unit 
   The project security deliverables are planned according to the agreed 
master schedule. All project deliverables that meet the client’s requirements were 
reviewed and documented by the project manager in the previous phase. The aim 
of this unit is to review and approve, or reject, the deliverables that have been 
achieved so far. This review and approval, or rejection, is carried out by the 
project steering committee. Any rejected security deliverable goes back to the 
project manager who updates the deliverable based on the steering committee 
comments and then the deliverable undergoes the same process again. 
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5.2.5 Closing Phase 
 
Figure 5.8: Closing Phase 
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When the project execution comes to the end, the project will be handed over 
to the client. Before the client takes control, the project requirements, including 
the security requirements, need to be verified to make sure that the project has 
achieved its security and non-security goals. The aim of this phase is to audit and 
verify the project requirements in order to close the project officially and issue 
the provider with the project closure certificate. Moreover, the lessons learned 
during the project phases are documented at this phase for future use. The 
closing phase has the following units:  
 Auditing Unit  
Security requirements that have been agreed by both parties, the client and 
provider, need to be validated and assessed before the transition of the project 
starts. The aim of this unit is to demonstrate that the applications or the 
products being delivered by the project are secure and that they work according 
to the requirements agreed in the project scope of the work. The validation and 
assessment may use different techniques based on the type of services being 
delivered by the project. Check lists or reviewing the project security deliverables 
and documents are examples that can be used for security auditing. Another 
example is penetration tests that can be used to demonstrate whether the project 
deliverables (e.g. applications, products) are secure as claimed or not. 
Vulnerabilities assessment is another example of project auditing that can help 
to evaluate the level of security risks that might be involved in the project 
products.   
 Lessons Learned Unit 
Mistakes are not always detrimental; sometimes they prevent organisations 
from repeating similar mistakes. It is important to document all lessons learned 
during the project execution. This is more important for organisations where 
outsourcing represents an integral part of their business. Such lessons could help 
organisations to avoid similar mistakes with future projects, which will help 
them to save their resources. Lessons learned should not be only mistakes; 
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positive actions that could have a significant impact on the security of the project 
should be taken into consideration as well. Whatever the type of project lesson 
learned, they should all be documented for future use through this unit. 
 Closure Unit 
The last step in the OSCR framework is to close the project formally. The 
client will have to issue the provider with a project closure certificate. By issuing 
this certificate, the client and all stakeholders involved in this project agree that 
the project has completed all its requirements and achieved its objectives. 
Moreover, responsibility for the project is transitioned officially to the client. As a 
result, the project is closed and the contract comes to an end.   
5.3 Analysis 
To manage the security and compliance risks in the outsourcing context 
effectively, we have proposed the OSCR framework. It is designed to provide a 
comprehensive methodology that provides organisations with the ability to 
minimise, mitigate or eliminate security risks in the early stages of project 
execution. The OSCR framework uses a hybrid threat classification approach 
that has been designed for the outsourcing context. It is designed to overcome the 
lack of exhaustive criteria limitation of existing threat classification approaches. 
Threats are considered from different perspectives to be able to identify all the 
potential security threats that the project might face.  
The OSCR framework is an asset-based approach that allows the framework 
to be independent from different constraints such as project size, type or time. 
The asset-based approach addresses variation in security requirements from one 
organisation to another as the approach is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach. It 
identifies assets that will be delivered by the project, assesses the security risks 
related to these assets, and proposes the appropriate security controls.   
Many project management and software development approaches, such as 
Waterfall and Agile, have been developed and adopted by different organisations. 
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The Waterfall model is a sequential development process, in which progress 
comes to existence through specific phases (requirements, design, development, 
testing and maintenance). The requirements should be clear (and remain 
unchanged in all phases) before moving to the design phase. The implementation 
based on this model is easy as it is a linear model and the resources required are 
minimal. Agile is an iterative methodology in which requirements are delivered 
iteratively and incrementally throughout the project life cycle. The requirements 
can be changed and customers’ satisfaction is achieved through quick and 
continuous delivery of small and working pieces of software [162, 163].     
While existing project management and software development approaches, 
such as Waterfall, Agile, etc., concentrate on the principles and processes that 
can be used to improve the software development process, the OSCR concentrates 
on the security and compliance processes that can be used to avoid or mitigate 
security risks when outsourcing. Although the OSCR framework uses specific 
phases, it is built upon the PDCA model, which allows the OSCR framework to 
overcome the limitation of Waterfall in responding to requirement changes. 
While the benefits of Agile can be seen more obviously in small projects and the 
required knowledge to implement it is high, the OSCR framework is independent 
from different constraints, such as the project size or time, and can be followed 
with fundamental knowledge of security management [162, 163]. The main 
features of the OSCR framework are summarised as follows: 
• Provides a systematic and comprehensive approach for managing the 
security and compliance risks when IT projects are outsourced. It takes 
into account all of the parties involved in the completion of the project’s 
execution, such as providers, the client and stakeholders. 
• It is a structured approach, which uses project phases to manage and 
control project security risks. 
• The Plan-Do-Check-Act model that the OSCR framework is built upon 
allows flexibility. The teams that are managing the security risks are 
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able to constantly oversee and assess the security controls and are 
therefore quickly able to execute any required improvements. 
• The OSCR framework is easy to use. Security risks can be managed 
separately in each project phase. 
• The OSCR framework is an asset-based approach that provides a 
general approach, meaning that it is suitable for projects of any size or 
type. 
• Compliance with security requirements and controls is enforced 
throughout the project’s execution.  
• The OSCR framework is reusable as similar projects can use the same 
risk analysis and threat classification.  
5.4 Summary  
In this chapter, we introduced the OSCR framework for the management of 
the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. It is designed to meet 
all identified requirements (previously discussed in Chapter 4) and to overcome 
any weaknesses in existing ISMS standards and frameworks. Risks associated 
with all parties involved in the project execution are analysed and managed in a 
systematic way. It is a structured approach, which uses project phases to manage 
and control project security risks. The framework is flexible as it follows the 
PDCA model, which allows the project teams involved in managing security risks 
to monitor and evaluate security controls continuously, and implement any 
improvements or changes. Simplicity and ease of use are other features of the 
OSCR framework as it utilises project phases for the management of security 
risks, which allows the separate management of security risks during each 
phase. The OSCR framework is independent from different constraints such as 
project size or type as it is an asset-based approach. The risks analysis and threat 
classification of the current project can be applied to new projects that have 
similarities, making reusability another feature of the OSCR framework.  
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In the following chapters, the OSCR framework will be evaluated. The 
evaluation will include a real case study, and also a focus group to provide 
independent validation evidence. 
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Chapter 6 Expert Evaluation  
As presented in Chapter 5, we have developed the OSCR framework for 
managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. In this 
chapter we present our first method (experts’ evaluation) for evaluating the 
OSCR framework. It was difficult to find one evaluation method that achieves all 
the evaluation objectives. Several factors such as cost, time, participants’ 
availability, and IT projects’ suitability impose different constraints or 
limitations on each evaluation method.     
6.1 Introduction 
The first evaluation method that we used was a focus group and 
questionnaire. The focus group is a powerful qualitative method that can be used 
to stimulate and explore participants’ experiences, ideas, opinions and attitudes 
towards the topic under investigation. It relies on interactions between 
participants to generate rich and detailed data while they discuss the topic with 
each other and with the researcher. Such dynamic interactions can provide a 
powerful technique for data generation, especially when existing knowledge 
about the topic under investigation is not enough, or when the topic is very 
complex and includes many variables [164, 165]. 
A focus group has many advantages over other research methods. The three 
most important advantages that make the focus group a good choice compared 
with other research methods are exploration and discovery, context and depth, 
and interpretation. The interactions and discussions with the topic context allow 
the researcher to collect rich and detailed data, which can be interpreted to form 
valid evidence about the research topic [166]. Thus, a focus group has the 
potential to reveal clear opinions about the OSCR framework. Because of these 
advantages, we decided to employ a focus group for evaluating the OSCR 
framework and we enhanced it with an online questionnaire.    
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Our focus group evaluation method was designed to evaluate the usefulness 
and coverage of each phase and its security units, as well as evaluating the 
general architecture of the OSCR framework. The aim of this evaluation was to 
draw ideas and recommendations from relevant people involved in outsourcing. 
Those people are believed to contribute to improving the OSCR framework by 
identifying potential weaknesses that it might have or by providing 
recommendations that help to improve the OSCR framework. The members of 
the focus group were from a government IT agent in the Middle East that had 
outsourced more than one hundred IT projects between 2010 and 2017. A variety 
of projects, including small and large, mission-critical, software and hardware 
projects, have been executed through different local and international providers. 
This agent is mature in terms of its security management practices and it follows 
leading ISMSs such as the ISO 2700x family and SABSA. It also has a Research 
and Development (R&D) centre and a Project Management Office (PMO) that 
follows Project Management Institute (PMI) standards.  For these reasons, it was 
decided to recruit experts from this agent and to conduct the focus group at its 
premises. This provided a convenient way for participants and the researcher to 
take part in this evaluation and to communicate and discuss their ideas and 
recommendations without constraints such as time zones or focus group 
arrangement expenses (e.g. hotels or transport).     
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: the evaluation 
objectives and scope are presented in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 respectively. The 
evaluation hypotheses are stated in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, the evaluation 
methodology is explained. We describe the questionnaire design, participants’ 
selection and evaluation procedure in Sections 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 respectively.  In 
Section 6.9, we present the evaluation results. We analyse the results in Section 
6.10. In Section 6.11, a summary of this chapter is provided.  
6.2 Evaluation Objectives 
The focus group evaluation and the questionnaire were designed to achieve 
specific objectives. The following lists the general objectives of this evaluation: 
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1. Identify potential weaknesses that may affect the ability of the OSCR 
framework to manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced 
IT projects effectively. 
2. Gather recommendations from expert people in outsourcing that could 
be used to improve the OSCR framework. 
3. Evaluate the general architecture of the OSCR framework, including 
the outsourcing threat classification approach that has been designed 
for the outsourcing context.  
6.3 Evaluation Scope 
The scope of the evaluation using the focus group and questionnaire covers 
different aspects of the OSCR framework such as: 
1. Achievement of promising features of the OSCR framework such as 
simplicity and ease of use. 
2. Usefulness of utilising project phases and units in managing the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
3. Flexibility of the OSCR framework as it utilises the Plan-Do-Check-Act 
(PDCA) model in managing the security and compliance risks in the 
outsourcing context. 
4. The framework units’ coverage of security aspects that need to be taken 
into consideration in the outsourcing context.  
5. Achievement of a systematic and comprehensive methodology for 
managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects 
using the OSCR framework. 
6. Effectiveness of the outsourcing threat classification approach for 
identifying security threats in the outsourcing context. 
7. The ability of the OSCR framework to be applied to any project as it is 
independent from different constraints such as project size, cost or 
duration. 
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6.4   Evaluation Hypotheses 
Six hypotheses were developed and tested in the evaluation: 
1. The OSCR framework is understandable, simple and easy to use [H1]. 
2. Utilising project phases for managing security and compliance risks is 
useful in the outsourcing context [H2]. 
3. The PDCA model improves the flexibility of security and compliance 
management in the outsourcing context [H3]. 
4. The OSCR framework provides a systematic and comprehensive 
methodology for managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects [H4]. 
5. Using the outsourcing threat classification approach provides an 
effective and useful way for identifying security threats in the 
outsourcing context [H5]. 
6. The OSCR framework can be generalised and applied to any project as 
it is independent from different constraints such as project size or cost 
[H6].  
6.5 Evaluation Methodology 
The following points summarise the methodology that has been used to 
conduct this evaluation:  
1. Selecting an appropriate agent who has long experience in IT 
outsourcing, security and compliance risk management. 
2. Recruiting appropriate people who meet specific criteria (presented in 
Section 6.7). These criteria were used to select potential participants 
including program managers, project managers, PMO officers, security 
and project team members, and architecture and application 
development teams from both sides: the client and the provider. 
3. Conducting a series of workshops that present the OSCR framework to 
each group, for example a program managers’ workshop, a project 
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managers’ workshop, and so on. Other workshops were conducted for 
undefined groups such as application and security management teams.   
4. Discussing with the attendees their comments and clarifying for them 
the OSCR framework features. Their recommendations were discussed 
and considered as well as their criticisms. 
5. At the end of each workshop, the attendees were invited to evaluate the 
OSCR framework and to provide their recommendations in order to 
improve the OSCR framework, using the online questionnaire.  
6.6 Questionnaire Design 
The evaluation data of the OSCR framework were collected using an online 
questionnaire, in addition to the focus group data. The online questionnaire 
provides a convenient way of collecting data for the researcher and it allows the 
participants to provide their feedback without time pressures or any other 
influence such as job role or colleagues’ opinions. To encourage the participants to 
take part in this evaluation, and to save their time, most of the questionnaire 
questions were guided. However, after each guided question, a space for 
comments was provided in case the participant wished to add a comment, 
criticism or recommendation. Several studies have shown that odd numbers of 
choices could be used as a dumping ground when participants are not sure about 
their answers or when they want to choose a legitimate answer that is socially 
desirable [167]. For this reason, the choices of answers were designed carefully. 
Odd numbers of choices were avoided. This could help to avoid random selection 
and encourage the participants to think carefully before choosing their 
appropriate answer. To reduce any influence of bias, such as job role or 
colleagues’ opinions, and to achieve anonymity, the evaluation was completed 
online and providing names was optional. The evaluation questions were 
categorised into two groups. The first group concentrated on evaluating the 
OSCR framework phases and their units. The second group focused on evaluating 
the general architecture of the OSCR framework.  
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6.7 Participant Selection  
Participation in the workshops and the evaluation was entirely voluntary. 
However, the invitation was only sent to participants who met specific criteria, as 
listed below:   
1. The participant should have relevant experience in IT projects and 
related areas such as security and applications development. 
2. Participants should have industrial experience in outsourcing IT 
projects. 
3. Participants have experience in a range of IT projects such as small, 
large, mission-critical and application development projects. 
4. Participant’s role is program manager, project manager, project team 
member, PMO officer, security specialist, IT architect, or applications 
developer. 
6.8 Evaluation Procedure  
Six groups were identified before conducting the workshops: program 
managers (client side), project managers (client side), project managers (provider 
side), project team members (both sides), PMO officers (client side), and security, 
architecture, and applications team members (both sides). Categorising the 
attendees into these groups was intended to provide an environment where the 
participants shared almost the same levels of knowledge, issues and concerns. 
The other reason for this categorisation was to reduce influence or bias that could 
result from the participants’ job roles, such as the influence of program managers 
on their project managers or the influence of project managers on their project 
team members. The last group was for independent participants, who have a 
wider view as they work on the organisation or provider level rather than at the 
project level. They have different backgrounds such as application development, 
security policies and compliance management.  
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Six focus group workshops were conducted based on the attendees’ groups. It 
was planned that each workshop would be attended by 6-10 participants and last 
between 60 and 90 minutes. The material was prepared and the questions were 
determined for the focus groups. To help monitor the recording and other 
equipment (e.g. projector, PC, etc.), and to arrange refreshments, a moderator 
was arranged. The location for the focus group workshops was based on the 
building where the majority of the outsourced IT projects were executed. The 
invitation was then sent to potential participants with the timetables and 
location for the workshops.  
At each workshop, the researcher welcomed the participants and explained 
the objectives of the workshop. The participants were told that the information 
would be confidential and that their anonymity would be maintained as the 
researcher had signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). The researcher then 
presented the OSCR framework and explained its phases, units and features. 
During the presentation, the attendees could ask for any clarification. When the 
researcher had completed the presentation, an open discussion was provided to 
draw out the attendees’ comments, criticisms, suggestions or recommendations. 
All workshops were recorded in order to allow the researcher to analyse the data 
carefully. At the end of each workshop, all of the attendees were invited to 
provide their feedback using the online questionnaire. The workshops were 
attended by 45 participants.  Although the evaluation link was sent to all of the 
participants by email, no pressure was placed on the attendees to complete it. 
Despite the lack of pressure, we still received 30 responses. As the researcher has 
signed an NDA, the exact attendees’ comments, criticisms, suggestions or 
recommendations will not be provided. Instead, a summary of the exact scripts 
will be presented and discussed in this chapter. This will help to overcome the 
limitation introduced by signing the NDA. 
6.9 Evaluation Results  
In this section we present the evaluation results. The IBM SPSS statistics 24 
tool was used to analyse the results. 
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6.9.1 Descriptive statistics 
A total of 30 participants responded to the questionnaire. As can be seen from 
Table 6.1, the organisational distribution shows that the highest number of 
participants belonged to the client 22 (73.3%), while participants from all the 
providers were 8 (26.7%).  
 Table 6.1: Participants’ Distribution by Organisation 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Client 22 73.3 73.3 
Providers 8 26.7 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
In terms of role, as presented in Table 6.2, most of the people (12, 40.0%), who 
participated in the study were project managers, whereas the smallest 
participant category was program managers (4, 13.3%).  
Table 6.2: Participants’ Distribution by Role 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Program Manager 4 13.3 13.3 
Project Manager 12 40.0 53.3 
Project Team 
Member 
9 30.0 83.3 
Other 5 16.7 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
With regard to qualifications, as shown in Table 6.3, the highest percentage 
(53.3%) of the participants had a Bachelor degree (n=16). There was only one 
participant with a Diploma, and similarly another with a PhD. 
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Table 6.3: Participants’ Distribution by Qualification 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Diploma 1 3.3 3.3 
Bachelor 16 53.3 56.7 
Master 12 40.0 96.7 
PhD 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
In terms of work experience, the majority of participants had either more 
than 10 years’ or 7-10 years’ experience in IT outsourcing, representing 66.6% in 
total. Only 13.3% had between 1 and 3 years of work experience in outsourced IT 
projects. Table 6.4 shows the participants’ distribution based on their experience. 
Table 6.4: Participants’ Distribution by Experience 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 1-3 years 4 13.3 13.3 
4-6 years 6 20.0 33.3 
7-10 years 10 33.3 66.7 
more 10 33.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
The participants were asked about the current security framework or 
standard that they used for managing the security risks of outsourced IT 
projects. The vast majority of the study population did not use any (16, 53.3%). 
Table 6.5 shows the participants’ distribution based on the ISMS they used. 
Table 6.5: Participants’ Distribution by ISMS Used 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 ISO 2700X 8 26.7 26.7 
SABSA 4 13.3 40.0 
None 16 53.3 93.3 
Other 2 6.7 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
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6.9.2 Framework Phases and Units Evaluation  
This part of the evaluation was designed to evaluate the usefulness (in terms 
of cost effectiveness, time efficiency and ease of use) of each phase units of the 
OSCR framework, as well as the coverage of the security aspects of this phase 
that need to be taken into consideration when managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. For the usefulness of the units of each 
phase, we have used a Likert-type scale using four ranks [167, 168] (not useful, 
somewhat useful, useful, and very useful). ‘Not useful’ means that the majority of 
the units of the phase are unlikely to add any value in terms of managing the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects, whereas ‘somewhat 
useful’ means that some of the units of the phase are unlikely to add value.  
‘Useful’ means that only a few units of the phase are unlikely to add value. ‘Very 
useful’ means that all units of the phase are likely to add value when managing 
outsourcing security and compliance risks. Although we avoided having an odd 
number of options for the answers, in order to reduce the use of the middle option 
as a dumping ground, this introduced potential bias towards the positive options 
(somewhat useful, useful, and very useful). However, the participants could still 
choose the negative option (not useful). For the coverage of the security aspects 
for each phase, we provided four options and the participants could choose one or 
more of the options. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix A.  
 Initiating Phase Evaluation 
The evaluation of the usefulness of the initiating phase, as presented in Table 
6.6, shows that 36.7% of the participants voted it as being "very useful", and 
53.3% of the participants regarded it as "useful" in terms of managing the 
security risks of outsourced IT projects. The "somewhat useful" option gained 
6.7% of the votes, whereas the "not useful" option has only 3.3% of the 
participants’ votes.  
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Table 6.6: Initiating Phase Units’ Usefulness 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Very useful 11 36.7 36.7 
Useful 16 53.3 90.0 
Somewhat useful 2 6.7 96.7 
Not useful 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
In the evaluation of the coverage of security aspects for the initiating phase, 
38.7% of participants thought that these units covered all of the required security 
aspects. 48.4% of participants indicated that the units covered most of the 
required security aspects, while the option “misses required security units” was 
chosen by 6.5% of the participants. The same percentage (6.5%) of the 
participants’ votes went to the option saying that the initiating phase covered 
unnecessary units. Table 6.7 shows the distribution of the participants across the 
options provided for this question. It should be noted that the participants could 
choose more than one option. 
Table 6.7: Initiating Phase Coverage 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Initiating Phase 
Coverage 
Covers all required 
security aspects in this 
phase 
12 38.7% 40.0% 
Covers most of the 
required security aspects 
in this phase 
15 48.4% 50.0% 
Misses required units 2 6.5% 6.7% 
Covers unnecessary 
units 
2 6.5% 6.7% 
Total 31 100.0% 103.3% 
 Initiating Phase Comments and Recommendations 
In this section, we discuss the participants’ comments and recommendations 
provided during the workshops or through the online questionnaire. Each 
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comment or recommendation will be stated and the response and the action 
taken will be provided.  
• Recommendation 1: It was recommended by a participant to keep the 
identification of potential security risks at an abstract level to 
minimise costs.  
Response: The risk identification task is vital in order to have risk 
visibility at an early stage when correction costs are minimal. We see 
that the more detailed the identification of potential security risks is, 
the more risk visibility is controlled and mitigated. The level of 
potential security risks identification, whether an abstract level or not, 
depends on different factors such as the organisation’s resources and 
the project’s requirements.  
Action: No change to the OSCR framework.  
• Recommendation 2: One participant suggested moving the potential 
security risks unit to the planning phase to minimise the time and cost 
required for this process.  
Response: The aim of this unit is to identify potential security risks 
that might take place while executing the project. This allows decision 
makers to take the right decision over whether to outsource or not 
before contracting with the provider. If we move this unit to the 
planning phase, the organisation may enter a contract without 
realising the security risks associated with this contract.  
Action: No change to the OSCR framework.  
• Recommendation 3: Another participant suggested adding an 
infrastructure/asset unit at this phase. This is to identify security risks 
at a network level and the required implementations such as firewall, 
protocols etc. 
Response: Although this suggestion seems to be beneficial, it will be 
difficult to implement it at this phase using a new unit as there is no 
project yet. Additionally, the OSCR framework has an assets unit at 
the planning phase, which includes network and infrastructure assets.  
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Action: No change to the OSCR framework.  
• Recommendation 4: The last suggestion was to add a new unit for 
implementing security mitigations that can mitigate the identified 
potential security risks before outsourcing.  
Response: We see this suggestion as valid and it does not conflict with 
any unit in the other phases.  
Action: the OSCR framework was updated to accommodate this 
suggestion. 
 Planning Phase  
The usefulness evaluation of the planning phase units was conducted in a 
similar way to that of the initiating phase evaluation. In Table 6.8, we can see 
that 43.3% of the participants voted in favour of the “very useful” option. 46.7% of 
the participants said that the planning phase units were useful for managing the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 6.7% of the total 
participants’ votes went to the option “somewhat useful”, while the “not useful” 
option was selected by only 3.3% of the participants.  
Table 6.8: Planning Phase Usefulness 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Very useful 13 43.3 43.3 
Useful 14 46.7 90.0 
Somewhat useful 2 6.7 96.7 
Not useful 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
Having evaluated the usefulness of the planning phase units, the participants 
evaluated the coverage of the security aspects in this phase. In Table 6.9, we see 
that 45.2% of the participants were in favour of the option that says that the 
planning phase covers all the required security aspects. The option “covers most 
security aspects in this phase” was chosen by 51.6% of the participants, whereas 
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the option “covers unnecessary units” received 3.2% of the participants’ votes. 
The option “misses some required units” was not selected by any participants.  
Table 6.9: Planning Phase Coverage 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Planning Phase 
Coverage 
Covers all required 
security aspects in this 
phase 
14 45.2% 46.7% 
Covers most of the 
required security aspects 
in this phase 
16 51.6% 53.3% 
Covers unnecessary 
units 
1 3.2% 3.3% 
Total 31 100.0% 103.3% 
 Planning Phase Comments and Recommendations  
• Comment 1: A comment from a participant says that these units 
present a methodological approach towards having correct risk 
identification and understanding, which consequently enables proper 
risk planning.  
Response: This comment exactly complies with the OSCR framework 
goals. The identification and assessment of security risks and security 
controls should be carried out early in the life cycle of the project by the 
two parties, the outsourced project provider and the client. This will 
allow proper handling of all risks at the early stages of the project life 
cycle where corrections can usually be made at minimum costs.  
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
• Recommendation 1: A human unit was suggested by a participant. 
According to this suggestion, a new human unit should be added to the 
OSCR framework to identify the number and roles of key resources 
involved in executing the project. Humans are considered to be a risk 
and the OSCR framework should identify their security risks in the 
project. 
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• Response: Taking this suggestion into consideration, we found that 
human resources are part of the project assets. The OSCR framework 
has a unit for project assets but does not take the human element into 
consideration.   
• Action: The OSCR framework was updated to accommodate this 
recommendation. 
• Recommendation 2: Another suggestion says that the threat 
classification unit, the risk assessment unit, and the risk repository 
unit should be integrated together to form one unit called the risk 
assessment unit.  
Response: The threat classification unit represents the method that 
we developed for the outsourcing context. The output of this unit is a 
list of threats based on the project assets that might take place while 
executing the project. The risk repository unit is intended to contain a 
list of all the active risks that have been assessed through the risk 
assessment unit. Active risks are accessed and monitored by project 
teams, such as project steering committees and PMO officers, even if 
they are not involved in the risk assessment process. Although 
integrating all the three units is feasible, we do not see any added 
value from doing so. In contrast, keeping those units as separate units 
provides a better understanding for those units, especially during the 
first use the OSCR framework and it does not provide irrelevant 
information that might not be required by different teams.  
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
• Recommendation 3: The last suggestion recommends moving the 
assets unit to the next phase. The rationale behind this 
recommendation is the fact that during the planning phase, assets 
might not represent the whole project assets and new ones might be 
added later, based on project requirements or security control changes.   
Response: The assets unit is vital for identifying security risks and it 
cannot be moved to the next phase. However, the OSCR framework is 
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built on the PDCA model, which facilitates the addition of any new 
project assets and which includes all of the required risk identification 
and assessment.   
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
 Executing Phase 
From Table 6.10, we see that 36.7% of the participants thought that the 
executing phase was very useful, while 56.7% of the participants saw it as being 
useful. The “somewhat useful” and “not useful” options were selected by 3.3% of 
the participants each. 
Table 6.10: Executing Phase Units’ Usefulness 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Very useful 11 36.7 36.7 
Useful 17 56.7 93.3 
Somewhat useful 1 3.3 96.7 
Not useful 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
In Table 6.11, the evaluation of the coverage of security aspects for the 
executing phase shows that 40% of the participants considered that the units in 
this phase covered all the required security aspects. 50% of the votes went to the 
option “covers most of the required security aspects in this phase”. 6.7% of the 
participants were in favour of the option “misses required units”, while the option 
“covers unnecessary units” was selected by 3.3% of the participants.  
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Table 6.11: Executing Phase Coverage 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Executing Phase 
Coverage 
Covers all required 
security aspects in this 
phase 
12 40.0% 40.0% 
Covers most of the 
required security aspects 
in this phase 
15 50.0% 50.0% 
Misses required units 2 6.7% 6.7% 
Covers unnecessary 
units 
1 3.3% 3.3% 
Total 30 100.0% 100.0% 
 Executing Phase Comments and Recommendations 
• Recommendation 1: Two participants suggested moving the 
performance unit and security issues unit to the next phase as the 
attention at this phase will be on the project’s functional requirements.   
Response: The executing phase is the stage where the deliverables are 
gradually coming into existence through the project’s execution 
timeline. As the focus, during this phase, is traditionally on the 
functional requirements of the project, the security requirements might 
be overlooked. Therefore, the executing phase units try to prevent this 
issue from happening, and security risks are considered as part of 
every deliverable through the executing phase. 
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
• Recommendation 2: There was also a recommendation suggesting 
that a project unit be added, which is currently in the initiating phase, 
to the executing phase specifically and to all other phases in general.  
Response: The project unit is designed to handle (create, update) 
essential project data such as project ID, name, code etc.  The essential 
data needs to be created once when initiating the project and it rarely 
needs to be updated during the upcoming phases. Adding the project 
units to all or some of the other phases of the OSCR framework does 
  
129 
 
not have any added value and conflicts with the original aim of the 
project unit. 
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
 Monitoring and Controlling Phase 
In Table 6.12, the evaluation of the usefulness of the monitoring and 
controlling phase units shows that 33.3% of the participants voted for the option 
“very useful”. 50% of the votes went to the option “useful” while the option 
“somewhat useful” gained 13.3% of the total votes. The last option “not useful” 
was selected by 3.3% of the participants. 
Table 6.12: Monitoring and Controlling Phase Units’ Usefulness 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Very useful 10 33.3 33.3 
Useful 15 50.0 83.3 
Somewhat useful 4 13.3 96.7 
Not useful 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
With relation to the coverage of security aspects in the monitoring and 
controlling phase, 40% of the participants thought that these aspects were 
covered in this phase. The second option, “covers most of the required security 
aspects in this phase”, was selected by 46.3% of the participants. 13.3% of the 
participants thought that the monitoring and controlling phase was missing some 
of the required units, but no-one thought that it covered unnecessary units. Table 
6.13 shows the participants’ distribution across the options provided for this 
question. 
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Table 6.13: Monitoring and Controlling Phase Coverage 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Monitoring and 
Controlling Coverage 
Covers all required 
security aspects in this 
phase 
12 40.0% 40.0% 
Covers most of the 
required security aspects 
in this phase 
14 46.7% 46.7% 
Misses required units 4 13.3% 13.3% 
Total 30 100.0% 100.0% 
 Monitoring and Controlling Phase Comments and 
Recommendations 
• Recommendation 1: Some participants recommended merging the 
units of this phase with the previous phase units.  
Response: The monitoring and controlling phase aims to review the 
execution performance reports, and to assess whether there is any need 
for improvement. Moreover, the project steering committee supports 
the project manager in resolving security issues that require 
intervention. Security change requests and security deliverables are 
reviewed and approved during this phase too. Therefore, this phase 
should be a separate phase to guarantee that the project teams who 
execute the project do not act as decision makers, approving their own 
performance reports, security change requests or security deliverables.  
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
• Recommendation 2: Another comment was raised about the 
performance unit. The participant sees that this unit could add extra 
cost and time to the project.  
Response: This comment might be true, however, adding a little extra 
cost and time is better than delivering a project with security issues 
and threats that might lead to major security incidents, which could 
cost the organisation a great deal of effort and costs. 
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Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
 Closing Phase 
At the end of this part of the evaluation, the participants evaluated the 
usefulness of the closing phase units. 40% of the participants chose the option 
“very useful”. The second option, “useful”, was selected by 40% of the 
participants. The “somewhat useful” option was favoured by 16.7% of the 
participants. The last option, “not useful”, gathered 3.3% of the participants’ 
votes. Table 6.14 shows the distribution of the participants across the options 
provided for this question.  
Table 6.14: Closing Phase Units’ Usefulness 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Very useful 12 40.0 40.0 
Useful 12 40.0 80.0 
Somewhat useful 5 16.7 96.7 
Not useful 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
In terms of the closing phase’s coverage, 38.7% of the participants considered 
that the closing phase covered all the required security aspects. 51.6% of the 
participants evaluated this phase as covering most of the security aspects that 
need to be considered when managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects. The third option, “misses required units”, was chosen by 
3.2% of the participants, whereas the fourth option gained 6.5% of the 
participants’ votes. Table 6.15 shows the distribution of the participants votes 
across the options provided for selection for this question. 
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Table 6.15: Closing Phase Coverage 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Closing Phase Coverage Covers all required 
security aspects in this 
phase 
12 38.7% 40.0% 
Covers most of the 
required security aspects 
in this phase 
16 51.6% 53.3% 
Misses required units 1 3.2% 3.3% 
Covers unnecessary 
units 
2 6.5% 6.7% 
Total 31 100.0% 103.3% 
 Closing Phase Comments and Recommendations  
• Recommendation 1: The first recommendation in this phase was to 
move the auditing unit to the previous phase; without achieving 
compliance, we cannot move to project closure.  
Response: This recommendation is valid as compliance management 
should be a continuous activity rather than one process.  
Action: the OSCR framework has been updated to reflect this 
recommendation. First, at the planning phase, we introduced a new 
unit called the compliance requirements unit in order to plan what will 
be audited to demonstrate security compliance. Second, the auditing 
unit was moved from the closing phase to the monitoring and 
controlling phase and renamed the compliance auditing unit, to be used 
by the project steering committee to assess the level of compliance with 
the requirements during project execution. Finally, at the closing 
phase, we substituted the auditing unit with the compliance acceptance 
unit in order to accept or reject the compliance based on the project 
steering committee’s assessment.      
• Recommendation 2: Another recommendation was adding a new test 
unit for testing the security requirements and all security plans and 
controls.  
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Response: Carrying out a comprehensive test at the closing phase 
might require a great deal of resources and efforts and might lead to a 
project delay. If the compliance and auditing are carried out correctly 
in the previous phases, compliance acceptance at this phase would be 
sufficient.  
• Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
6.9.3 Framework General Architecture Evaluation  
This section of the evaluation was designed to evaluate the general 
architecture of the OSCR framework. The evaluation questions will be stated, 
followed by their relevant results.  
1. The main architecture of the OSCR framework is: 
 Understandable. 
 Simple and easy to use. 
 Difficult. 
 Requires some improvements (please comment): 
The evaluation result for this question, as presented in Table 6.16, shows that 
33.3% of the participants said that the OSCR framework is understandable. 
51.3% of the participants chose the option “simple and easy to use”. The option 
that describes the OSCR framework as difficult was not selected by any 
participants, whereas 15.4% chose the last option, which says that the OSCR 
framework requires some improvements. It should be noted that the participants 
could select more than one option. 
Table 6.16: Framework General Architecture Evaluation 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Framework General 
Architecture 
Understandable 13 33.3% 43.3% 
Simple and easy to use 20 51.3% 66.7% 
Requires some 
improvements 
6 15.4% 20.0% 
Total 39 100.0% 130.0% 
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2. Utilising project phases in managing security risks of outsourced IT 
projects is: 
O Not useful  O Somewhat Useful O Useful O Very useful  
The respondents’ answers to this question show that 46.7% agreed that 
utilising project phases is very useful, while 43.3% selected the option “useful”. 
The “somewhat useful” option was chosen by 6.7% of the participants, while the 
“not useful” option was selected by 3.3% of the participants. Table 6.17 shows the 
distribution of the participants’ evaluations across the options provided for 
selection.  
Table 6.17: Utilising project phases 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Very useful 14 46.7 46.7 
Useful 13 43.3 90.0 
Somewhat useful 2 6.7 96.7 
Not useful 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
3. To what extent do you agree with the statement that adopting the Plan-Do-
Check-Act (PDCA) model in managing security risks of outsourced IT 
projects improves the framework flexibility? 
O Disagree  O Neutral  O Somewhat Agree    O Agree 
50% of the participants agreed with the statement, while 26.7% somewhat 
agreed. The “neutral” option was selected by 20% of the participants, whereas 
3.3% disagreed. Table 6.18 shows the distribution of the participants’ evaluations 
across the options provided for selection. 
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Table 6.18: PDCA Model Statement 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Agree 15 50.0 50.0 
Somewhat Agree 8 26.7 76.7 
Neutral 6 20.0 96.7 
Disagree 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
4. Do you agree with the statement that the OSCR framework provides a 
systematic and comprehensive approach for managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects? 
O Disagree  O Neutral  O Somewhat Agree    O Agree 
73.3% of the participants agreed with this statement, whereas 10% of the 
participants somewhat agreed. 13.3% chose the “neutral” option, and 3% 
disagreed with this statement. Table 6.19 shows the distribution of the 
participants’ evaluation across the options provided for selection. 
Table 6.19: Systematic and Comprehensive Statement 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Agree 22 73.3 73.3 
Somewhat Agree 3 10.0 83.3 
Neutral 4 13.3 96.7 
Disagree 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
5. The outsourcing threat classification approach provides an effective and 
useful way for identifying security threats in outsourcing context.  
O Disagree  O Neutral  O Somewhat Agree    O Agree 
76.7% of the participants agreed with this statement while 6.7% somewhat 
agreed. 13.3% of the participants chose the “neutral” option, whereas 3.3% 
disagreed with this statement. Table 6.20 shows the distribution of the 
participants’ evaluations across the options provided for selection. 
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Table 6.20: Threat Classification Approach Statement 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Agree 23 76.7 76.7 
Somewhat Agree 2 6.7 83.3 
Neutral  4 13.3 96.7 
Disagree 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
6. To what extent do you agree that the OSCR framework can be applied to 
any outsourced IT project as it is independent from different constraints 
such as project size, cost, or any other constraints? 
O Disagree  O Neutral  O Somewhat Agree    O Agree 
The evaluation result for this question shows that 70% of the participants 
agreed with this statement. 13.3% of the participants chose the option “somewhat 
agree”, whereas 13.3% of the participants chose the “neutral” option. 3.3% of the 
participants disagreed with this statement. Table 6.21 shows the distribution of 
the participants’ evaluations across the options provided for selection. 
Table 6.21: Framework Generality 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Agree 21 70.0 70.0 
Somewhat Agree 4 13.3 83.3 
Neutral 4 13.3 96.7 
Disagree 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
6.10 Evaluation Analysis  
In order to analyse the results accurately in a quantitative way, a Likert scale 
was used and scaled from 1 to 4 as shown in Table 6.22 and Table 6.23. The 
weighted mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) were then used. The weighted 
mean (M) was used to identify the overall results for the usefulness of each phase 
units as well as the overall results for the general architecture of the framework. 
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The standard deviation (SD) was used to know how the participants’ results 
differed from the mean value.  
Table 6.22: Weighted Mean (Very useful, Useful, Somewhat useful, Not useful) 
Level Weight Weighted Mean  
Very useful 1 From 1 to 1.74 
Useful 2 From 1.75 to 2.49 
Somewhat Useful 3 From 2.50 to 3.24 
Not useful 4 From 3.25 to 4 
Table 6.23: Weighted Mean (Agree, Somewhat Agree, Neutral, Disagree) 
Level Weight Weighted Mean 
Agree 1 From 1 to 1.74 
Somewhat Agree 2 From 1.75 to 2.49 
Neutral 3 From 2.50 to 3.24 
Disagree 4 From 3.25 to 4 
Table 6.24 presents a summary of the evaluation results, weighted mean, 
standard deviation and overall results. It illustrates that the participants’ overall 
result was “useful” when they were evaluating the units’ usefulness for the 
initiating, monitoring and controlling and closing phases. When they were 
evaluating the units’ usefulness for the planning and executing phases, their 
overall result was “very useful”.  
As can be seen from Table 6.24, the majority of the participants chose either 
the option “very useful” or “useful” for all the framework phases. Only one 
participant chose the option “not useful”. Based on their feedback, the OSCR 
framework needs to be incorporated with the PMI current processes, or a new 
knowledge area should be added. Although integrating the OSCR framework 
with the PMI standard is feasible, it conflicts with our objective to make the 
framework independent from any existing standard or framework. This will allow 
any organisation to use the OSCR framework without the need to change their 
existing security or project management standards.   
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Table 6.24: Framework Phases and Units Evaluation Summary 
Evaluation 
Very 
Useful Useful 
Somehow 
Useful 
Not 
Useful Weighted 
Mean 
SD 
Deviation 
Overall 
Result N N N N 
% % % % 
Initiating 
Phase Units 
11 16 2 1 1.77 0.73 Useful 36.7 53.3 6.7 3.3 
Planning 
Phase Units 
13 14 2 1 1.70 0.75 Very Useful 43.3 46.7 6.7 3.3 
Executing 
Phase Units 
11 17 1 1 1.73 0.69 Very Useful 
36.7 56.7 3.3 3.3 
Monitoring 
and 
Controlling 
Phase Units 
10 15 4 1 
1.87 0.78 Useful 33.3 50.0 13.3 3.3 
Closing 
Phase Units 
12 12 5 1 1.83 0.83 Useful 40.0 40.0 16.7 3.3 
For the evaluation of hypotheses, we will restate each hypothesis and discuss 
whether it has been accepted or not. 
1. The OSCR framework is understandable, simple and easy to use [H1]. 
To test this hypothesis, the participants were asked to evaluate the general 
architecture of the OSCR framework by choosing the appropriate answers. Four 
options were provided for selection as presented earlier in Section 6.9.3 Table 
6.16. The majority of the participants chose understandable or simple and easy to 
use (84.6%). This supports that the OSCR framework is understandable, simple 
and easy to use.  
2. Utilising project phases for managing security and compliance risks is 
useful in the outsourcing context [H2]. 
In order to test this hypothesis, the participants were asked to rate the 
usefulness of utilising project phases for managing security and compliance risks 
in the outsourcing context. From Table 6.25, it can be seen that the majority of 
the participants chose “very useful” and “useful” and the overall result is “very 
useful”. This result supports that utilising project phases for managing security 
and compliance risks is useful.  
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Table 6.25: Utilising project phases – summary 
Evaluation 
Very 
Useful Useful 
Somehow 
Useful 
Not 
Useful Weighted 
Mean 
SD 
Deviation 
Overall 
Result N N N N 
% % % % 
H2 14 13 2 1 1.67 0.76 Very Useful 46.7 43.3 6.7 3.3 
 
3. The PDCA model improves the flexibility of security and compliance 
management in the outsourcing context [H3]. 
One of the OSCR framework features is the PDCA model. The framework 
utilises the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model to improve its flexibility to deal 
with changes in security requirements, controls and plans, which are more often 
encountered in outsourced IT projects. The participants were asked if they agreed 
that utilising the PDCA model improved the OSCR framework’s flexibility in the 
outsourcing context. As can be seen in Table 6.26, the “somewhat agree” option 
was the participants’ overall result towards this question. This result supports 
that adopting the PDCA model makes the OSCR framework more flexible in the 
outsourcing context.    
4. The OSCR framework provides a systematic and comprehensive 
methodology for managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects [H4]. 
The majority of the participants chose the options “agree” or “somewhat 
agree” when they were asked whether they agreed or not with the statement that 
says the OSCR framework provides a systematic and comprehensive methodology 
for security management in the outsourcing context. Table 6.26 shows that the 
participants’ overall response was to agree with this statement, which indicates 
that this hypothesis is supported. 
5. Using the outsourcing threat classification approach provides an 
effective and useful way of identifying security threats in the 
outsourcing context [H5]. 
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To test this hypothesis, the participants were asked if they agreed or not that 
using the proposed threat classification approach provided an effective and useful 
way of identifying security threats in the outsourcing context. The results in 
Table 6.26 show that the participants’ overall response was to agree, which 
indicates that this hypothesis is supported. 
6. The OSCR framework can be generalised and applied to any project as 
it is independent from different constraints such as project size or cost 
[H6].  
 The OSCR framework was designed to be independent from different 
constraints such as project size, cost or duration.  The participants were asked if 
they agreed or not with this statement. The participants’ overall response was to 
select “agree”, which indicates that this hypothesis is supported.  
 
Table 6.26: Overall Evaluation Summary 
Overall 
Evaluation 
Agree Somewhat Agree Neutral Disagree Weighted 
Mean 
SD 
Deviation 
Overall 
Result N N N N 
% % % % 
H3 15 8 6 1 1.77 0.90 Somewhat Agree 50.0 26.7 20 3.3 
H4 22 3 4 1 1.47 0.86 Agree 73.3 10 13.3 3.3 
H5 23 2 4 1 1.43 0.86 Agree 76.7 6.7 13.3 3.3 
H6 21 4 4 1 1.50 0.86 Agree 70 13.3 13.3 3.3 
6.11 Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented our evaluation results for the OSCR 
framework for managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT 
projects. The first method that we used to evaluate the OSCR framework was a 
focus group, enhanced by a questionnaire. The focus group method has several 
advantages such as gathering in-depth information, and being able to expand 
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and clarify questions.  The focus groups were conducted with experienced IT 
agents. Several outsourced IT projects have been executed by local and 
international providers for this agent.  
The evaluation results show that the OSCR framework has achieved 
reasonable acceptance in the outsourcing context. All the hypotheses were 
supported by the participants. Several features such as its flexibility, simplicity 
and ease of use have been acknowledged by the participants. The OSCR 
framework provides a comprehensive methodology that is capable of providing 
organisations with the ability to minimise, mitigate or eliminate security risks in 
the early stages of project execution. It is also acknowledged by the participants 
that the OSCR framework is strengthened by a robust threat classification 
approach that improves threat identification in the outsourcing context. Bearing 
in mind that outsourcing environments are less stable and more systems are 
integrated together, the OSCR framework is enhanced by the PDCA model, 
which provides a continuous improvement process to accommodate the changes 
and improvements required while executing the project.   
The participants’ recommendations contributed to improving our 
understanding of different factors that need to be considered when managing the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. The following 
summarises these factors:  
• Outsourcing compliance management is a continuous process that 
should be carried out throughout the project execution, rather than one 
process carried out before closing the project.  
• Humans should also be considered as a source of security risks and 
their potential impact should be analysed and controlled.  
• Other factors, such as the cost of managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects, should be considered. A 
balance between security risk management and cost should be achieved 
as not all organisations are able to afford costs that might be outside 
their budget boundaries.  
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With the consideration of the valuable recommendations from the 
participants, the OSCR framework has been updated and improved. The 
recommendations are believed to improve the OSCR framework’s ability to 
manage security and compliance risks in a more effective way in the outsourcing 
context. The following summarises the updates to the OSCR framework resulted 
from the participants’ recommendations: 
• At the initiating phase, a new unit was added for implementing 
security mitigations, in order to mitigate the identified potential 
security risks before outsourcing.  
• At the planning phase, another unit, called the compliance 
requirements unit, was added. This provides a role for the 
organisation/project manager to plan what will be reviewed when 
auditing the security of the project.  
• At the monitoring and controlling phase, the auditing unit was moved 
from the closing phase and renamed the compliance auditing unit in 
order to assess the level of compliance with security requirements.  
• Finally, at the closing phase, we substituted the auditing unit with the 
compliance acceptance unit to accept or reject the assessment of the 
compliance with security requirements. 
 Although the number of participants is quite small, they represented a good 
representative sample, as they are experienced in outsourced IT projects and 
their security and compliance risks.  
In the following chapter, the framework is applied to real outsourced IT 
projects as a case study.  
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Chapter 7 Case Study Evaluation 
In the previous chapter, the OSCR framework for outsourced IT projects was 
evaluated by experts using a focus group and questionnaire. This chapter 
represents the empirical case study method that we used to evaluate the OSCR 
framework. The aim of this case study was to evaluate the novelty of the OSCR 
framework and to assess its ability to manage the security and compliance risks 
of IT projects in the outsourcing context effectively. It also aimed to discover 
potential changes and improvements that could enhance the OSCR framework’s 
performance when outsourcing IT projects. It should be noted that this case study 
is different from the API/PNR case study we used for illustration in Chapter 5.  
7.1 Introduction 
Among research methods (e.g. survey, action research, etc.), the case study 
method was chosen to evaluate the OSCR framework. The case study method 
offers several benefits [169]. The following highlight some of these benefits: 
• Using real outsourced IT projects provides the researcher with a 
holistic view and a deep understanding of the phenomena as it 
facilitates the description and explanation of a research problem or 
situation [170, 171]. 
• It allows the researcher to investigate the ability of the OSCR 
framework to manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced 
IT projects effectively in their real-life context. 
• The rich and in-depth data that can be obtained helps the researcher to 
understand the complexity of the outsourcing context, in which the 
client, providers and stakeholders interact together during the 
execution time of the projects. 
• The practical knowledge and experience of the participants could help 
discover potential weaknesses and provide some valuable 
recommendations, which could contribute to improving the OSCR 
framework. 
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Past literature has identified several guidelines for conducting a rigorous case 
study. In spite of the fact that these guidelines do not guarantee the quality of 
the case study, they provide the researcher with practical measures for 
conducting a rigorous case study that aims to provide evidence about the 
phenomena under investigation from the data being collected. For this reason, 
the guidelines in [172-174] were taking into consideration when conducting this 
case study. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: the evaluation 
objectives and scope are presented in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 respectively. In Section 
7.4, the evaluation methodology is explained. We discuss the projects’ selection in 
Section 7.5. We describe the evaluation procedure, evaluation data source, and 
how to reduce evaluation bias in Sections 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8 respectively. In Section 
7.9, we highlight the case study validity and in Section 7.10 we present the 
evaluation results. Changes to the OSCR framework resulted from all of the 
evaluation methods used, and these are presented in Section 7.11. We analyse 
and compare the OSCR framework with the existing ISMS standards and 
framework in Section 7.12. In Section 7.13, a summary of this chapter is 
provided. 
7.2 Evaluation Objectives 
The case study was designed to achieve the following objectives: 
1. Assess the ability of the OSCR framework to effectively manage the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
2. Draw ideas and recommendations from relevant people involved in 
outsourcing, which can be used to improve the OSCR framework. 
3. Discover potential drawbacks and weaknesses that might affect the 
ability of the OSCR framework to manage the security and compliance 
risks of outsourced IT projects effectively. 
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7.3 Evaluation Scope 
The scope of the evaluation using a case study covers different aspects of the 
OSCR framework: 
1. The effectiveness of the OSCR framework to manage the security risks 
of outsourced IT projects compared to the security management 
standards and frameworks used by the client and providers. 
2. The effectiveness of the outsourcing threat classification to identify 
potential security threats in the outsourcing context. 
3. The ability of the OSCR framework to provide a comprehensive 
methodology for managing security and compliance risks in the 
outsourcing context. 
4. The ability of the OSCR framework to enhance compliance enforcement 
throughout project execution. 
5. The flexibility and ease of use of the OSCR framework to manage the 
security risks of outsourced IT projects and to be independent from 
different constraints such as project type, cost or time. 
In spite of the fact that the scope of the case study might overlap with the 
scope of the focus group and questionnaire, which were discussed in the previous 
chapter, it represents the practical part of the evaluation. Those diverse 
evaluation methods (focus group, questionnaire, and case study) were used also 
to provide independent validation evidence. 
7.4 Evaluation Methodology 
The following steps summarise the methodology that has been used to 
conduct this case study: 
1. Appropriate agents were found who had long experience in IT 
outsourcing, security and compliance risk management. 
2. Researcher signed the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). 
  
146 
 
3. Outsourced IT projects were selected that met the specific criteria used 
for selecting potential projects (presented in Section 7.5). 
4. An introductory workshop was conducted for all participants. The 
OSCR framework was explained and discussed in the workshop. 
5. Participants who agreed to take part in this case study signed the 
consent form. 
6. Participants were provided with the material and templates (provided 
in Appendix B), and with the researchers’ contact details in case they 
needed some extra clarifications. 
7. The participants applied the OSCR framework to the selected 
outsourced IT projects. 
8. Project data was shared with the researcher at the end of each phase of 
the OSCR framework. 
9. The participants provided the researcher with their overall feedback at 
the end of the project’s execution. 
7.5 Project Selection 
The selection of the outsourced IT projects that were used as the case study 
was made following the below criteria: 
1. The project execution time should not exceed six months, in order to 
meet the research’s time constraint. 
2. The selected projects should be executed by two different providers with 
diverse security experience and practices. 
3. The selected projects should differ in their missions and objectives in 
order to allow the OSCR framework to be evaluated as far as possible in 
different security aspects (e.g. hardware, software, network, and so on). 
4. The providers should have security experience and there should have 
been no major security incidents with the client. 
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7.6 Evaluation Procedure 
Based on the selection criteria (Section 7.5), two projects were chosen. Table 7.1 
and Table 7.2 provide information about these two projects. The two projects 
were executed by two different providers for the same client. The participants in 
the case study worked for an IT agent for the government and local and 
international providers. Their combined experiences covered a wide range of 
outsourced IT projects, including mission-critical, software and hardware IT 
projects of different sizes. The OSCR framework was applied to the two 
outsourced IT projects from the beginning of the projects’ execution until their 
end.  
Table 7.1: Case Study First Project 
Provider Type Provider Size Provider Main Business 
International + 4700 Employees Air Transport Industry 
Project Type Project Time Project Cost 
Turn-key solution 6 Months $ 5000000 
Project Description 
The project will automate the border processes at one international airport. 
Travellers will be able to exit or enter the country using self-service machines. 
If the system succeeds, it will be deployed at all international airport across 
the country. The project involved software development, hardware 
deployment, and integration with the client’s relevant applications and ISs. 
Table 7.2: Case Study Second Project 
Provider Type Provider Size Provider Main Business 
Local 50-100 Employees Information Technology Solutions 
Project Type Project Time Project Cost 
Turn-key solution 6 Months $ 1000000 
Project Description 
The project will enable police officers to use a mobile application while they 
are carrying out their field duties so that they can perform some of their 
ongoing activities without the need to contact police centres (e.g. information 
checks about people, cars etc.). The project also involved software development 
and integration with the client’s relevant applications and ISs. 
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Following the selection of the two projects for the case study, an invitation 
was sent to the two project members to attend an introductory workshop. In the 
workshop, the researcher explained the objectives of the case study and 
presented the OSCR framework. The participants were told that information 
would be confidential and that their anonymity would be maintained as the 
researcher had signed the NDA. The application of the OSCR framework was 
explained, as well as the templates that were designed for data collection. The 
participants who agreed to take part in the case study then signed the consent 
form.   
For each project, there was one project owner from the client, one project 
manager and two project team members from the providers involved in the case 
study. The project owner oversaw the project execution and facilitated 
communications with the client’s relevant departments (PMO, Finance etc.) The 
project manager was responsible for the project teams and the execution of the 
whole project. The project team members were responsible for implementing the 
project’s planned tasks. 
Although the start dates for the two projects were almost the same (one 
week’s difference), the OSCR framework was applied to the two projects 
separately. The two providers were located by the client in two different buildings 
(client criteria). There was no direct communication between the participants 
from the two providers. During the implementation of the OSCR framework, the 
researcher engaged with the participants through different communication 
methods to clarify any aspects of the OSCR framework. At the end of each phase, 
the participants shared the project data with the researcher using the templates 
given to them. The project data were then analysed and processed. If there were 
any issues with applying the OSCR framework accurately, the researcher 
resolved the issue with the relevant participants. As the researcher conducted a 
workshop for all the participants and engaged with the participants during all 
the project phases through different communication methods, there were no 
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major issues with the application of the OSCR framework to the projects. The 
following summarises the case study procedure: 
1. At the initiating phase, the OSCR framework was used by the client 
participants to identify the project’s essential data, potential security 
risks and stakeholders. The data were then shared with the researcher 
at the end of this phase. 
2. At the planning phase, the units of the OSCR framework were used by 
the client and providers to identify the security requirements and the 
projects’ assets. The outsourcing threat classification approach was 
then used to identify the security risks associated with executing the 
projects. The participants then followed the OSCR framework approach 
to assess the identified security risks and proposed security controls 
that were believed to avoid or mitigate the impact of the identified 
security risks. Roles, responsibilities and security plans were identified 
and reviewed. At the end of the planning phase, the participants shared 
the project data with the researcher. 
3. At the execution phase, the participants put their plans into practice. 
The OSCR framework units were used to submit the performance 
reports and to record security issues and security change requests. At 
the end of this phase, the project data was sent to the researcher. 
4. At the monitoring and controlling phase, the OSCR framework was 
used to review and approve or reject the performance reports. 
Improvements were proposed and implemented where required. 
Security issues that needed intervention from the project steering 
committee were reviewed and resolved. The security Change Requests 
Unit was used to analyse and approve or reject all received security 
change requests. The participants at the end of this phase shared the 
project data with the researcher. 
5. At the closing phase, the OSCR framework units were used to 
document security lessons learned and to accept or reject the security 
compliance of the two projects. Finally, closure certificates were issued 
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to the two providers. The project data, along with the overall 
participants’ feedback, were then sent to the researcher. 
7.7 Evaluation Data Source 
The two projects that have been used as the case study were the data source 
for this evaluation. The participants were asked to apply the OSCR framework to 
the two projects and to use the special templates (provided in Appendix B) that 
have been designed for this purpose during all project phases. Project documents 
such as Request for Proposal (RFP) and Scope of Work (SOW) were also used to 
make sure that the security requirements were extracted and implemented 
according to the client’s needs. The researcher and participants used different 
direct communication methods, such as meetings, emails, or video and voice calls. 
This allowed the researcher to have reasonable control over the data collection. 
At the end of the projects’ execution, each participant submitted their final 
feedback on the OSCR framework directly to the researcher. Using separate 
participant feedback as well as project documents as data sources facilitated data 
triangulation, which was used to enhance the case study’s validity, as will be 
explained in Section 7.9. 
7.8 Reducing Bias 
Taking into consideration the fact that by their nature case studies are 
vulnerable to bias, four sources of bias were identified in this case study: fear of 
external influence, restrictions, time pressure, and environment changes. The 
researcher has taken this into account and used the following measures to reduce 
bias as far as possible: 
1. The participants were told that the researcher had signed the client 
NDA and that all collected data would be confidential and not be 
shared with their employers or anyone else. Projects’ and participants’ 
privacy and anonymity would be maintained. All of the collected data 
would only be used by the researcher and his supervisor for the purpose 
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of evaluating the OSCR framework. This ensured that the participants 
gave their feedback without any external influence (e.g. employer 
influence). 
2. No influence or restrictions were placed on the participants. The OSCR 
framework was applied to the two projects by the participants only. The 
researcher conducted the introductory workshop, provided the 
participants with the material and case study templates, and answered 
any questions asked by the participants. 
3. No time pressure was put on the participants and the OSCR framework 
was applied to the two projects from the beginning of the projects’ 
execution until their end. The environment was maintained the same, 
with no changes, during the projects’ execution. 
4. At the end of the projects’ execution, each participant provided their 
overall feedback separately to avoid any external influence (e.g. job 
role, colleague influence etc.). 
5. All project data were collected using the templates provided to the 
participants. This allowed the researcher to review and analyse the 
case study results carefully without any time constraints, which might 
lead the researcher toward the desired conclusion only. 
7.9 Case Study Validity 
To enhance the validity of the case study outcomes, the construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability were considered during all case 
study phases [172]. 
Construct Validity: deals with operational measures that can be employed to 
provide a degree of certainty that the case study measures what was intended by 
the researcher. Construct validity was considered by developing a simplified 
procedure for the case study, conducting a workshop to explain how to apply the 
OSCR framework, and providing the participants with all the required material 
and templates. Using multiple sources of evidence, reviewing the case study 
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reports by key informants, and maintaining a chain of evidence were strategies 
employed to ensure construct validity. 
Internal Validity: is concerned with how to justify the causal relationships 
between the case study factors such as time pressure or environment changes. 
The participants were allowed to apply the OSCR framework from the beginning 
of the projects’ execution until their end. There was no time pressure on them to 
rush. The two projects were executed without any environment changes. To 
increase the internal validity, data source triangulation was employed (e.g. 
collecting data from the participants and from the project documents). 
External Validity: is concerned with knowing whether the case study results 
can be generalised to other cases or not. In spite of the fact that the OSCR 
framework could not be applied to more than two projects due to several 
constraints (e.g. the research time, travel cost, security and privacy issues), the 
case study represented two real outsourced IT projects in their live context. Two 
different providers applied the OSCR framework to the projects. The type, size 
and mission of the two projects were different. As a result of this, we suggest that 
the case study results can be generalised to other cases. 
Reliability: is concerned with showing that other investigators can obtain the 
same case study results if they use the same procedure for the data collection of 
the project. Our case study results depended on the results obtained from 
applying the OSCR frameworks to the two outsourced IT projects. Other 
researchers who familiarise themselves with the OSCR framework and follow the 
same procedure for data collection and analysis can replicate the case study 
results. 
7.10 Case Study Results 
In this section, we will present and discuss the participants’ feedback, issues, 
and their suggestions and recommendations to improve the OSCR framework. 
The general evaluation questions will be stated and followed by the participants’ 
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responses. Project-specific data will not be discussed due to confidentiality issues 
and the need to maintain privacy and anonymity (NDA obligations). 
1. In comparison with the current security standard or framework (e.g. ISO 
27000x, SABSA) that you use, how do you rate the OSCR framework? 
• Provides better management for security risks of outsourced IT 
projects in all phases. 
• Provides better management for security risks in some phases. 
(Please comment)…………………………………………………………….. 
• Same as the current security framework or standard that you use. 
• Provides lower management for security risks of outsourced IT 
projects. 
In Table 7.3, the evaluation result for this question shows that 62.5% of the 
participants say that the OSCR framework provides better management for the 
security risks of outsourced IT projects in all phases. The option that says the 
OSCR framework provides better management for the security risks of 
outsourced IT projects in some phases was chosen by 37.5% of the participants. 
The last two options were not selected by any of the participants. 
Table 7.3: Participants Distribution 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Provides better 
management for security 
risks of outsourced IT 
projects in all phases 
5 62.5 62.5 
Provides better 
management for security 
risks in some phases 
3 37.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0  
In Table 7.4, the majority of the providers’ and half of the client’s participants 
acknowledged that the OSCR framework provides better management for the 
security risks of outsourced IT projects in all phases. The remaining half of the 
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client’s participants said that it provides better management for security risks of 
outsourced IT projects in some phases (specifically, the initiating, planning, and 
monitoring and controlling phases). 
Table 7.4: Participants’ Distribution by Organisation 
 
Organisation 
Total Client Provider 
Q1 Provides better 
management for security 
risks of outsourced IT 
projects in all phases 
Count 1 4 5 
% within Q1 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
% within 
Organisation 
50.0% 66.7% 62.5% 
% of Total 12.5% 50.0% 62.5% 
Provides better 
management for security 
risks in some phases 
Count 1 2 3 
% within Q1 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Organisation 
50.0% 33.3% 37.5% 
% of Total 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 
Total Count 2 6 8 
% within Q1 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within 
Organisation 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
2. What are the issues that you think exist in the OSCR framework? 
Based on the participants’ responses, the following represent the issues 
existing in the OSCR framework: 
• Issue 1: when outsourcing, the provider has their own policy 
constraints, which are unlikely to map directly onto the processes 
defined in the OSCR framework. 
Response: the OSCR framework is intended to overcome existing 
security standards and frameworks weaknesses. In the event that the 
OSCR framework provides better security management, then the 
existing internal provider policies should not be a barrier to adopting 
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the OSCR framework. The change should be planned and implemented 
along the line of any other change (e.g. technology changes). 
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
• Issue 2: one of the key issues when outsourcing sensitive systems is 
where the data is kept and which legal jurisdiction applies to this data 
(some legal systems will override particular project agreements, which 
may undermine the OSCR framework). 
Response: where sensitive data are stored is outside the scope of the 
OSCR framework. Generally speaking, all project assets should be 
identified, including data. The security risks associated with the 
project assets should then be identified and assessed. Following that, 
security controls that mitigate the identified security risks should be 
put into practice. Contract conditions and other agreements (e.g. SLAs 
or NDAs) could enhance the security controls and reduce the potential 
security risks. If there are any exceptions, they should be managed 
through the Change Requests Unit. 
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
• Issue 3: the one-size-fits-all approach is not practical given that the 
types and sizes of outsourced projects change over time. 
Response: the OSCR framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach. It 
is an asset-based approach, and was designed to be independent from 
different constraints such as the project type, cost or size. The rationale 
behind this is to provide a general methodology that can be tailored to 
fit any project based on the project assets rather than on project type or 
size. In this methodology, the need to develop different frameworks to 
fit different project types, sizes, costs, and missions is eliminated. 
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
• Issue 4: the framework should clearly allow for new security risks to 
be added to the initial scope on an ongoing basis. 
Response: in spite of the fact that adding new security risks is 
managed through the Threat Classification Unit, its description did not 
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explain this clearly. The name of this unit also might confuse users of 
the OSCR framework. 
Action: the description of the Threat Classification Unit was updated 
to explain how to add new security risks throughout project execution. 
Moreover, the Threat Classification Unit was renamed the Threat 
Identification Unit to provide a clearer meaning of this unit. 
• Issue 5: mapping between the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model and 
the project lifecycle is not clear. 
Response: in the PDCA model, the plan stage involves planning how 
to deliver the desired outputs of the project that meet the client’s 
business needs. This stage reflects exactly what the planning phase 
does in the OSCR framework. The ‘Do’ stage is designed to allow the 
plans developed in the previous stage to be carried out. The execution 
phase in our framework represents this stage of the PDCA model. The 
‘Check’ stage involves evaluating performance in the ‘Do’ stage. The 
‘Act’ stage is used to propose new changes if the performance 
evaluation in the previous stage shows that the plans developed in the 
plan stage will not achieve the desired outputs. Those two stages are 
represented by the monitoring and controlling phase in the OSCR 
framework. 
Action: the description of the OSCR framework was updated to 
explain how the PCDA model is mapped to the OSCR framework 
phases (Appendix B). 
3. What improvements could be made to the OSCR framework in order to 
increase its ability to manage the security risks of outsourcing more 
effectively? 
• Recommendation 1: a clear exceptions process is required where 
business drivers force deviation from security policies. 
Response: although exceptions that have not been analysed and 
assessed may threaten the entire organisation’s security, there might 
be a need to allow exceptions to take place where they are required 
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(e.g. due to cost constraints). Nevertheless, they must be controlled and 
kept to the minimum. 
Action: the objectives of the Change Requests Unit are updated to 
process exceptions in a controlled manner. 
• Recommendation 2: It is advised that a third-party is assigned to the 
task of periodically auditing the compliance with the security 
requirements. Members of this audit team must be drawn from 
agencies not associated with the client in any way, to avoid conflict of 
interest or compromise of integrity. 
Response: the OSCR framework provides an approach for managing 
providers’ compliance with the client security requirements. As the 
provider executes the project and the client audits the compliance 
through the project steering committee, there is no conflict of interest. 
However, external auditors could add a higher value of compliance if 
they are experienced and specialised in this domain. 
Action: No change to the OSCR framework. 
• Recommendation 3: The implementation guidelines of the OSCR 
framework need to be improved. In an outsourcing environment, the 
time constraint needs to be considered. If the guidelines are not clear, 
this might affect the project master schedule as project team members 
may need more time to master the new processes of the OSCR 
framework. 
Response: during the introductory workshop, the OSCR framework 
was explained. The researcher was engaged with the participants 
during all implementation phases through different communication 
methods. Considering the absence of the researcher in the future use of 
the OSCR framework, there were some areas of the guidelines that 
need to be improved (e.g. Threat Identification Unit, Change Request 
Unit, and PDCA model). 
Action: the guidelines of how to implement the OSCR framework were 
updated to provide more information about how to apply the OSCR 
framework in the outsourcing context (Appendix B). 
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• Recommendation 4: roles and responsibilities in the OSCR 
framework should not allow name-based RACI (Responsible, 
Accountable, Consult, and Informed). 
Response: we utilised a role-based RACI method for assigning roles 
and responsibilities of project security activities in addition to the 
name-based RACI for use in some cases where project personnel are 
permanent (e.g. maintenance projects). For the purpose of outsourcing 
context, where personnel resources are not stable and might take part 
in the project activities in specific phases only (e.g. planning phase), it 
is true that the role-based RACI suits the context of outsourced projects 
more than name-based RACI. Even if the personnel are permanent, the 
role-based RACI will work fine. 
Action: the roles and responsibilities method used by the OSCR 
framework was updated to be only a role-based RACI method. 
7.11 OSCR Framework Changes 
In this section, we present all changes and improvements resulted from the 
all evaluation methods that we used to evaluate the OSCR framework (focus 
group, questionnaire, and case study). The final version of the OSCR framework 
is presented in Figure 7.1. The following summarises these changes and 
improvements: 
7.11.1 Security Mitigations Unit (Initiating Phase) 
The aim of this new unit is to propose and implement security controls that 
can be used to mitigate the potential security risks that might take place while 
executing the project. These potential security risks are identified by the client 
through the Potential Security Risks Unit. 
7.11.2 Assets Unit (Planning Phase) 
The project assets categories (Software, Hardware, Network, and 
Information) of the OSCR framework were updated to include human element. 
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Human is considered as a risk which should be identified and assessed along 
other assets risks. 
7.11.3 Threat Identification Unit (Planning Phase) 
The aim of this updated unit is to identify security threats using the 
outsourcing threat classification approach. The description of the Threat 
Classification Unit did not explain this clearly. The name of this unit also might 
confuse users of the OSCR framework. Therefore, the name was changed to 
Threat Identification Unit. 
7.11.4 Compliance Requirements Unit (Planning Phase) 
The aim of this new unit is to plan the requirements for compliance that will 
be audited during the monitoring and controlling phase by the project steering 
committee. 
7.11.5 Roles and Responsibilities Unit (Planning Phase) 
The role-based RACI method for assigning roles and responsibilities of project 
security activities will be the only method used by the OSCR framework. Name-
based RACI will not be used as personnel resources of outsourced projects are 
usually not stable and might take part in the project activities in specific phases 
only (e.g. planning phase). The role-based RACI suits the context of outsourced 
projects more than name-based RACI. Even if the personnel are permanent, the 
role-based RACI will work fine. 
7.11.6 Change Requests Unit (Executing Phase) 
A new objective was added to this unit to process exceptions in a controlled 
manner as there might be a need to allow exceptions to take place where they are 
required. The original name and objectives for this unit are still the same without 
any change. 
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7.11.7 Compliance Auditing Unit (Monitoring & Controlling Phase) 
The aim of this new unit is to audit compliance requirements planned in the 
Compliance Requirements Unit. This will increase the OSCR’s ability to manage 
compliance more accurately, according to what has been planned, rather than 
depending on the auditors’ effort, which might vary from one auditor to another. 
7.11.8 Compliance Acceptance Unit (Closing Phase) 
The aim of this updated unit is to accept or reject the provider’s compliance 
with security requirements based on a project steering committee assessment 
resulting from the Compliance Auditing Unit. 
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Figure 7.1: OSCR Framework-Final version 
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7.12 Discussion  
In this section we will compare the OSCR framework with the existing ISMS 
standards and frameworks that we reviewed in Chapter 3. As can be seen in 
Table 7.5, we applied the same criteria (Sub-section 3.3.1) to the OSCR 
framework. The result shows that the OSCR framework provides better security 
and compliance risk management for the consideration of outsourced projects and 
usability criteria when compared with the information security management 
theme (e.g. ISO/IEC 2700x series, NIST SP 800 series, GMITS). For the IT 
governance and service management theme (e.g. COBIT, ITIL), the OSCR 
framework outperforms it in three criteria: risk management, consideration of 
outsourced projects and usability. The OSCR framework also provides better 
security and compliance risk management, when compared with the risk 
management theme (e.g. OCTAVE, CORAS, CRAMM), in all criteria except the 
usability criterion. For the security architecture and engineering theme (e.g. 
SABSA, SSE-CMM), the OSCR framework achieves better security and 
compliance risk management in two criteria: consideration of outsourced projects 
and usability.      
Table 7.5: OSCR Framework Comparison with ISMSs 
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1-Security 
Requirements 
Management:                       
Information 
Security Policy √ √ √ √ √ × × × √ √ √ 
Communications 
and Operations 
Management 
√ √ √ √ × ≈ × × √ √ √ 
Access Control √ √ ≈ √ √ × × × √ √ √ 
Information 
Systems 
Acquisition, 
Development, 
and 
Maintenance 
√ √ √ √ × × × × √ √ √ 
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Asset 
Management √ √ ≈ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Incident 
Management √ √ √ √ √ × × × ≈ ≈ √ 
Business 
Continuity 
Management 
√ √ √ √ √ × × × √ ≈ √ 
2- Risks 
Management:                       
Physical and 
Environmental 
Risks 
√ √ √ ≈ × ≈ ≈ ≈ √ √ √ 
Human 
Resources Risks √ √ √ ≈ × ≈ ≈ ≈ √ √ √ 
Technical Risks √ √ √ ≈ ≈ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
3- 
Consideration 
of outsourced 
projects: 
≈ ≈ ≈ × × × × × ≈ × √ 
4- Compliance √ √ √ √ √ × × × √ √ √ 
5- Usability:                       
Cost 
effectiveness × × × × × √ √ √ × × √ 
Time  efficiency × × × × × √ ≈ √ × × √ 
Simplicity and 
easiness × × × × × √ √ √ × × √ 
 
Table 7.6: OSCR Framework Comparison with ISMSs - Summary 
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Count  
√ 11 11 9 8 6 5 4 5 10 9 15 
≈ 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 0 
× 3 3 3 4 8 7 8 8 3 4 0 
Percentage  
√ 73% 73% 60% 53% 40% 33% 27% 33% 67% 60% 100% 
≈ 7% 7% 20% 20% 7% 20% 20% 13% 13% 13% 0% 
× 20% 20% 20% 27% 53% 47% 53% 53% 20% 27% 0% 
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7.13 Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented the empirical evaluation method that we 
used to evaluate the novelty of the OSCR framework in managing the security 
and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. It was decided to use a case study 
in evaluating the OSCR framework due to the several benefits of using the case 
study such as the rich and in-depth data that can be obtained and the practical 
knowledge and experience of the participants who took part in this evaluation. 
As a case study, we have used two outsourced IT projects. The aim of this case 
study was to assess the ability of the OSCR framework to manage the security 
and compliance risks of IT projects in outsourcing context effectively. It was also 
aimed to discover potential changes and improvements that could enhance the 
OSCR framework performance when outsourcing IT projects. 
According to the case study results, the participants acknowledged that the 
OSCR framework provided them with an effective approach for managing 
security and compliance risks in the outsourcing context. In comparison with 
what they use currently (e.g. ISO2700x, COBIT5, etc.), the OSCR framework was 
better and covered all required security aspects that need to be considered when 
outsourcing. It was understandable, simple and easy to use and independent 
from different constraints such project size, cost, or execution time. 
Based on the evaluation results, the OSCR framework was updated to 
accommodate the case study observations and the participants’ suggestions and 
improvements that are believed to improve the ability of the OSCR framework to 
effectively manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
Finally, we revisited the evaluation criteria that we used in Chapter 3 to 
evaluate the existing ISMS standards and frameworks. The OSCR met all the 
criteria and achieved better management of the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects in comparison with these ISMS standards and 
frameworks.    
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In the following chapter, a summary of this thesis, research contributions, 
limitations, and future work will be provided. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the OSCR framework was evaluated using a case 
study. In this chapter a summary of this thesis, research contributions, 
limitations and future work will be presented. The research findings are provided 
and linked to the research questions to show how each research question has 
been answered. 
8.2 Research Summary 
Outsourcing has been adopted by many organisations as the principal means 
of delivering critical IT services for themselves and their clients. On the one 
hand, outsourcing offers organisations a great deal of benefits such as cost 
reductions, quality improvements and access to the latest technology. On the 
other hand, it brings them different security risks such as confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability risks. 
The lack of a comprehensive methodology that is capable of effectively 
managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects was one of 
the motivations for this research. The main objective of this research was to 
develop a framework for managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects. The main question and two sub-questions asked in this 
research are: 
1- How can we manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT 
projects effectively? 
a. What are strengths and weaknesses of the existing security standards 
and frameworks for managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects? 
b. What are the requirements for managing the security and compliance 
risks of outsourced IT projects? 
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In order to answer the research questions and achieve the research objectives, 
a research methodology was developed and put into practice. According to the 
research methodology, the work started by reviewing the literature related to 
outsourcing (presented in Chapter 2). The aim was to provide background 
information related to outsourcing business practice. Different benefits can be 
offered by outsourcing. Cost reductions, concentration on core business activities, 
flexibility and quality improvement, and minimising routine tasks and 
obsolescence risk, are examples of such benefits. Despite the enormous benefits 
that outsourcing can offer organisations, it might expose organisations to 
different risks such as security risks and contract violations. 
Security risks associated with outsourcing led to the need to review existing 
ISMS standards and frameworks to assess their ability to manage these risks. 
This review represents the second step in the research methodology. For this 
purpose, specific criteria were identified and followed. We proposed five specific 
criteria for this review: security requirements management, risks management, 
consideration of outsourced projects, compliance management, and usability. To 
provide a more precise coverage of the review, each criterion is further 
decomposed into elements. 
As presented in Chapter 3, existing ISMSs standards and frameworks are 
categorised into four themes: information security management, IT governance 
and service management, risk management, and security architecture and 
engineering. Representative examples of ISMSs standards and frameworks were 
provided and reviewed based on the proposed criteria. The review results show 
that existing ISMSs have some limitations with regard to managing security 
risks in the outsourcing context. The lack of comprehensive methodology, low 
usability, generality, and the lack of adequate consideration of outsourced 
projects are examples of these limitations. 
To manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects 
effectively, specific requirements and needs were identified as a result of the 
literature and the ISMSs reviews. The requirements and needs identification 
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represents the third step in the research methodology. As presented in Chapter 4, 
the requirements were aligning security management with project management, 
establishing a comprehensive methodology for managing security requirements, 
managing security risks from different perspectives, managing compliance, 
improving flexibility and usability and enhancing reusability. 
 In response to these requirements and needs, we proposed a framework 
called the OSCR framework (Outsourcing Security and Compliance Risks 
framework) for managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT 
projects, which represents the fourth step in the research methodology. As 
presented in Chapter 5, the framework utilises project phases (initiating, 
planning, execution, monitoring and controlling, and closing) and the PDCA 
model. Each project phase has its own security processes. During the planning, 
execution, and monitoring and controlling phases, the PDCA model is applied. 
The framework uses a hybrid threat classification approach that is designed 
for the outsourcing context, in which environments are less stable and more 
systems are integrated. It combines different threat classification criteria and 
considers threats from different perspectives such as external threats, provider 
threats, client threats, and physical and environmental threats. 
Evaluating the OSCR framework was the last step of the research 
methodology. The OSCR framework was evaluated using two empirical methods. 
The first method, as presented in Chapter 6, was a focus group and a 
questionnaire. The aim of this evaluation was to identify any potential 
weaknesses that the OSCR framework might have, as well as drawing out ideas 
and recommendations from the relevant people involved in outsourcing who could 
contribute to improving the OSCR framework. Valuables ideas and 
recommendations were received from the participants and considered before 
conducting the case study. 
Having considered the ideas and recommendations from the first evaluation 
method and carrying out the required updates, the OSCR framework has been 
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applied to real outsourced IT projects as presented in Chapter 7. It was decided 
to use a case study in order to evaluate the OSCR framework as this had several 
benefits, such as the rich and in-depth data that can be obtained and the 
practical knowledge and experience of the participants who took part in this 
evaluation. The case study allowed us to investigate the ability of the OSCR 
framework to manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects 
effectively in their "real-life" context. 
8.3 Answers to the Research Questions  
In this section, we will discuss the research questions and explain how they 
were answered in this research. Each question will be stated and followed by the 
required explanation. 
1. How can we manage the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT 
projects effectively? 
This question represents the main question of this research. Two sub-
questions were prepared and asked in order to answer the main research 
question as follows. 
a) What are strengths and weaknesses of the existing security standards and 
frameworks for managing the security and compliance risks of outsourced 
IT projects? 
To answer this question, and based on the aim of this research and the 
outcome of the literature review, we proposed five specific criteria for reviewing 
the existing ISMS standards and frameworks as presented in Chapter 3. 
The main weaknesses resulting from the review are summarised as follows: 
• Lack of or weak comprehensive security methodology: this was a limitation 
of the majority of the ISMSs reviewed. They tended to provide only general 
recommendations and gave no detailed instructions for their application. 
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• Lack of or weak consideration of compliance management: the majority of 
the ISMSs reviewed failed to supply guidance on how organisations could 
enforce compliance with security requirements. 
• Usability: the usability issue with a large part of the reviewed ISMSs was 
that in order to implement them effectively, the organisation would need 
access to a large bank of resources. When outsourcing, budget constraints 
and adhering to the project schedule are important, therefore ease of use, 
cost effectiveness, simplicity and time efficiency are paramount.  
• Generality: The suggestions provided by existing ISMSs are general and 
they do not take into account the variety of security requirements that 
exists in different organisations. They lack explanations of how to apply the 
suggestions given, and in which situations they apply. 
• Lack of adequate consideration of outsourced projects: On the whole, ISMSs 
are designed with organisations’ internal processes in mind, not the 
challenges and risks associated with outsourced IT projects. These risks are 
rarely mentioned, and if they are, they are only addressed very generally 
and there are no detailed guidelines on how to deal with them.  
Following the review, the following conclusions were drawn: 
• No one standard or framework is able to satisfy all the required criteria. 
• The ISMSs reviewed in this research were clearly not designed specifically 
for the management of the security and compliance risks of outsourced IT 
projects. Attempting to update them so that they could be applied to this 
type of project would increase their complexity, and consume valuable time 
and resources. 
• The strengths and weaknesses of the different standards and frameworks 
reviewed here differ considerably. For example, OCTAVE is characterised 
by high usability but low security requirements management, and ISO/IEC 
2700x is the opposite, with high security requirements management but 
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low usability. A new proposed framework should build on these strengths 
while aiming to reduce the weaknesses. 
• All of the frameworks and standards reviewed suffered from poor usability. 
b) What are the requirements for managing the security and compliance risks 
of outsourced IT projects? 
As presented in Chapter 4, the following requirements need to be taken into 
consideration when outsourcing in order to manage the security risks of 
outsourcing more effectively: 
• Aligning Security Management with Project Management: this may 
enable separate security risk management, which in turn could 
facilitate greater understanding of security requirements. Resources 
may then be freed for use on other project activities. 
• Managing Security Requirements: the security programme or 
framework employed by an organisation to assess the risks of 
outsourcing projects should comprise a complete and clear 
methodology. Organisations can then confidently identify their 
security requirements, the first step towards managing them. All of 
the factors (e.g. security policy, access list…etc.) that are part of a 
comprehensive security programme or framework should be 
considered. 
• Managing Security Risks: the security programme or framework 
should identify and manage the risks that arise from different 
perspectives (e.g. technical, human…etc.). 
• Managing Compliance: the security programme or framework should 
provide guidelines on effectively enforcing compliance. 
• Improving Usability: the security programme or framework should 
provide high usability from different perspectives (e.g. cost 
effectiveness, time efficiency….etc.). 
  
172 
 
• Supporting Flexibility: The security programme or framework should 
incorporate a degree of flexibility so that any changes that occur can 
be accommodated. 
• Enhancing reusability: Within the same organisation, outsourced IT 
projects may share several common elements, such as environments, 
assets, etc. It is clearly a waste of resources to spend time repeating 
tasks that do not need to be repeated, therefore being able to reuse 
previous threat identification and risk assessment results is a great 
benefit, as it frees up resources for other parts of the project and 
speeds up the process. 
Based on the outcomes of answering the two sub-questions, we have 
developed the OSCR framework for managing the security and compliance risks 
of outsourced IT projects as a response for the main question of the research. As 
presented in Chapter 5, the OSCR framework meets all the requirements that 
have been identified for managing the security and compliance risks of 
outsourced IT projects. 
In comparison with existing ISMS standards and frameworks, the OSCR 
framework has met all the five criteria that were used to evaluate the ISMSs in 
Chapter 3. When considering the first criterion (security requirements 
management), the OSCR framework outperformed the risk management theme 
approaches (e.g. OCTAVE), but did not provide a big improvement compared to 
the other three themes: information security management (e.g. ISO/IEC 2700x 
series), IT governance and service management (e.g. ITIL) and security 
architecture and engineering (e.g. SABSA). Focusing on the second criterion (risk 
management), the OSCR framework is as good as the approaches of the 
information security management, security architecture and engineering themes, 
but provides better performance than the approaches of the IT governance and 
service management, and risk management themes. When looking at the third 
criterion (consideration of outsourced project), the OSCR framework provides 
better performance than the approaches of all the themes. In the fourth criterion 
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(compliance), the OSCR outperforms the approaches of the risk management 
theme. But it performs better than all the approaches of all the themes when 
focusing on the last criterion (usability), except the approaches of the risk 
management theme.  
The research main question (how can we manage the security and compliance 
risks of outsourced IT projects?) is answered by the development of the OSCR 
framework. The evaluation of the OSCR framework assessed the effectiveness of 
the solution (the framework) with regard to its ability to manage the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
8.4 OSCR Framework Evaluation 
The main evaluation methods that we used to evaluate the novelty and the 
ability of the OSCR framework to manage security and compliance risks 
effectively were a focus group, a questionnaire, and a case study. 
The evaluation methods were planned in such a way that they covered 
different aspects of the OSCR framework. The following highlight the aspects 
that were targeted during the evaluation: 
• Evaluating the general architecture of the OSCR framework, including 
the outsourcing threat classification approach, which was designed for 
the outsourcing context. 
• Assessing the ability of the OSCR framework to effectively manage the 
security and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects. 
• Evaluating the OSCR framework’s coverage of security aspects that 
need to be taking into consideration in the outsourcing context. 
• Comparing the OSCR framework with related ISMS standards and 
frameworks. 
• Gathering recommendations from expert people in outsourcing that 
could be used to improve the OSCR framework. 
• Evaluating the achievement of the promising features of the OSCR 
framework (e.g. simplicity, undependability, flexibility). 
  
174 
 
 
1- Focus Group and Questionnaire 
Six focus group workshops were conducted and complemented with an online 
questionnaire. The participants (programme manager, project manager, project 
team member, PMO officer, security specialist, IT architect, or applications 
developer) have relevant experience in outsourced IT projects and related areas 
such as security and applications development. 
As presented in Chapter 6, the evaluation results show that the OSCR 
framework has achieved a high acceptance in the outsourcing context. Several 
features such as flexibility, simplicity and ease of use have been confirmed by the 
participants. It was agreed by the participants that the framework provides a 
comprehensive methodology that is capable of providing organisations with the 
ability to minimise or mitigate security risks in the early stages of project 
execution. It is also acknowledged by the participants that the OSCR framework 
is strengthened by a robust threat classification approach that improves threat 
identification in the outsourcing context. The PDCA model provides a continuous 
improvement process to accommodate the changes and improvements required 
while executing the project. 
The results of this evaluation were used to update the OSCR framework to 
reflect some valuable recommendations from the participants (e.g. compliance 
management, potential security risk mitigations). They were suggested to 
improve the OSCR framework’s ability to manage security and compliance risks 
in a more effective way in the outsourcing context. 
2- Case Study 
As the OSCR framework had been revised and improved based on the 
outcome from the focus group and the questionnaire, as well as publication 
feedback, the framework was put into practice. As a case study, we used two 
outsourced IT projects. The OSCR framework was applied to the two outsourced 
IT projects from the beginning of the projects’ execution until their end. 
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As presented in Chapter 7, the case study results confirmed that the OSCR 
framework provided the participants with an effective approach for managing 
security and compliance risks in the outsourcing context. In comparison with 
what they use currently (e.g. ISO2700x, COBIT5, etc.), the OSCR framework was 
better and covered all the required security aspects that needed to be considered 
when outsourcing. It was understandable, simple and easy to use and 
independent from different constraints such project size, cost, or execution time. 
Finally, the OSCR framework was updated to accommodate the case study 
observations and the participants’ suggestions and improvements. 
8.5 Research Contributions 
The OSCR framework that is to be used for managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects represents the major contribution of 
this research. Also, the review of existing ISMS standards and frameworks 
provides an assessment of these ISMSs in the outsourcing context and identifies 
their strengths and weaknesses. Other contributions include the analysis of 
outsourcing business practice, the threat classification approach, and the 
research publications. The following provides more details about these 
contributions. 
1- The OSCR Framework 
The OSCR framework contributes to the knowledge body as follows: 
• Developing a comprehensive methodology for security and compliance 
risks management in the outsourcing context. 
• Introducing the concept of aligning security management with project 
management. 
• Identifying security processes that need to be used when outsourcing. 
Each phase of the OSCR framework consists of specific processes that 
add value for security and compliance risk management. 
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• Designing an outsourcing threat classification approach that suits the 
outsourcing context, where different parties are involved in the project 
execution. 
• Considering flexibility and continuous improvements by utilising the 
PDCA model. 
• Improving adherence to security requirements. This is essential as 
without it, there is a danger that the security requirements will not be 
fulfilled. 
• Achieving promising features. The evaluators acknowledged several 
useful features of the OSCR framework, for example it was simple and 
easy to use, and they valued its flexibility and reusability. 
2- ISMSs Review 
Existing ISMSs have been reviewed and analysed in this research. The 
review classified existing ISMSs into four themes and identified their 
weaknesses, strengths and main focus. Based on the review outcome, the existing 
ISMSs still have weaknesses that affect their ability to manage the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects effectively. 
3- Outsourcing Analysis 
Outsourcing business practice has been analysed as it was important to 
understand this business practice, its benefits, risks, and so on. This allowed us 
to identify challenges and needs for managing the security and compliance risks 
of outsourced IT projects effectively. The analysis showed that despite the 
enormous benefits that outsourcing could offer organisations; it might expose 
organisations to different security risks such as confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability risks. 
4- Research Publications 
Our aim was to publish the findings from this research at a number of 
relevant conferences. We successfully published six publications on various 
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aspects of the research, including the OSCR framework, the review of ISMSs and 
the outsourcing threat classification approach. 
8.6 Research Limitations 
In spite of the fact that the OSCR framework contributes significantly to 
providing a comprehensive and effective methodology for managing the security 
and compliance risks of outsourced IT projects, there are still some limitations. 
The following highlights them briefly: 
• The case study was limited in terms of the number and type of projects 
due to several constraints (e.g. research time, cost…etc.). 
• The case study (the two projects) was conducted in a single client 
environment. It would have been better to conduct it at different clients 
in order to assess the OSCR framework in different environments and 
with different security practices. This limitation was due to several 
constraints (e.g. client willingness, privacy issues, execution 
time…etc.). 
• The questionnaire was limited in terms of the participants’ numbers. 
This was due to the difficulty of finding experienced candidates in 
security management for outsourced IT projects within the research 
time frame. 
• The OSCR framework does not come with a software tool for 
automating paperwork. Having such a tool would speed up the process 
and allow projects teams to access project data in a more convenient 
way. 
• There were no major security incidents during the case study 
implementation. Although it was not practical to create one, it would 
have been better if we had experienced at least one and been able to 
present the OSCR framework’s ability to handle the security changes 
in response to the security incident using the PDCA model. 
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8.7 Future Work 
Despite the research limitations presented in the previous section, we assert 
that this research has largely achieved its objectives. A comprehensive approach 
(the OSCR framework) was developed for managing security and compliance 
risks in outsourcing. Based on the evaluation results, the OSCR framework 
provides a powerful approach capable of managing the security and compliance 
risks in the outsourcing context. We think that there are still some opportunities 
to improve this work. The following give some directions for these opportunities: 
• The OSCR framework could be initiated with a list of potential 
security and compliance risks that might take place when outsourcing. 
The outsourcing threat classification approach that we developed in 
this research could be used for this purpose. Many security risks are 
common (e.g. DoS) and can take place in different environments. This 
list could reduce the amount of work required for the risk 
identification process. 
• The OSCR framework could be enhanced by a software tool to 
automate the framework processes. This will reduce the paperwork 
time and provide a wider ability to access the project data. 
• The OSCR framework could be evaluated in different environments 
with different clients. More projects that differ in their size, type or 
mission might be used. This will provide more comments and 
recommendations to improve the OSCR framework. 
• The OSCR framework could be evaluated using a simulation of major 
security incidents if a real one is not experienced. 
• The OSCR framework was designed for conventional outsourcing 
contexts. However, we suggest that it could be generalised to other 
outsourcing contexts such as cloud computing and offshoring. More 
study and evaluation need to be conducted to determine the needs and 
challenges for these contexts. 
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 Focus Group and Questionnaire 
Data Confidentiality  
The identity of the participants will be kept anonymous in this research. The 
data collected will be employed solely for improving the OSCR and for 
statistical analysis. The participants’ names will not be mentioned in any of 
the research documents. By signing this consent statement you are indicating 
that you have understood the information supplied to you about participation 
in the research project and you agree to participate. This does not affect your 
legal rights or release the investigators, sponsors, or involved institutions 
from their legal and professional responsibilities. You may decline to answer 
certain items or questions in the focus group or questionnaires. You may 
withdraw from the study at any time without specifying a reason, with no 
penalty. It is important that you continue to feel fully informed about 
participation, therefore if at any time you have any questions you would like 
to ask, or you wish to seek clarification on any points, please contact the 
researcher. 
Consent Statement: 
I have read the above information and I confirm that I am 18-year old or 
above. I consent to participate in this evaluation. 
Participant Name ……………………………………Date: ……………………. 
Participant Signature ……………………………………………………………. 
Framework Units & Phases Evaluation (Questionnaire) 
1- The Initiating Phase Units (Project Unit, Stakeholders Unit, and Potential 
Security Risks Unit) in relation to managing the security and compliance 
risks of outsourced IT projects are: 
O Not useful O Somewhat Useful O Useful O Very useful  
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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2- The Initiating Phase of the OSCR framework (tick where appropriate): 
 covers all required security aspects in this phase. 
 covers most of the required security aspects in this phase. 
 misses required units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 covers unnecessary units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3- The Planning Phase Units (Security Requirements Unit, Assets Unit, 
Threat Classification Unit, Risk Assessment Unit, Security Controls Unit, 
Roles And Responsibilities Unit, Risks Repository Unit, And Security Plans 
Unit) in terms of security risks management of outsourced IT projects are: 
O Not useful O Somewhat Useful O Useful O Very useful  
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4- The Planning Phase of the OSCR framework (tick where appropriate): 
 covers all required security aspects in this phase. 
 covers most of the required security aspects in this phase. 
 misses required units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 covers unnecessary units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5- The Executing Phase Units (Performance Unit, Security Issues Unit, 
Change Requests Unit, And Security Deliverables Unit) in terms of security 
risks management of outsourced IT projects are: 
O Not useful O Somewhat Useful O Useful O Very useful  
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6- The Executing Phase of the OSCR framework (tick where appropriate): 
 covers all required security aspects in this phase. 
 covers most of the required security aspects in this phase. 
 misses required units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 covers unnecessary units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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7- The Monitoring and Controlling Phase Units (Evaluation Unit, Auditing 
Unit, Issue Resolution Unit, Change Approval Unit, And Deliverables 
Approval Unit) in relation to managing security risks in outsourcing 
context are: 
O Not useful O Somewhat Useful O Useful O Very useful  
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
8- The Monitoring and Controlling Phase of the OSCR framework (tick where 
appropriate): 
 covers all required security aspects in this phase. 
 covers most of the required security aspects in this phase. 
 misses required units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 covers unnecessary units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
9- The Closing Phase Units (Auditing Unit, Lessons Learned Unit, And 
Closure Unit) in relation to managing security risks in outsourcing context 
are: 
O Not useful O Somewhat Useful O Useful O Very useful  
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
10- The Closing Phase of the OSCR framework (tick where appropriate): 
 covers all required security aspects in this phase. 
 covers most of the required security aspects in this phase. 
 misses required units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 covers unnecessary units: (please comment) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OSCR Framework Overall Evaluation (Questionnaire) 
1- The main architecture of the OSCR framework is: 
 Understandable. 
 Simple and easy to use. 
 Difficult. 
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 Requires some improvements (please comment): 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2- Utilising project phases in managing security risks of outsourced IT 
projects is: 
O Not useful O Somewhat Useful O Useful O Very useful  
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3- To what extent do you agree with the statement that adopting the Plan-Do-
Check-Act (PDCA) model in managing the security risks of outsourced 
projects improves the framework’s flexibility? 
O Disagree  O Neutral  O Somewhat Agree    O Agree 
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4- Do you agree with the statement that the OSCR framework provides a 
systematic and comprehensive approach for managing the security and 
compliance risks of outsourced IT projects? 
O Disagree  O Neutral  O Somewhat Agree    O Agree 
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5- The proposed threat classification approach provides an effective and 
useful way for identifying security threats in outsourcing contexts. 
O Disagree  O Neutral  O Somewhat Agree    O Agree 
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6- To what extent do you agree that the OSCR framework can be applied to 
any outsourced IT projects regardless of project size, cost, or any other 
constraints? 
O Disagree  O Neutral  O Somewhat Agree    O Agree 
Comments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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 Case Study 
Data Confidentiality 
Confidentiality and participant anonymity will be strictly maintained. All 
information gathered will be used for improving the OSCR and statistical 
analysis only and no names or other identifying characteristics will be stated in 
the final or any other reports. Your signature on consent statement indicates that 
you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation 
in the research project and agree to take part as a participant. In no way does 
this waive you legal rights nor release the investigators, sponsors, or involved 
institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to not 
answer specific items or questions in the focus group or questionnaires. You are 
free to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. Your continued 
participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free 
to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation. If you 
have further questions concerning matters related to this research, please contact 
the researcher. 
Consent Statement 
I hereby confirm that I have read the above information and I am 18-year old 
or above. I consent to participate in this evaluation. 
Participant Name ……………………………………Date: ……………………. 
Participant Signature ……………………………………………………………. 
OSCR Framework Guidelines 
The OSCR framework is designed to manage the security and compliance 
risks of outsourced IT projects effectively. It utilises project phases (Initiating, 
Execution, Monitoring and Controlling, and Closing) and the Plan-Do-Check-Act 
(PDCA) model, as shown in Figure B-1. In the PDCA model, the Plan stage 
involves planning how to deliver the desired outputs of the project that meet the 
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client’s business needs. This stage reflects exactly what the planning phase does 
in the OSCR framework. The Do stage is designed to allow carrying out the plans 
developed in the previous stage. The Execution phase in our framework 
represents this stage of the PDCA model. The Check stage involves evaluating 
performance in the Do stage. The Act stage is used to propose new changes if the 
performance evaluation in the previous stage shows that the plans developed in 
the plan stage will not achieve the desired outputs. Those two stages are 
represented by Monitoring and Controlling Phase in our OSCR framework. 
The OSCR framework also uses a hybrid threat classification approach that is 
designed for the outsourcing context, in which environments are less stable and 
more systems are integrated. The threat classification approach considers threats 
from different perspectives such as external threats, provider threats, client 
threats, and physical and environmental threats. The following sub-sections 
explain the framework phases in more details. 
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Figure 0.1: OSCR Framework 
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Initiating Phase 
The aim of this phase is to establish the project’s unique details, and identify 
major project stakeholders and potential security risks to which the project might 
be exposed, as well as security controls that will be used to mitigate the potential 
security risks. The client is responsible for this phase, as no provider has yet been 
selected. This phase achieves its objectives through the following units: 
• Project Unit 
Designed to handle (create, update) essential project data such as project ID, 
name, code…etc. Please use the following table for this purpose. 
Table B-1: Project Essential Data 
Project ID  Project Code  
Project Name  
Project Type  
Project Start Date  
Project End Date  
Project Duration  
Project Owner  
Project Provider  
Project Manager  
Project Cost  
 
• Stakeholders’ Unit 
The aim of this unit is to identify all project stakeholders and their roles and 
responsibilities in the project. Please use the following table for this purpose. 
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Table B-2: Stakeholders Data 
Project ID  Project Code  
Stakeholders’ Data 
Stakeholder Name Stakeholder Type Stakeholder Role 
   
   
   
• Potential Security Risks Unit 
The aim of this unit is to identify potential security risks that might take 
place while executing the project. This allows decision makers to take the right 
decision about whether to outsource or not. Please use the following table for this 
purpose. 
Table B-3: Potential Security Risks 
Project ID  Project Code  
Potential Security Risks 
RISK ID Risk Description  
1  
2  
3  
• Security Mitigations Unit 
Designed to propose and implement security controls (countermeasures) that 
will be used to mitigate the potential security risks. Please use the following 
table for this purpose. 
Table B-4: Security Countermeasures 
Project ID  Project Code  
Risk ID Countermeasure Type Security Countermeasures  
R1   
R2   
R3   
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Planning Phase 
The planning phase is the core part of this framework. It corresponds to the 
plan stage of the PDCA model. The planning phase aims are achieved in units as 
follows: 
• Security Requirements Unit 
The project security requirements are documented and signed off by the client 
and the provider through this unit. Please use the following table for this 
purpose. 
Table B-5: Security Requirements 
Project ID  Project Code  
Security Requirements 
Requirement ID Requirement Description 
RQ-1  
RQ-2  
RQ-3  
• Assets Unit 
All project assets are identified and categorised (hardware, software, 
information, network, or human) through this unit. It answers the question about 
what should be protected. If the project affects any organisation’s assets, then 
they should be identified and categorised as well. Please use the following table 
for this purpose. 
Table B-6: Project Assets 
Project ID  Project Code  
Project Assets 
Asset Type Asset ID Asset description 
Hardware     
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Project ID  Project Code  
Project Assets 
Asset Type Asset ID Asset description 
Software     
Network     
Information      
• Threat Classification Unit 
A hybrid threat classification approach is designed to be capable of 
identifying the wide range of potential security threats that might occur during 
the project execution. In another words, it identifies what to protect from. This 
threat classification approach uses six criteria: 
 Threat Source: it represents the origin of the threat, which can be 
external threats, client threats, provider threats, or environmental and 
physical threats. 
 Threat agent: the agent that causes the threat. This can be technical, 
human, or organisational. 
 Asset type: the type of the asset impacted by this threat, such as 
networks, software, hardware, information. 
 Threat intention: the type of human behaviour that caused the threat. 
It can be accidental or intentional. 
 Environmental and physical threat type: the type of environmental and 
physical threat. It can be controlled or uncontrolled. 
 Threat impact: the result of the threat when it occurs. This can be any 
breach in confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 
Please use the following tables for this purpose. 
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Table B-7: External Threats 
Project ID  Project Code  
External Threats Impact 
 
Software:   
C-I-A 
   
Hardware:  
   
Network:  
  
 Information:  
   
Human Accidental:  
   
Intentional:  
   
Table B-8: Provider Threats 
Project ID  Project Code  
Provider threats Impact 
Technical     
C-I-A 
Software:   
   
Hardware:  
   
Network:  
   
Information:  
   
Human Accidental:  
   
Intentional:  
   
Organisational    
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Table B-9: Client Threats 
Project ID  Project Code  
Client threats Impact 
 
Software:   
C-I-A 
   
Hardware:  
   
Network:  
   
Information:  
   
Human Accidental:  
   
Intentional:  
   
Organisational    
Table B-10: Environmental & Physical Threats 
Project ID  Project Code  
Environmental & Physical Threats Impact 
Controlled: 
 
C-I-A 
 
 
Non-Controlled: 
 
 
  
• Risk Assessment Unit 
The ultimate aim of this unit is to estimate and prioritise the impact of the 
potential security risk on project assets. The risk assessment unit has five steps: 
vulnerabilities identification, risk likelihood determination, risk magnitude 
determination, risk estimation, and risk prioritisation. 
These five steps are described as follows: 
 Vulnerabilities identification: it is essential to identify all 
vulnerabilities that might be used by threat sources identified in the 
previous section to calculate risks exposure. 
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 Risk likelihood determination: the OSCR framework utilises NIST SP 
800-30 (Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments)[19], and divides the 
likelihood of the risk into five number ranges (0-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 
and 81-100). These ranges represent five level values (very low, low, 
moderate, high, and very high) respectively. Table B-11 shows the 
threat likelihoods values and their description for the OSCR 
framework. 
Table B-11: Threat likelihoods 
Qualitative 
Values 
Semi-
Quantitative 
Values % 
Description  
Very High 81-100 
Almost certain that threat will be initiated by 
threat sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
High 61-80 
High likely that threat will be initiated by 
threat sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
Moderate 41-60 
Somewhat likely that threat will be initiated 
by threat sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
Low 21-40 
Unlikely that threat will be initiated by threat 
sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
Very Low 0-20 
High unlikely that threat will be initiated by 
threat sources (external, provider, client, or 
environmental and physical threats). 
 Risk magnitude determination: In a similar way to the risk likelihood 
categories, the magnitude or impact of the risk is divided into five 
number categories (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), which represent five level values 
(minor, moderate, major, critical, and severe) respectively. Table B-12 
shows the threat impact values and their description for the OSCR 
framework. 
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Table B-12: Threat Impacts (magnitudes) 
 
 Risk estimation: In the OSCR framework, we will use a semi-
quantitative method to estimate the security risks of outsourced IT 
projects as shown in Table B-11 and Table B-12. This will allow 
decision makers to understand risk assessment results easily and also 
help risk assessors to assess risks more accurately and to interpret 
them to an understood value (e.g. 80 interpreted to high) We will also 
use the ordinary risk exposure (RE) equation, which has been used in 
many risk assessment analyses for risk estimation. In the RE equation, 
the risk exposure is the result of the likelihood multiplied by the 
magnitude or the impact of the risk. The RE equation is used as 
follows: 
RE = likelihood * magnitude 
Following the above guidance and explanation, security risks can be 
estimated easily using the risk exposure equation. Please use the following table 
for this purpose. 
 
 
Qualitative 
Values 
Semi-
Quantitative 
Values 
Description  
Severe 5 Multiple severe or catastrophic impacts on the project, or organisation assets if the threat occurs. 
critical 4 Severe or catastrophic impact on the project, or organisation assets if the threat occurs. 
Major 3 Serious impact on the project, or organisation assets if the threat occurs. 
Moderate 2 Limited impact on the project, or organisation assets if the threat occurs. 
Minor 1 Negligible impact on the project, or organisation assets if the threat occurs. 
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Table B-13: Risk Estimation 
Project ID 
 
Project Code  
Risk ID  
Asset Type  
Asset ID  
Asset Name  
Threat   
Threat Source  
Vulnerability   
Risk Likelihood  
Magnitude   
Risk Exposure  
 Risk prioritisation: the last step in this unit but not the least is 
intended to prioritise the risks estimated in the previous step. The aim 
of this step is to allow project teams to concentrate first on risks that 
impose higher impacts on confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
project assets. Please use the following table for this purpose. 
Table B-14: Risk Prioritisation 
Project ID  Project Code  
Risk ID Threat Source Risk Description RE 
R1    
R2    
R3    
• Security Controls Unit 
Through this unit, security controls or countermeasures that can mitigate 
identified security risks are selected. Countermeasures determine how to protect 
project or organisation assets. Countermeasures are categorised in this 
framework into technical, human, or organisational. Please use the following 
table for this purpose. 
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Table B-15: Security Countermeasures 
Project ID  Project Code  
Risk ID Countermeasure Type Security Countermeasures  
R1   
R2   
R3   
• Compliance Requirements Unit 
Designed to identify compliance requirements that will be audited by the 
project steering committee. 
• Roles and Responsibilities Unit 
The aim of this unit is to assign security activities to project teams using a 
clear method that helps prevent any ambiguities between the project teams. We 
use a role-based and name-based version of the responsible, accountable, consult, 
and inform method (RACI) for assigning the roles and responsibilities of project 
security activities. Please use the following table or a similar one for this 
purpose. 
 
Table B-16: Roles and Responsibilities 
Project ID 1 Project Code API/PNR 
Security Activity Project Owner 
Project 
Manager 
Business 
Analyst 
Security 
Architect 
Development 
Team 
Security 
requirements       
Project assets      
Threat classification      
• Risk Repository Unit 
This unit contains all of the thus-far identified project security risks. Any risk 
that has been logged into the risk repository unit should have sufficient 
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information about the risk such as risk ID, description, impact, asset name, and 
so on. Please use the following table for this purpose. 
Table B-17: Risk Repository Entry 
Project ID  Project Code  
Risk ID  
Asset Type  
Asset ID  
Asset Name  
Threat   
Threat Source  
Vulnerability   
Risk Likelihood  
Magnitude   
Risk Exposure  
Risk Description  
Impact on Security  
Security Controls  
• Security Plans Unit 
This unit is responsible for developing security plans that will be used to 
achieve the project’s security goals and contribute to building a secure and 
protected environment such as an incident management plan, business 
continuity management plan, and so on. 
Executing Phase 
This phase, which represents the Do stage of the PDCA model, achieves its 
objectives through the following units: 
• Performance Unit 
Prepare and submit security performance reports. These reports are reviewed 
and signed off by the project steering committee in the next phase. 
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• Security Issues Unit 
Record any security issues that might be experienced during the project’s 
execution. 
• Change Requests Unit 
If there is any need to change any security plan or control, the change is 
raised through this unit. 
• Security Deliverables Unit 
Ensure that security deliverables are submitted on time to avoid any delay, 
which might lead to penalties. 
Monitoring and Controlling Phase 
This phase, which represents the Check and Act stages of the PDCA model, 
achieves its objectives through the following units: 
• Evaluation Unit 
The security performance reports are reviewed and assessed. Based on this 
review, the project steering committee may propose improvements that help to 
achieve the project’s security goals in an effective and efficient way. If the 
performance is good and there is no need for any improvement, then the steering 
committee signs off the existing performance reports. 
• Compliance Auditing Unit 
This unit is designed to enforce compliance with the compliance requirements 
to reduce any security violations. 
• Issues Resolution Unit 
Security issues that might be experienced during the project execution are 
resolved. Security issues resolution might be beyond the ability of the project 
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manager, and therefore intervention by the project steering committee might 
help in their resolution. 
• Change Approval Unit 
The project steering committee analyses security changes and assesses their 
potential impact on different aspects such as the project budget and schedule. If 
these changes can be tolerated by both parties, then they approve them. 
• Deliverables Approval Unit 
The security deliverables that have been achieved so far are reviewed and 
approved, or rejected. 
Closing Phase 
This phase achieves its objectives through the following units: 
• Compliance Acceptance Unit 
Designed to accept or reject the project’s compliance with the requirements 
identified in the planning phase based on the assessment of the compliance 
carried out by the project steering committee in the Monitoring and Controlling 
phase. 
• Lessons Learned Unit 
Document all security lessons learned for future use. 
• Closure Unit 
Issue the provider with the project closure certificate and officially close the 
project. 
OSCR Framework Evaluation and Improvements 
Having applied the framework to your outsourced IT project, please provide 
us with your feedback by answering the following questions: 
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1- What is the current security framework or standard that you use for 
managing security risks for outsourcing? 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2- In comparison with the current security or framework that you use, how do 
you rate the OSCR framework? 
 Provides better management for security risks of outsourced IT projects 
in all phases. 
 Provides better management for security risks in some phases. (Please 
comment): --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Same as the current security framework or standard that you use. 
 Provides lower management for security risks of outsourced IT projects. 
3- What are the issues that you think exist in the OSCR framework? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
4- What improvements could be made to the OSCR framework in order to 
increase its ability to manage the security risks of outsourcing more 
effectively? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
